Selection, Trade, and Employment: The Strategic Use of Subsidies

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Abstract: We study how the interaction between economic openness and competitive selection affects the effectiveness of employment and entry subsidisation. Within a heterogeneous-firms model with endogenous labour supply, optimal employment subsidies are shown to have pro- or anti-competitive effects on industry selection depending on whether the economy is open or not. Selection effects resulting from international competition and fiscal externalities imply that non-cooperative policies may entail under-subsidisation of employment. Entry subsidies always have pro-competitive selection effects on the industry, but are shown to be less effective in raising employment and welfare than employment subsidies.

JEL classification: E61, F12, F42

Keywords: optimal policy, employment subsidies, competitive selection, international trade

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1. Introduction

In recent years, welfare state reforms have tended to be characterised by a shift in emphasis from the use of passive labour market policies to that of active labour market policies (ALMPs) which are central to the “European Employment Strategy” to address structural unemployment and to increase labour participation rates. ALMPs are often combined with reductions in employment protection within the flexicurity model and consist of interventions aimed at reducing search frictions (e.g. public employment services) and increasing employability (e.g. training schemes), but also encompass direct job creation measures such as wage and employment subsidies. This type of subsidies accounted on average for about 25% of total ALMPs in the OECD in 2003 and their use intensified during the Great Recession – see e.g. the Kurzarbeitergeld in Germany (OECD, 2009), and the increase in the use of the Employment Adjustment Subsidy Programme in Japan (Kluve, 2010) – and were endorsed by the International Labour Organisation and the International Monetary Fund (see, e.g. ILO-IMF, 2010; and IMF, 2013). In addition, whilst they have often been introduced to support specific types of workers (such as the young or the long-term unemployed), they have increasingly been perceived as a means to accelerate job recovery, and demands for targeting them towards specific types of firms (as opposed to types of workers) and/or sectors have abounded.¹

The literature on the assessment of the effectiveness of ALMPs typically adopts partial equilibrium approaches in which the focus is placed on microeconomic incentives (for individual workers, e.g. in seeking work, and for individual firms, e.g. in hiring). These policies, however, have implications that go beyond individual agents’ behaviour and affect aggregate performance via aggregation effects that start from the industry level. In addition to being influenced by the extent of international openness, these effects also work through complex channels that are shaped by competitive selection forces within industries – which thus turn out to be an important determinant of the aggregate general equilibrium impact of policy. The fact that exposure to international competition enhances competitive selection within industries and the role of the latter in determining aggregate productivity are now acknowledged by policy makers, with increasing awareness that “productivity growth requires constant reallocation of resources ... from less to more efficient produces” (Blanchard et al., 2014).

In this paper we aim to investigate how the interaction between economic openness and competitive selection shapes the effectiveness of employment subsidies and governments’ incentives in adopting them. Within an imperfectly competitive framework characterised by firm heterogeneity – which, in the presence of free-entry and exit, results in the endogenous

¹ For instance, Marzinotto et al. (2011) suggest that unused EU structural funds could be used to target wage subsidies to promote job creation in the exportable sector as a means to reducing external debt burdens. In a similar vein, the Irish Exporter Association argued that “the [2009] Employment Subsidy Scheme Second Round is too little” and that “spreading the [use of the] Employment Subsidy Fund will inevitably dilute ... [its] impact ... to support ... exports, ... key route to balancing the Exchequer and driving the economy out of recession” http://www.irishexporters.ie/section/TheEmploymentSubsidySchemeSecondRoundistoolittle.
determination of the marginal and average productivity of the industry – we ask whether employment subsidies can help achieve the type of reallocations that can lead to higher aggregate productivity and employment, and how their effectiveness is affected by international policy spill-overs.

From a theoretical perspective, an employment subsidy can be justified if it corrects distortions that render the market equilibrium suboptimal. As is well understood since the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), in a one-sector-CES world the market solution corresponds to the first best. Dhingra and Morrow (2015) show that this result is not altered by cost heterogeneity, i.e. how the market allocates resources across firms does not matter and the optimal policy continues to be *laissez faire*. However, as in the homogenous firm case of Dixit and Stiglitz, as long as the utility function also includes another good (or leisure) and provided that there is direct substitutatbility between goods and the corresponding price mark-ups differ, the monopolistic distortion leads to inefficient market allocations that can be corrected by policy. As we show in this paper, the extent to which a tax-and-subsidy policy corrects the distortion depends on the degree of productivity heterogeneity among firms producing varieties of the differentiated good.

We assume that, in addition to the differentiated good, the representative consumer’s utility is defined over both leisure and a homogeneous good. The endogeneity of labour supply is important, given our aim to examine the impact on the level of employment (and welfare) of subsidising firms’ wage bill. However, in order to obtain a ‘conventional’ labour supply function, whereby supply responds to the real wage by a constant elasticity, we choose to include the disutility of work in the utility function additively. Hence, the source of distortion arising from the lack of mark-up synchronisation in the model stems from the existence of the homogeneous good which we assume to be a direct substitute in consumption for the differentiated good. The presence of the homogeneous good, in turn, allows us to capture the effects of policy on inter-sectoral reallocations and trade patterns. Our tax-and-subsidy policy is applied to the differentiated sector only. This reflects the fact that the policy maker would find it optimal to target subsidisation to the source of the distortion, but it can be shown that subsidising employment in both sectors would not affect the main qualitative role of the policy. In addition, with a sector ally targeted policy, the presence of the homogeneous good also allows for the possibility that employment in each sector might adjusts such that total employment remains constant rendering the policy ineffective.

We show that optimal employment subsidies exist that raise the level of employment and welfare. Whilst this is not per se surprising in light of the mark-up distortion, the analysis provides interesting, and at times counterintuitive, insights into the nature of the adjustments effected by government intervention. The subsidy does not only affect aggregate employment directly, but also via changes in aggregate productivity that result from reallocation effects across countries, sectors, and firms within sectors. Ultimately, by subsidising employment, the government controls the selectivity of competition in the monopolistic industry and contributes
to correcting the market distortion that results in an under-consumption of the differentiated good. We show that the size of the optimal subsidy and the extent to which it addresses the market distortion falls with the degree of heterogeneity of firms. In the limit, when firms are homogeneous, the optimal subsidy eliminates the mark-up margin. Crucially, international openness alters the nature of the effects of the policy on selection and aggregate productivity. Whilst in autarky the optimal employment subsidy, by softening competition, has anti-competitive effects on the economy, in the open economy it has pro-competitive effects and results in a higher average productivity of firms. International spill overs, consisting of selection and fiscal externalities, lead to non-cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria that are characterised by positive subsidies. We show that whether the non-cooperative solutions entail levels of subsidisation that are higher or lower than those corresponding to the cooperative outcome hinges on the nature of the externality between countries. The latter, in turn, depends on how the subsidy is targeted within the sector.

Reforms of product markets – particularly aimed at facilitating entry – are considered as an effective means of increasing aggregate productivity and employment (see, e.g., Blanchard et al., 2014). We thus compare the effects of employment subsidy to those of an entry subsidy. Our analysis reveals that whilst an entry subsidy always has pro-competitive selection effects on the industry, it is less effective in raising employment and welfare than an employment subsidy. This is due to the fact that the latter enables the government to tackle the monopolistic distortion more directly.

Dating back to the pioneering works of Pigou (1933) and Caldor (1936), an extensive literature has examined the impact of employment subsidies and the taxation required to finance them. A significant strand of this literature, however, does not rely on general equilibrium frameworks characterised by imperfectly competitive goods markets, and/or limits the analysis to closed economy settings. An exception is Molana et al. (2012) who study the role of employment subsidies as fiscal stimuli in an open economy. However, their paper does not allow for heterogeneity across firms and hence cannot account for the role of competitive selection in determining these effects. Our research is also related to a strand of the literature that highlights the impact of intra-industry reallocations on aggregate performance. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) find that the size composition of industries interacts with trade

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3 In a closed economy macroeconomic model à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Fleurbaey (1998) shows that employment subsidies financed by profit taxation take the economy closer to the Walrasian equilibrium. Bettendorf and Heijdra (2004) analyse the use of production subsidies (in the presence of import tariffs) but their analysis is limited to the case of a small open economy and abstracts from distortionary taxes on labour income. Bilbiie et al. (2008) have studied the effectiveness of labour, sales and other subsidies as counter-cyclical stabilisation policy tools within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, but do not allow for intra-industry selection effects.
openness in determining aggregate output volatility. Several studies document how misallocations across heterogeneous production units can affect aggregate productivity and the transmission of shocks (e.g., Baily et al., 1992; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2010). Of particular interest is the fact that different firms exhibit different cyclical patterns of net job creation (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012; Elsby and Michaels, 2013). These papers, however, do not consider the interaction between competitive selection on the one hand, and labour market policies aimed at increasing employment and trade openness on the other. Another strand of the literature to which our work is related concerns the effects of policy on competitive selection. Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2009) focus on the effects of trade policy in a small open economy, whilst Felbermayr et al. (2013) consider non-cooperative tariff policies within a two-country setting. Contrary to our model, both of these papers assume a one sector economy and an exogenous labour supply, and their focus is not on employment creation policies. Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) develop a two-country model to analyse strategic interaction between governments in setting entry subsidies financed via lump-sum taxation.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the closed economy case, Section 3 extends the model to a two-country setting and Section 4 analyses the strategic subsidy games between governments. In Section 5 we examine the role of trade liberalisation and productivity shocks and in Section 6 we compare the impact of employment and entry subsidies. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Closed economy

Consider an economy consisting of two sectors, one imperfectly and one perfectly competitive, respectively producing a horizontally differentiated good and a homogeneous commodity. Labour supply is endogenous and government employment subsidies to the monopolistic sector are financed via proportional income taxation.

2.1. Demand and technology

The population of consumers is characterised by a representative household with $N$ identical members that are either employed or unemployed. We assume that an employed worker is required (by legislation) to supply a fixed number of work hours (which is normalised to unity), a fraction $h$ of household members are employed, and the total household income is equally shared amongst its members (unemployed members are ‘insured’ in this sense even if there is

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4 In a recent paper, Haaland and Venables (2016) derive optimal domestic sales subsidies, import tariffs and export subsidies in a two sector model of a small open economy. By allowing for labour supply in the monopolistic sector to be flexible or fixed, their model generalises the results obtained using special cases in the literature. Costinot et al. (2016) examine optimal trade policy in a two country setting and show that firm heterogeneity reduces the optimal level of trade protection. They also show that whilst it is optimal to impose uniform domestic and export taxes across domestic firms, optimal import taxes vary with foreign exporters’ productivity.
no unemployment benefit per se; see e.g., Andolfatto, 1996; Merz, 1995). The corresponding utility function and the budget constraint, written at the household level, are

\[
U = \left( \frac{A}{1-\beta} \right)^{1-\beta} \left( \frac{Y}{\beta} \right) - \frac{\theta N h^{1+\delta}}{1+\delta}, \quad 0 < \beta < 1, \delta > 0, \theta > 0, N > 0 ,
\]

(1)

\[
P_A A + P_Y Y = N (1-t) wh ,
\]

(2)

where \(A\) and \(P_A\) are quantity consumed and price of the homogenous commodity, \(Y\) and \(P_Y\) are the quantity consumed and price of the differentiated good, \(w\) is the wage rate, and \(t\) is the proportional income tax rate.\(^5\) Choosing \(A\), \(Y\) and \(h\) to maximise (1) subject to (2) yields the demand functions for the two goods and the aggregate labour supply function, which are respectively given by

\[
A = \frac{(1-\beta)(1-t)wL'}{P_A}, \quad Y = \frac{\beta(1-t)wL'}{P_Y} \quad \text{and} \quad L' = Nh = N \left( \frac{(1-t)w}{\theta P} \right)^{1/\delta},
\]

(3)

where \(P = P_{A}^{1-\beta} P_{Y}^\rho\) is the consumer price index. \(Y\) is assumed to be a CES bundle of differentiated varieties with ‘dual’ price index \(P_Y\), respectively given by

\[
Y = \left( \int_{i \in M} (y(i))^{1/\sigma} \right)^{1/1-\sigma} \quad \text{and} \quad P_Y = \left( \int_{i \in M} (p(i))^{1-\sigma} \right)^{1/\sigma},
\]

(4)

where \(M\) is the set of available varieties, \(y(i)\) and \(p(i)\) are the quantity consumed and the price of variety \(i\) respectively, and \(\sigma>1\) is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties. The demand for each variety is then

\[
y(i) = Y \left( \frac{p(i)}{P_Y} \right)^{-\sigma}, \quad i \in M .
\]

(5)

The homogenous good is produced under perfectly competitive conditions using a constant returns to scale technology with a unit labour requirement of one, i.e. \(L_A = A^\rho\), where \(L_A\) and \(A^\rho\) denote the labour demand and the quantity supplied by this sector, respectively. Given the assumed technology, the zero-profit condition and free mobility of labour across the two sectors imply \(w = P_A\). We use this good as the numeraire and normalise \(P_A = 1\), which in turn implies \(w = 1\) and \(P = P_Y^\rho\).

\(^5\) The additivity of leisure in the utility function ensures that labour supply responds to the real wage by a constant elasticity, as in “conventional” labour supply functions. We concentrate on proportional income taxation since it accounts for the bulk of tax revenue from the personal sector in advanced industrial economies, but the use of a lump-sum taxation instead would not alter the qualitative nature of the results.
In the differentiated good sector, each firm employs labour as the only input to produce one variety of the good using a linear technology with increasing returns to scale. Dropping the variety indicator \( i \) and distinguishing firms by their productivity parameter \( \varphi \in [1, \infty) \), the labour requirement to produce and market a quantity \( y \) of the good is
\[
l(\varphi) = \alpha + \frac{y(\varphi)}{\varphi},
\]
where \( \alpha \) is the fixed labour requirement. Since with CES preferences firms’ mark-up, and hence the monopolistic distortion addressed by the subsidy, does not depend on their productivity, we assume that the government sets a uniform subsidy rate \( s \in [0,1) \) common to all firms in the industry.\(^6\) Thus a firm’s profit is
\[
\pi(\varphi) = p(\varphi) y(\varphi) - (1-s)l(\varphi).
\]
Profit maximisation under standard monopolistically competitive assumptions then yields the familiar mark-up rule:
\[
p(\varphi) = \frac{\sigma(1-s)}{(\sigma-1)\varphi}.
\]
Given this, and revenue \( r(\varphi) = p(\varphi) y(\varphi) \), profits are:
\[
\pi(\varphi) = r(\varphi) / (\sigma - 1 - s)\alpha.
\]

As in Melitz (2003), before they can set up and start producing, a large pool \( F \) of identical potential entrants each pay a fixed entry sunk cost \( f \), measured in terms of the numeraire good,\(^7\) that enables them to draw a productivity parameter \( \varphi \) from a common population with a known p.d.f. \( g(\varphi) \), defined over \( \varphi \in [1, \infty) \) with a continuous cumulative distribution \( G(\varphi) \). A firm’s survival in the market will depend on the magnitude of its \( \varphi \) in relation to the threshold \( \varphi_c \), which satisfies \( \pi(\varphi_c) = 0 \) and defines the marginal firms; firms with \( \varphi \in [1, \varphi_c) \) will not enter since they would make a loss, while those with \( \varphi \in [\varphi_c, \infty) \) will make non-negative profits. Prior to entry, therefore, it is known that a fraction \( G(\varphi_c) \) of \( F \) will be unsuccessful, while a fraction \( M \equiv (1 - G(\varphi_c)) F \) will succeed and start production. Thus, ex-post, \( M \) is the mass of varieties available to consumers. We can therefore redefine the p.d.f. of the surviving firms over \( \varphi \in [\varphi_c, \infty) \) by
\[
\mu(\varphi) = \frac{g(\varphi)}{1 - G(\varphi_c)},
\]
which can then be used to obtain – see Melitz (2003) for details – a measure of the aggregate productivity of the industry as the weighted average of operating firms’ productivity levels \( \varphi \in [\varphi_c, \infty) \),
\[
\bar{\varphi} = \left( \int_{\varphi_c}^{\infty} \varphi^{\sigma-1} \mu(\varphi) d\varphi \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}.
\]
Using \( p(\bar{\varphi}) / p(\varphi_c) = \varphi_c / \bar{\varphi} \), \( y(\bar{\varphi}) / y(\varphi_c) = (\bar{\varphi} / \varphi_c)^\sigma \) and \( r(\varphi) = p(\varphi) y(\varphi) \), we obtain

\(^6\) With firm-specific market power, first-best policies depend on firms’ productivity – see, e.g., Leahy and Montagna (2001) and Nocco et al. (2014).

\(^7\) It can be easily verified that setting the entry cost is in terms of labour does not alter these results.
\[
\frac{r(\tilde{\phi})}{r(\varphi_c)} = \left( \frac{\tilde{\phi}}{\varphi_c} \right)^{\sigma-1} \Rightarrow r(\tilde{\phi}) = \alpha \sigma (1-s) \left( \frac{\tilde{\phi}}{\varphi_c} \right)^{\sigma-1}.
\] (7)

All the relevant variables can then be written in terms of \( \varphi_c \) and \( \tilde{\phi} \). In particular, the industry price level, profits and labour demand are respectively given by

\[
P_y = M^{1/(1-\sigma)} \frac{\sigma (1-s)}{(\sigma-1)\tilde{\phi}^*},
\] (8)

\[
\pi(\tilde{\phi}) = \alpha (1-s) \left[ \left( \frac{\tilde{\phi}}{\varphi_c} \right)^{\sigma-1} -1 \right],
\] (9)

\[
l(\tilde{\phi}) = \alpha \left( \sigma -1 \right) \left( \frac{\tilde{\phi}}{\varphi_c} \right)^{\sigma-1} + 1.
\] (10)

Finally, the indirect per capita utility can be written as

\[
u = \frac{U}{N} = \theta \frac{\delta h^{1+\delta}}{1+\delta},
\] (11)

which is obtained by substituting (3) in (1) and shows, as expected, that in the absence of income from any other sources except labour the utility from consumption dominates the disutility from work making \( u \) monotonically increasing in \( h \). Thus, maximising \( u \) is equivalent to maximising \( h \).

2.2. General equilibrium and policy analysis

Entry continues until the expected net entry profit is zero, which implies

\[
M \pi(\tilde{\phi}) - Ff = 0.
\] (12)

The aggregate market clearing conditions for the labour, differentiated good and homogeneous good markets are, respectively,

\[
L_d + Ml(\tilde{\phi}) = L^*,
\] (13)

\[
Mr(\tilde{\phi}) = \beta (1-t) L^*,
\] (14)

\[
A + fF = A^*,
\] (15)

where \( A = (1-\beta)(1-t)L^* \), and \( A^* = L_d \).

Finally, the government budget constraint is
\( s Ml(\tilde{\phi}) = tL'. \) (16)

The above equations complete the model, which consists of 14 equations and 14 unknowns: \( F, M, L', L, l(\tilde{\phi}), A, A', P_r, r(\tilde{\phi}), \gamma(\tilde{\phi}), \pi(\tilde{\phi}), \tilde{\phi}, \phi_c \) and either the tax rate \( t \) or the subsidy rate \( s \). In order to obtain explicit solutions, we adopt the Pareto distribution and let

\[
G(\phi) = 1 - \phi^{-\gamma} \quad \text{and} \quad g(\phi) = \gamma \phi^{-(1+\gamma)}, \quad \phi \in [1, \infty),
\]
(17)

where the shape parameter \( \gamma > \sigma - 1 \) provides an inverse measure of dispersion. Then, \( 1 - G(\phi_c) = \phi_c^{-\gamma} \) and (6) imply

\[
\tilde{\phi}_c^{\sigma-1} = \left(\frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma}\right) \phi_c^{-\sigma}. \quad (18)
\]

Making use of (18) and (9), we rewrite (12) as

\[
M \alpha (1-s) \left(\frac{\sigma - 1}{1 + \gamma - \sigma}\right) - Ff = 0. \quad (19)
\]

Given (17), \( M = (1 - G(\phi_c)) F \) implies \( M = \phi_c^{-\gamma} F \) which can then be substituted into (19) to obtain the equilibrium value of the productivity cut-off,

\[
\phi_c = \left(\frac{\alpha (\sigma - 1)(1-s)}{f (1 + \gamma - \sigma)}\right)^{1/\gamma}. \quad (20)
\]

As is clear from (20), \( \frac{\partial \phi_c}{\partial \gamma} < 0 \): the minimum productivity required to survive in equilibrium is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity between firms. Moreover, \( \frac{\partial \phi_c}{\partial s} < 0 \): a higher subsidy softens competition, making it easier to survive in equilibrium.

For a given \( s \), and treating \( t \) as endogenous, the model can be solved to express all endogenous variables in terms of \( s \) (see the online Appendix for details). The corresponding equilibrium tax rate is given by

\[
t = \frac{\beta (1 + \gamma \sigma - \sigma) s}{\beta (1 + \gamma \sigma - \sigma) s + \gamma \sigma (1-s)} < s. \quad (21)
\]

The indirect utility function in (11) is monotonically increasing in \( h \) which, from (3), is in turn given by \( h = \left(\frac{1-t}{\partial P_r^{\beta}}\right)^{1/\delta} \). Thus, the subsidy affects welfare through its impact on the tax
rate $t$ and on the CES price index $P_y$; $s$ affects the latter directly as well as indirectly via its impact on the mass of varieties $M$ and the average industry productivity $\bar{\phi}$ – see (8). Using (21) and the solution for $P_y$ to evaluate $h$, we obtain the solution $h(s)$ which can be shown to be strictly concave in $s$. Therefore, given that $\frac{\partial \bar{\phi}}{\partial s} < 0$ also holds, it is welfare-improving to subsidise employment and to soften competitive selection in the monopolistic sector. Furthermore, $h(s)$ reaches a unique maximum at

$$s^{opt} = \frac{(1-\beta)}{(1-\beta)\sigma + \frac{\beta(\sigma-1)}{\gamma}} > 0.$$  

Since $\frac{ds^{opt}}{d\gamma} > 0$, the lower is the degree of productivity heterogeneity between firms, the larger is the optimal subsidy – which reflects the fact that at higher values of $\gamma$ the subsidy has a lower marginal effect. Consistently, by substituting (22) into (20), it can be easily verified that $\frac{\partial \varphi^{opt}}{\partial \gamma} < 0$, i.e. the optimal value of the productivity cut-off is lower (and so is the optimal average productivity in the industry) the more homogeneous are firms.

Two considerations are in order to qualify these results. First, as discussed in the introduction, the distortion underpinning the optimality of intervention rests on the existence of an outside good as a direct substitute for the differentiated good, and on a discrepancy in mark-up pricing between the two production sectors that results in a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation between the outside good and the differentiated good. In this situation, the market outcome is characterised by a sub-optimal level of consumption of the differentiated product and an excessive consumption of the homogenous (outside) good. In contributing to correct this distortion, the subsidy reduces the share of employment in the homogenous good sector. This point is well understood since Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and is not altered by the existence of intra-industry heterogeneity (Dhingra and Morrow, 2015). In addition, note that the homogenous firms case can be obtained in our model by letting $\gamma \to \infty$, which implies that all firms draw the same productivity level with probability one. As is clear from equation (20), $\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} \varphi^{opt}_y = 1$. Given the firm’s optimal price rule, $p(\varphi) = \frac{\sigma(1-w)}{(\sigma-1)\varphi}$, this implies that when firms are homogenous $p(\varphi^{opt}_{y \to \infty}) = w$ holds. More fundamentally, from equation (22), $\lim_{\gamma \to \infty} s^{opt} = \frac{1}{\sigma}$; thus, with homogenous productivities, the optimal subsidy eliminates the mark-up margin $\sigma/(\sigma-1)$ and fully corrects
the monopolistic distortion. More generally, the extent to which the subsidy addresses this distortion is directly related to the size of $\gamma$, i.e. it increases in the degree of homogeneity of firms.

Finally, it can be shown that a higher value of $\gamma$ is associated with a lower mass of firms and a lower aggregate employment. In particular, we find that

$$ L^{opt} = L(\gamma, s^{opt}(\gamma)) \Rightarrow \frac{dL^{opt}}{d\gamma} = \frac{\partial L^{opt}}{\partial \gamma} + \frac{\partial L^{opt}}{\partial s^{opt}} \frac{ds^{opt}}{d\gamma}, $$

where $\frac{dL^{opt}}{d\gamma} < 0$, $\frac{d^2 L^{opt}}{d\gamma^2} > 0$. Hence, ceteris paribus, a fall in productivity heterogeneity (i.e. a higher value of $\gamma$) will result in a lower aggregate employment in equilibrium, despite a higher optimal subsidy rate. It can also be verified that the share of employment in the homogenous good sector, $L_1 / L^{opt}$, is negatively related to $s$.

Intuitively, by reducing firms’ costs and making it easier for them to survive in equilibrium, the subsidy softens competition and this works towards increasing the mass of surviving firms. As shown in the online Appendix, $M$ is concave in $s$, but reaches a maximum at a subsidy level that exceeds the value that maximises employment. Thus, increasing the subsidy up to its optimum level expands the mass of firms in the industry, which contributes towards raising welfare and aggregate employment (and will also have procompetitive effects that partially offset the initial competition softening effects of the subsidy). However, as is clear from (21), an increase in subsidy raises the tax rate, which reduces labour supply and welfare. In addition, the lower average productivity in the industry contributes to offsetting the initial price-reducing effect of the subsidy. Taken together, these forces underpin the concavity of $h(s)$.

In sum, by reducing the selectivity of competition in the monopolistic industry, the subsidy triggers a reallocation of resources across the two production sectors, away from leisure and – within the monopolistic sector – away from the most efficient and towards less efficient firms. Despite its anti-competitive effects, an optimally chosen subsidy leads to welfare gains.

3. A two-country setting

In this section we extend the model to a two-country setting. Both economies (home and foreign) are characterised by the same consumer preferences and technologies discussed in the autarkic model above. The homogenous good (that we retain as the numeraire) is freely traded whilst the differentiated good is traded at a per-unit iceberg trade cost. We shall denote the foreign country’s variables by an asterisk and focus the discussion on the home country.

The differentiated varieties aggregator and price index are now respectively given by
\[
Y = \left( \int_{i \in M} y_d(i)^{1-\sigma} \, di + \int_{i \in M' \subset M} y_s(i)^{1-\sigma} \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}, \quad P_Y = \left( \int_{i \in M} p_d(i)^{1-\sigma} \, di + \int_{i \in M' \subset M} p_s(i)^{1-\sigma} \, di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},
\] (23)

where the subscripts \(d\) and \(x\) refer to domestically consumed and exported varieties, respectively: thus, \(y_d\) and \(p_d\) are the quantity and price of domestically produced varieties while \(y_s\) and \(p_s\) are the quantity and price of foreign produced varieties that are consumed in the home country. Demand for these varieties are respectively given by

\[
y_d(i) = Y \left( \frac{p_d(i)}{P_d} \right)^{-\sigma}, \quad y_s(i) = Y \left( \frac{p_s(i)}{P_s} \right)^{-\sigma}.
\] (24)

The possibility of trade implies that firms in the monopolistic sector will have to decide after entry whether to produce for the domestic market only or to also export. The possibility of trade implies that firms in the monopolistic sector will have to decide after entry whether to produce for the domestic market only or to also export. In addition to the fixed entry cost \(f\) and the fixed cost \(\alpha_d\) required for the production and marketing of the output \(y_d\) sold in the domestic market, an exporting firm also incurs a fixed cost \(\alpha_x\) (also in terms of labour) for producing and marketing the output \(y_s\) it sells abroad. Given the higher complexity of operating in foreign markets, it is plausible to assume \(\alpha_d < \alpha_x\). Given the higher complexity of operating in foreign markets, it is plausible to assume \(\alpha_d < \alpha_x\).

As in the autarkic case, we shall assume that the government does not set firm-specific subsidies. However, the openness of the economy results in the possibility of broad categories of firms/activities to be targeted – e.g. consistent with the pressures for some form of employment support to be directed to exporters during the recent recession. Hence, we shall briefly examine an ‘export-only’ subsidy, \(s_x\), for labour employed in the production for exports, and a ‘domestic-only’ subsidy, \(s_d\) for labour employed in production for domestic sales, in addition to the ‘uniform’ employment subsidy case, \(s = s_d = s_x\). A firm’s profits, in the home country, from its domestic and foreign sales are then given respectively by

\[
\pi_d(\varphi) = p_d(\varphi) y_d(\varphi) - (1-s_d) w l_d(\varphi), \quad \pi_s(\varphi) = p_s(\varphi) y_s(\varphi) - (1-s_x) w l_s(\varphi),
\] (25)

with the respective labour requirements given by

\[
l_d(\varphi) = \alpha_d + \frac{y_d(\varphi)}{\varphi}, \quad l_s(\varphi) = \alpha_s + \frac{\tau y_s(\varphi)}{\varphi},
\] (26)

where \(\tau > 1\) denotes the per-unit iceberg trade cost facing the exporters. Maximisation of (25) subject to the demand functions in (24) and the labour requirements in (26) implies the following optimal price rules for a firm with productivity \(\varphi\) serving both markets:
\[ p_d(\varphi) = \frac{\sigma(1-s_d)w}{(\sigma-1)\varphi}, \quad p_x(\varphi) = \frac{\sigma(1-s_x)\tau w}{(\sigma-1)\varphi}. \]  

### 3.1. The general equilibrium

The competitive selection process that follows entry will result in the emergence of two productivity cut-offs, defined by \( \varphi_d = \sup\{ \varphi : \pi_d(\varphi) = 0 \} \) and \( \varphi_x = \sup\{ \varphi : \pi_x(\varphi) = 0 \} \). These correspond respectively to the productivity of the marginal firms that survive in the domestic market and to that of the marginal exporters. Thus, the possibility of international trade, and the fact that trade is costly, will result in a partitioning between exporting and non-exporting firms. Only relatively more productive firms will afford to export and \( \varphi_x \) determines the partition between the two types of firm: for a given mass of entrants \( F \), a mass \( M \equiv (1-G(\varphi_d))F = \varphi_d^\ast F \) of firms with productivity \( \varphi \in [\varphi_d, \infty) \) will survive and produce for the domestic market and a subset of these with mass \( M_x \equiv (1-G(\varphi_x))F = \varphi_x^\ast F \), and with productivity \( \varphi \in [\varphi_x, \infty) \), will also produce and export to the foreign country. Following the same procedure as in autarky, for any given \( \varphi_d \) and \( \varphi_x \) we obtain the corresponding average productivities,

\[ \bar{\varphi}_d = \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma-\sigma} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)} \varphi_d, \quad \bar{\varphi}_x = \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma-\sigma} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)} \varphi_x. \]  

The zero expected net entry profits condition implies that

\[ M \pi_d(\bar{\varphi}_d) + M_x \pi_x(\bar{\varphi}_x) - P_x F = 0 \]  

always holds in equilibrium. The labour market clearing condition is

\[ L_d + M I_d(\bar{\varphi}_d) + M_x I_x(\bar{\varphi}_x) = L^*, \]  

where, as in autarky, \( L_d = A^* \) and \( L^* = N \left( \frac{(1-t)w}{\theta D^{\alpha-\beta} \beta \gamma} \right)^{1/\delta} \). The balanced government budget constraint and the trade balance equation are, respectively

\[ \begin{align*}
    w \left( s_d M I_d(\bar{\varphi}_d) + s_x M_x I_x(\bar{\varphi}_x) \right) &= twL^*, \\
    P_x \left( A^* - A - f F \right) + M_x r_x(\bar{\varphi}_x) &= M_x^* r_x(\bar{\varphi}_x).
\end{align*} \]  

Finally, the model is closed by noting that since the homogenous good is produced competitively, traded freely, and used as numeraire, \( w = P_d = w^* = P_x^* = 1 \). As shown in the online Appendix, we reduce the model to 12 equations which can be solved to determine
\( \varphi_d, \varphi_s, \varphi_d^*, \varphi_s^*, F, F', P_\ell, P'_\ell, h, h', t, t' \). Using these equations, the following relationships can be shown to hold in general equilibrium between the two countries’ productivity cut-offs:

\[
\frac{\varphi_d}{\varphi_d^*} = \tau \left( \frac{1-s_s}{1-s_d} \right)^{\gamma/(\sigma-1)} \left( \frac{\alpha_s}{\alpha_d} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}, \quad \frac{\varphi_s}{\varphi_s^*} = \tau^* \left( \frac{1-s_s}{1-s_d} \right)^{\gamma/(\sigma-1)} \left( \frac{\alpha_s}{\alpha_d} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)}.
\]  

(33)

These imply that, for any given level of \( \tau \) and \( \tau^* \), subsidy policies in the two countries trigger selection effects that will result in changes in the efficiency composition of the industry (and hence in market structure) in both countries.

### 3.2. The effects of employment subsidies

The model can be solved recursively to first determine the two countries’ productivity cut-offs \( (\varphi_d, \varphi_s, \varphi_d^*, \varphi_s^*) \) from four equations consisting of (33) above and the two countries’ zero expected net profits of entry equations which can be written as (see the online Appendix):

\[
\alpha_d (1-s_d) \varphi_d^\gamma + \alpha_s (1-s_s) \varphi_s^\gamma = \frac{(1+\gamma-\sigma)f}{\sigma-1},
\]

\[
\alpha_d^* (1-s_d^*) \varphi_d^*^\gamma + \alpha_s^* (1-s_s^*) \varphi_s^*^\gamma = \frac{(1+\gamma^*-\sigma)f^*}{\sigma-1}.
\]

(34)

We now impose full symmetry, i.e. \((\alpha_d, \alpha_s, f, \gamma, \tau) = (\alpha_d^*, \alpha_s^*, f^*, \gamma^*, \tau^*)\), on (33) and (34) and focus on a uniform subsidy by letting \( s \equiv s_s = s_d \) and \( s^* \equiv s_s^* = s_d^* \). Allowing for the two countries’ subsidies to differ, i.e. \( s \neq s^* \), we obtain the solutions for the domestic and export productivity cut-offs for the home country:

\[
\varphi_d = \left( \frac{\alpha_d (\sigma-1)(1-s)}{f^*(1+\gamma^*-\sigma)} \right)^{1/\gamma^*} \left( \frac{\alpha_s^*}{\alpha_d^*} \right)^{\gamma^*/(\sigma-1)-1} \left( \frac{\alpha_s}{\alpha_d} \right)^{1/(\sigma-1)-1} \tau^* - \left( \frac{1-s^*}{1-s} \right)^{\gamma^*/(\sigma-1)-1} \tau^\gamma.
\]

(35)

\[
\varphi_s = \left( \frac{\alpha_s (\sigma-1)(1-s)}{f^*(1+\gamma-\sigma)} \right)^{1/\gamma} \left( \frac{\alpha_s}{\alpha_d} \right)^{\gamma/(\sigma-1)-1} \left( \frac{1-s^*}{1-s} \right)^{\gamma^*/\sigma/(\sigma-1)-1} \tau^\gamma - \left( \frac{1-s_s}{1-s} \right)^{\gamma^*/(\sigma-1)-1} \tau^{-\gamma^*}.
\]

(36)

These can be substituted into (33) to obtain the corresponding expressions for the foreign country. Inspection of the cut-offs reveals that with full symmetry and for any given \( s^* \) and a
sufficiently large $r$, a unilateral rise in $s$ increases $\varphi_d$ and $\varphi^*_s$ (with the latter rising even more than $\varphi_d$ does) and reduces $\varphi_s$ and $\varphi^*_d$.

Equations (35), (36) and the corresponding equations determining the foreign productivity cut-offs can then be used to obtain the mass of firms characterising the equilibrium. While this could not be done analytically, our extensive numerical analysis shows that an increase in uniform subsidy in the home country will lead to greater entry ($F$), a larger mass of surviving firms ($M$) characterised by a higher average efficiency ($\hat{\varphi}_d$), and a larger extensive margin of export ($M_s / M$). It will also have the opposite effects on the foreign country, which experiences a reduced entry ($F^*$), a smaller mass of surviving firms ($M^*$) characterised by a lower average efficiency ($\hat{\varphi}_d^*$), and a smaller extensive margin of export ($M^*_s / M^*$).

Thus, contrary to what happens in autarky, a unilateral increase in uniform employment subsidy to all home firms has a pro-competitive selection effect on the monopolistic industry. To begin with, as in autarky, the policy has an anti-competitive effect on the monopolistic sector: by lowering labour costs, it will initially work towards a reduction of both the domestic and the export productivity cut-offs. By softening competition and making it easier to survive in the domestic market and to export, this effect will bring about entry – which, as noted for the autarkic case, will partially offset the initial anticompetitive impact of the policy. The openness of the economy introduces another pro-competitive effect, however. As is reflected in the positive relationship between $\varphi_d$ and $\varphi^*_s$, the reduction of $\varphi_d$ triggered by the subsidy makes it easier for foreign exporters to penetrate the domestic market. This toughens the degree of import competition facing domestic firms and exerts an upward pressure on $\varphi_d$. The net effect of the subsidy is an increase in the domestic productivity cut-off and in the size of the monopolistic industry. Moreover, the subsidy has an adverse selection effect on the foreign country, which results from an expenditure switching effect across countries, with consumption of imported varieties falling in favour of domestic ones. This effect, together with the increase in the mass of home country exporters, underpins a contraction of the monopolistic sector in the foreign country.

4. Welfare and optimal policy in the symmetric case

Retaining the assumption of symmetry between countries, in this section we study the optimal policy. As in autarky, the indirect utility function is monotonically increasing in employment
which we continue to use to proxy welfare. Given the complexity of the algebra involved, however, we now use numerical solutions to illustrate the optimal policy and its effects.  

4.1. Uniform subsidies

We now let \( s = s_d = s^* \) and \( s^* = s^*_d \). In order to carry out the analysis in the \((s^*, s)\) space, we indicate the solution for employment in the home and foreign country by \( h(s^*, s) \) and \( h^*(s^*, s) \) which can be shown to be concave in \( s \) (for any given \( s^* \)) and in \( s^* \) (for any given \( s \)), respectively. In Figure 1 we plot, for a few different values of \( s^* \), sections of \( h(s^*, s) \) in \((s, h)\) space which show that, for all relevant values of \( s^* \), \( h(s^*, s) \) is strictly concave in \( s \) and has a unique maximum at some \( 0 < s < 1 \).

Figure 1. Sections of home country’s welfare function \( h(s^*, s) \) in \((s, h)\) space
(for different values of \( s^* \))

![Figure 1](image)

Note: The curves are truncated at each end to reduce the scale effect.

Thus, each country has a unilateral incentive to set a positive employment subsidy. The concavity of a country’s welfare function with respect to its own subsidy stems from the positive selection effects of the policy discussed in the previous section together with negative fiscal effects; specifically, the welfare function exhibits a trade-off between: (i) the combined effect of the larger mass of firms and their higher average productivity (which implies that consumers gain both at the extensive and at the intensive margin because of a higher variety and lower average prices), and (ii) the higher tax rate required to finance the increase in the subsidy (other things equal, the increase in a country’s tax rate is higher the larger is its mass of firms). Clearly, the externalities of a unilateral change in subsidy by the home country’s...

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8 Our reported simulations are based on parameter values (given in Table 1 in the Appendix) that are widely used in the literature for this type of models, see, e.g., Felbermayr et al. (2011). In addition, we have verified the robustness of these results by checking that they hold qualitatively as the crucial parameters vary within typical ranges.
government will affect the foreign country’s policy incentives. When both governments are policy active, their reaction functions and the resulting Nash equilibrium can be obtained using the iterative numerical solution method by maximising (sequentially and in turn) \( h(s^*, s) \) and \( h^*(s^*, s) \), holding the other country’s subsidy constant. Our numerical analysis shows that 

\[
\frac{\partial^2 h(s^*, s)}{\partial s \partial s^*} > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 h^*(s^*, s)}{\partial s \partial s^*} > 0
\]

which imply that the two countries’ subsidies are strategic complements and the two reaction functions are upward sloping in \( (s^*, s) \) space. We also find that the welfare functions are saddle-shaped, implying that the policy externality is non-monotonic. To explain this, consider the effects of increases in the foreign subsidy rates on home welfare. As \( s^* \) increases, while the optimal value of \( s \) rises, the corresponding maximum value of \( h(s^*, s) \) falls initially and then rises as \( s^* \) exceeds a threshold value. Figure 1 illustrates this property. The left panel shows the negative externality region for \( s^* \): as \( s^* \) is raised, \( h(s^*, s) \) shifts down and its maximum moves to the right; thus whilst the policy choices exhibit strategic complementarity throughout, in this region the raising of \( s^* \) is an ‘unfriendly move’ by the foreign country. There is however a threshold for \( s^* \) at which the raising of \( s^* \) becomes a ‘friendly move’. This is shown in the right panel of Figure 1: as \( s^* \) is raised, \( h(s^*, s) \) shifts up and its maximum still moves to the right.

Figure 2 shows the home governments’ reaction function \( RF(s^*, s) = 0 \) and the corresponding iso-welfare contours in the \( (s^*, s) \) space.

**Figure 2. The iso-welfare contours and the reaction function for the home country with uniform employment subsidy**

![Diagram showing the reaction function and iso-welfare contours](image)

Note: (i) \( s^* \) is the threshold at which externality switches; (ii) \( \varepsilon > 0 \) is the unilateral optimal subsidy when \( s^* = 0 \); (iii) \( RF \) is approximated by a straight line for simplicity to emphasise its monotonicity and slope relative to the 45° line.
While the reaction function is upward sloping in the \((s^*, s)\) space, the shape and hierarchy of the iso-welfare loci change at the threshold level of \(s^*\) denoted by \(\bar{s}^*\). This occurs at the intersection of the \(RF\) with the 45° degree line; given the assumed symmetry, and as will be clearer from Figure 3, this corresponds to the Nash equilibrium solution \((s_N^*, s_N)\).

Figure 3 depicts both governments’ reaction functions. As can be seen from the figure, the cooperative solution \((s_C^*, s_C)\) in which the two governments jointly choose subsidies to maximise the sum of the two countries’ welfare lies above the Nash equilibrium, i.e. \((s_C^*, s_C) > (s_N^*, s_N)\), since it occurs in the positive externality region. Hence, the non-cooperative behaviour entails under-subsidisation from a global welfare point of view. Table 1 in the Appendix provides a comparison of the non-cooperative and cooperative solutions with the no-policy benchmark solution (see columns labelled “Initial Case”).

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**Figure 3. Nash and cooperative solutions with uniform employment subsidy**

As discussed in the previous section, a country’s unilateral increase in subsidy has negative selection and variety effects on its competitor’s industry that amount to an international reallocation of resources across countries within the monopolistic sector. These two effects combine to produce a negative spillover effect on the foreign country by increasing the foreign price index \(P_f^*\). This negative externality is partially mitigated by the fact that the average productivity of home country’s exporters is lower as a result of the subsidy – and hence
the average price of imported varieties in the foreign country is now higher, softening
competition for foreign firms in their domestic market. As can be seen by comparing the
“Employment Subsidy” and “No Policy Benchmark” columns of Table 2 in the Appendix, a
unilateral increase in $s$ raises $\varphi_d$ as well as $\varphi_x$ and results in lower $F^*$, $\varphi_d^*$, and $M^*_x$. In
addition, the policy has a positive fiscal externality on the foreign country: since an increase in
$s$ reduces the mass of foreign firms and exporters, it can be shown to decrease the foreign
government’s subsidy bill (for a given $\bar{F}^* > 0$), thus enabling the foreign government to reduce
its tax rate for a given level of subsidy (or to increase the subsidy rate for a given tax rate).
Overall, the trading partner experiences a fall in welfare that gives rise to an incentive to
retaliate. Consistently, this retaliation by the foreign country has a welfare reducing (and anti-
competitive) effect on the home country.

As is evident from Table 1 in the Appendix, welfare at the Nash equilibrium is higher
than in the no-policy case, even though both countries experience a worsening of their firms’
productivity distribution (reflected in a fall in the domestic cut-off relative to the no-policy
case). Up to the Nash equilibrium values of subsidies $(s^*_w, s^*_n)$, there are negative policy
externalities as the negative selection and variety effects dominate the positive fiscal-spill-over
effects. The Nash equilibrium occurs where the negative selection and variety effects are
exactly offset by the positive fiscal spill-over effects. However, when setting their policies non-
cooperatively, the two governments fail to internalise the fact that raising subsidies above the
Nash equilibrium level would generate a positive externality since the negative selection and
variety effects would then be dominated by the positive fiscal-spill-over effects. The
cooperative behaviour, where these positive externalities are jointly exploited, yields a higher
welfare level.

4.2 Targeted employment subsidies

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, measures targeted to supporting employment and/or
reducing the labour costs of the exporters were seen as crucial in offsetting the adverse effects
of negative trade shocks on employment and output (Jansen and von Uexkull, 2010). We
therefore briefly consider the effects of an ‘export-only’ employment subsidy (i.e.
$s_x > 0, \quad s_d = 0$). If used unilaterally, this policy has the same qualitative effects on the two
countries’ productivity cut-offs as a uniform subsidy: by increasing the domestic cut-off and
reducing the export productivity cut-offs it has pro-competitive effects on the domestic industry
and triggers a reallocation of resources towards relatively more efficient firms. However, by
discriminating in favour of the export activity of firms, the ‘export-only’ subsidy has stronger
reallocation effects.

As with the uniform subsidy, an employment subsidy targeted to exports has a negative
efficiency spill-over and a positive fiscal spill-over effect on the trading partner. In this case,
however, the latter is smaller (due to the relatively smaller subsidy bill arising from subsidising only exporting activities) and never dominates, so that the overall externality effect is always negative. This case is illustrated in Figure 4 where, similar to the uniform subsidy case, the reactions functions of the two countries are upward sloping. However, due to the monotonic nature of the inter-country negative externality, the cooperative solution now lies below the Nash equilibrium level of subsidy: by failing to internalise the negative externality, the non-cooperative behaviour of the governments entails over-subsidisation from a global welfare point of view.

### Figure 4. Nash and cooperative solutions with export-only employment subsidy

![Diagram](image)

It is also interesting to briefly consider the effects of a ‘domestic-only’ subsidy (i.e. $s_x > 0, \ s_y = 0$) where the employment subsidy is targeted towards the domestic operation of firms. This policy, which is clearly biased towards relatively less efficient firms, softens selection in the home market (i.e. contrary to the previous two cases, it reduces the domestic productivity cut-off) and thus reallocates resources away from more efficient and towards relatively less efficient firms. In so doing, the subsidy achieves the strongest ‘home-market effect’ and leads to the largest negative externality on the foreign country (via its strongest market stealing effect). In this case, as shown in Figure 5, the two governments’ reaction functions are downward sloping, since the subsidies are strategic substitutes, and the negative externality induces governments to over-subsidise when acting non-cooperatively, with the cooperative solution lying below the Nash equilibrium.
5. Trade liberalisation and productivity shocks

As is well established in the literature, in this type of model trade liberalisation (i.e. a reduction in trade costs) typically has pro-competitive effects on an industry, and reallocates resources towards more efficient firms. We show that trade liberalisation also strengthens the pro-competitive effects of an employment subsidy.

Figure 6 illustrates the effects of a 5% reduction in trade costs on the effectiveness of unilateral increases in uniform employment subsidy by the home government when the foreign government is policy inactive: as the graph in the left panel shows, increases in $s$ raise $\phi_d$ and this effect is stronger the lower are trade costs.

Figure 6. Impact of unilateral uniform employment subsidy policy by home country ($s^* = 0$) as trade costs fall by 5%
Thus, the standard competitive selection forces triggered by trade liberalisation strengthen the pro-competitive effects of the subsidy discussed earlier. As a result, the unilateral optimal subsidy is lower and its welfare effects are higher at lower trade costs, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 6.

As can be seen from Table 1 in the Appendix, trade liberalisation also results in a lower Nash equilibrium subsidy and hence in a much higher degree of under-subsidisation relative to the cooperative solution – therefore suggesting much stronger policy externalities beyond the Nash equilibrium when trade barriers are lower. This is because whilst the Nash equilibrium subsidy falls with \( \tau \), the optimal subsidy in the symmetric cooperative case is unaffected by trade costs. To see this, consider that the equilibrium solutions for subsidy and tax levels in the cooperative case cannot be distinguished from the corresponding solutions in the autarkic case given by equations (21) and (22) – see also Table 1 for our numerical solutions. Specifically, the (reduced form) objective functions are:

\[
h(s^*, s; \tau^*, \tau) = h^*(s^*, s; \tau^*, \tau) = \tilde{h}(s; \tau)
\]

which can be written as \( \tilde{h}(s) = \kappa(\tau) h(s) \), where \( h(s) \) is the corresponding autarkic (reduced form) employment equation and \( \kappa(\tau) \) is a monotonically decreasing function with \( \kappa'(0) < 0 \), \( \kappa(1) > 1 \) and \( \kappa(\infty) = 1 \). Table 1 in the Appendix also reports the effects of a 5% reduction in \( \gamma \) on the Nash and cooperative equilibria. A fall in \( \gamma \) corresponds to an increase in the degree of heterogeneity of firms’ productivity, and can hence be thought of as an industry-wide positive productivity shock. As one would expect, in the no-subsidy equilibrium this leads to an increase in welfare and to a reallocation of resources towards the monopolistic sector driven by an increase in both domestic and export productivity cut-offs that raise the average productivity in that sector. With policy active governments, the same productivity shock results in the non-cooperative equilibrium being characterised by higher subsidies. Thus, contrary to the autarkic and cooperative case, the non-cooperative equilibrium is characterised by a positive relationship between the size of the optimal subsidy and the degree of heterogeneity of firms. The degree of under-subsidisation relative to the cooperative solution would also be higher than in the benchmark case at lower values of \( \gamma \) – i.e. with more efficient productivity distributions, subsidising above the Nash level would generate larger positive policy externalities which non-cooperative policies fail to internalise.

6. Entry subsidies: a comparison

Given the role of entry in facilitating reallocations towards more efficient producers, the reduction of entry barriers is seen as an effective way to increase aggregate productivity and

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9 Consistently, we have verified numerically that if the home country had a productivity distribution characterised by a higher heterogeneity than its trading partner (i.e. \( \gamma < \gamma' \)), a unilateral subsidy when the foreign government is not policy active would be more effective in raising welfare and employment, and hence the optimal subsidy would be lower, than when countries’ productivity distributions are symmetric.
In this section we briefly examine the effect of entry subsidies on aggregate productivity and employment against those of employment subsidies discussed above. In order to allow for a direct comparison between the two types of subsidies, we modify our model to replace employment subsidies $s$ with an ad-valorem entry subsidy $\nu$ (i.e. proportional to a firm’s entry cost $f$) which is again financed via proportional income taxation. Thus, setting $s=0$ in the autarkic model developed in Section 2 and introducing $\nu$ instead, the government budget constraint in equation (16) becomes

$$\nu f F = t L'. \tag{37}$$

Since the subsidy reduces the effective cost of entry, the expected zero-profit entry condition in (12) is now given by

$$M\pi (\tilde{\phi}) - (1 - \nu) f F = 0. \tag{38}$$

Note that because the entry subsidy does not affect firms’ marginal conditions, the average industry revenues and profits are not affected by the policy.

The autarkic productivity cut-off is now given by

$$\varphi_c = \left( \frac{\alpha (\sigma - 1)}{f(1+\gamma - \sigma)(1-\nu)} \right)^{1/\gamma}, \tag{39}$$

which is increasing in $\nu$. Thus, as in Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) and contrary to the employment subsidy case discussed above, an entry subsidy has a pro-competitive effect in autarky, and this effect is stronger the higher is the degree of heterogeneity among firms (i.e. the lower is $\gamma$). The welfare function in (11) can be shown to be strictly concave in $\nu$ with the corresponding optimal entry subsidy in autarky given by

$$\nu_{opt} = \frac{\gamma (1-\beta)}{\gamma\sigma - \beta (\sigma - 1)} \tag{40}$$

which is positive and decreasing in $\gamma$. Hence, in contrast to the employment subsidy case, the more homogenous are firms the lower are the optimal entry subsidy and industry average productivity. A comparison between equations (22) and (40), and the corresponding welfare levels reveals that $\nu_{opt} < s_{opt}$ and $h(\nu_{opt}) < h(s_{opt})$: ceteris paribus, (i) the optimal entry subsidy rate is smaller than the optimal employment subsidy rate, and (ii) the optimal employment subsidy is associated with higher employment and welfare levels. To see this, consider that the procompetitive effects of the entry subsidy can be shown to result in a fall in the mass of employment.
surviving firms. Instead, an increase in the mass of firms contributes to explaining why the optimal employment subsidy, despite its anti-competitive effects on the industry in autarky, leads to higher levels of welfare than an entry subsidy. More generally, underpinning these results is the fact that an employment subsidy offers a more direct way, than an entry subsidy, of tackling the monopolistic distortion. As noted, the latter is reflected in the wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between the differentiated product and the homogenous good, and an entry subsidy will affect the marginal rate of substitution only via its impact on the proportional income tax rate.

Moving to the two-country setting, the solutions for the unilateral, Nash and cooperative policy equilibria are also given in Table 2 in the Appendix. As can be seen from the table, governments have a unilateral incentive to subsidise the entry of firms. However, contrary to autarky, the unilateral (i.e. when the trading partner’s government is policy inactive) optimal entry subsidy rate is higher than the unilateral optimal employment subsidy rate – but its associated level of welfare continues to be lower than that achieved via an employment subsidy. To see this, consider that in a two-country world, both subsidies have procompetitive effects on the industry but these are stronger with an entry subsidy that leads to a larger entry. The resulting tougher selection forces lead to a smaller increase in the equilibrium mass of firms in the industry (and even in a fall in the extensive margin of exports). It is the smaller increase in product variety that drives the lower welfare achieved with this type of subsidy.

The reaction functions of the two governments when they are both policy active, which are illustrated in Figure 7, are upward sloping in \((\nu^*, \nu)\) space with the Nash equilibrium entailing a positive entry subsidy rate. The Nash equilibrium, however, lies above the cooperative solution, hence non-cooperative behaviour leads to over-subsidisation in this case. The intuition behind these results is consistent with that provided by Pflüger and Suedekum (2013): an increase in entry subsidy by one government has a selection and a fiscal externality effect on its trading partner. Whilst the latter is positive, the former is negative and dominates. As can be seen from Table 2 in the Appendix, although qualitatively the nature of the international spill-over effects of an entry subsidy are similar to those of an employment subsidy, the latter has a stronger negative externality. This gives an incentive to retaliate that results in the non-cooperative equilibrium being characterised by over-subsidisation from a global welfare point of view. As is clear from Table 2, although the non-cooperative entry subsidy is larger than the corresponding employment subsidy, the former leads to a lower level of welfare than the latter. Thus, despite its direct (and hence stronger) pro-competitive effects, an entry subsidy is less effective in increasing employment and welfare than an employment subsidy.

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10 Pflüger and Suedekum (2013) find that the mass of firms does not change in autarky. The difference in results between the two papers mainly hinges on their assumption of (i) quasi-linear preferences (and hence the lack of income effects); (ii) the use of lump-sum tax and subsidy; and (iii) fixed labour supply.
7. Conclusions

Employment subsidies are an important component of active labour market policies and their use by governments has increased in recent years in an attempt to raise (or restore) employment levels in the face of an adverse economic climate. This paper has studied how competitive selection forces affect international policy spillovers and the nature of optimal subsidy policy. Specifically, we have shown that intra-industry competitive selection is an important channel in the transmission of the effects of employment subsidies on the level of economic activity and aggregate efficiency. Importantly, and perhaps counterintuitively, international openness alters the nature of the effects of the subsidy on intra-industry selection: whilst the subsidy has an anti-competitive effect in autarky, it has pro-competitive effects in the open economy (akin to those of trade liberalisation) which result in higher average productivity and in a larger extensive margin of export. These results suggest that, when average productivity is endogenous, international trade openness strengthens the unilateral case for employment subsidisation.

In addition, given the implications of the policy for market entry, aggregate efficiency and welfare, and in light of the international externality effects of the policy, governments have an incentive to use employment subsidies strategically. We show that international spillovers consist of both selection and fiscal externalities that result in non-cooperative and cooperative policy equilibria that are characterised by positive subsidies. Whether the non-cooperative solutions entail levels of subsidisation that exceed or fall short of those characterising the cooperative outcome depends, however, on the nature of the externality between countries; the latter, in turn, rests on whether the subsidy is uniform or is targeted towards certain types of firms.
Notably, despite stronger pro-competitive effects on industry, an entry subsidy is shown to be less effective in increasing employment and welfare than an employment subsidy. This is because it offers a less direct way of tackling the monopolistic distortion than does an employment subsidy.
References


Appendix: Tables 1 and 2 reporting the numerical solutions

Table 1. Comparing the equilibrium solutions of the two-country model for different cases: the role of $\gamma$ and $\tau$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Benchmark Equilibrium with no Subsidy</th>
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<th>Nash Equilibrium with Uniform Subsidy</th>
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<td>$\gamma$ falls by 5% $\tau$ falls by 5%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>$\phi_d$</td>
<td>1.576315</td>
<td>1.507403</td>
<td>1.529077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi_s$</td>
<td>2.624806</td>
<td>2.510056</td>
<td>2.539295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>32.31272</td>
<td>29.35685</td>
<td>29.55308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>6.876808</td>
<td>6.594781</td>
<td>6.974983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_{-}$</td>
<td>1.214627</td>
<td>1.284653</td>
<td>1.267254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_{x}$</td>
<td>0.208905</td>
<td>0.183934</td>
<td>0.190042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_s = M L_s (\phi_s)$</td>
<td>289.9721</td>
<td>306.6896</td>
<td>302.5359</td>
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<tr>
<td>$L_x = M L_s (\phi_s)$</td>
<td>102.4336</td>
<td>108.3391</td>
<td>106.8718</td>
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<tr>
<td>$(L_s + L_x)/L'$</td>
<td>0.626625</td>
<td>0.661448</td>
<td>0.652575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- See Table 2 for the case of unilateral policy by the home country when the foreign country is policy inactive.
- The parameter values used in the numerical simulations are: $N = 1000$, $\beta = 0.8$, $\delta = 2$, $\theta = 8.9245$, $\sigma = 3.8$, $\alpha_j = 2.5$, $\alpha_x = 5.0$ and $f = 3.36$. The solutions were obtained using the MCP/PATH engine in GAMS; the robustness of these solutions are confirmed by extensive sensitivity analyses. The solution values for all other variables and further details about the numerical analyses are available from the authors on request.
Table 2. Comparing the Optimal Policy Values of Variables in Different Cases: the role of different subsidies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>No Policy</th>
<th>Unilateral Policy</th>
<th>Cooperative Policy</th>
<th>Nash Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benchmark</td>
<td>Employment Subsidy, $s$</td>
<td>Entry Subsidy, $\psi$</td>
<td>Employment Subsidy, $s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s, \psi$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0675</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.061378</td>
<td>0.042784</td>
<td>0.093264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h$</td>
<td>0.626221</td>
<td>0.632891 (0.61641)</td>
<td>0.631018 (0.618848)</td>
<td>0.627455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi_0$</td>
<td>1.576315</td>
<td>1.62377 (1.523872)</td>
<td>1.718958 (1.536813)</td>
<td>1.507403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi_s$</td>
<td>2.624806</td>
<td>2.307872 (2.972826)</td>
<td>2.559028 (2.862328)</td>
<td>2.510056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>32.31272</td>
<td>44.19013 (18.26889)</td>
<td>48.69677 (22.43769)</td>
<td>29.35685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M_s$</td>
<td>1.214627</td>
<td>2.572795 (0.449714)</td>
<td>1.99547 (0.62825)</td>
<td>1.284653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_s$</td>
<td>0.208905</td>
<td>0.187957 (0.217316)</td>
<td>0.194055 (0.21518)</td>
<td>0.183934</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The columns with “Subsidy, $\psi$” relate to the analysis of entry subsidy in Section 6 below.
- The columns in the Unilateral Policy refer to the case in which the home country acts unilaterally while the foreign country remains policy inactive. Figures in square brackets are the corresponding values for the foreign country.
- The parameter values used in the numerical simulations are as reported in Table 1, with $\gamma = 3.4$ and $\tau = 1.3$.
- The solutions were obtained using the MCP/PATH engine in GAMS; the robustness of these solutions are confirmed by extensive sensitivity analyses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Notation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed cost of production of the differentiated good (closed economy)</td>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed cost of production of the differentiated good (domestic &amp; export)</td>
<td>$\alpha_d, \alpha_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget share of $Y$ &amp; $A$</td>
<td>$\beta$ &amp; $1-\beta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour supply elasticity (inverse of real wage elasticity of supply)</td>
<td>$\delta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity distribution shape parameter (Pareto)</td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Level Productivity (differentiated good sector)</td>
<td>$\varphi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity cut-off for marginal firms (closed economy)</td>
<td>$\varphi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productivity cut-offs for marginal firms (non-exporting &amp; exporting)</td>
<td>$\varphi_d, \varphi_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average productivity (closed economy)</td>
<td>$\bar{\varphi}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average productivity (non-exporting &amp; exporting)</td>
<td>$\bar{\varphi}_d, \bar{\varphi}_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale coefficient of labour supply</td>
<td>$\theta$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES elasticity of substitution</td>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit of a firm producing the differentiated good (closed economy)</td>
<td>$\pi$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit of a firm producing the differentiated good (domestic &amp; export)</td>
<td>$\pi_d, \pi_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceberg trade cost for exporting firms</td>
<td>$\tau$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita demand for homogenous good</td>
<td>$\bar{a}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate demand for homogenous good</td>
<td>$\bar{A}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate supply of homogenous good</td>
<td>$A'$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass of entrants</td>
<td>$F$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment ratio</td>
<td>$h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed entry cost</td>
<td>$f$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour requirement for producing the differentiated good (closed economy)</td>
<td>$l$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour requirement for producing the differentiated good (domestic &amp; export)</td>
<td>$l_d, l_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate labour supply (employment)</td>
<td>$L' = N h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer population size</td>
<td>$N$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass of varieties of differentiated good produced (mass of surviving firms)</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass of varieties of differentiated good produced and exported</td>
<td>$M_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer price index</td>
<td>$P$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Price of the homogeneous good</td>
<td>$P_y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CES price index for $Y$</td>
<td>$P_y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety prices set by a firm producing the differentiated good (closed economy)</td>
<td>$p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety prices set by a firm producing the differentiated good (non-exporting &amp; exporting)</td>
<td>$p_d, p_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue of a firm producing the differentiated good (closed economy)</td>
<td>$r$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue of a firm producing the differentiated good (domestic &amp; export)</td>
<td>$r_d, r_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour subsidy received by differentiated good producers</td>
<td>$s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour subsidy received by differentiated good producers (domestic &amp; export)</td>
<td>$s_d, s_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entry subsidy</td>
<td>$v$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income tax rate</td>
<td>$t$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wage rate</td>
<td>$w$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demand for a variety of differentiated good (closed economy)</td>
<td>$y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic and foreign demand for a domestically produced variety of differentiated good</td>
<td>$y_d, y_s$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate demand for differentiated good (CES)</td>
<td>$Y$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total and per capita utility</td>
<td>$u$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A1. Solution of the closed economy model

Use \( \bar{\phi}^{\sigma-1} = \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma - \sigma} \right) \phi^{\sigma-1} \) in (18) to write (7) and (9), \( r(\bar{\phi}) = \alpha \sigma (1-s) \left( \frac{\bar{\phi}}{\phi_c} \right)^{\sigma-1} \) and \( l(\bar{\phi}) = \alpha \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \left( \frac{\bar{\phi}}{\phi_c} \right)^{\sigma-1} + 1 \), as \( r(\bar{\phi}) = \alpha \sigma (1-s) \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma - \sigma} \right) \) and \( l(\bar{\phi}) = \alpha \left( \frac{1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma}{1+\gamma - \sigma} \right) \),

which are then substituted in (13) and (15) to obtain \( M \alpha \sigma (1-s) \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma - \sigma} \right) = \beta \left( 1-t \right) L^s \) and \( sM \alpha \left( \frac{1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma}{1+\gamma - \sigma} \right) = tL^s \). For any given \( M \) and \( L \) these solve for \( t \), given by equation (21), and also imply \( M = \frac{\beta \left( 1+\gamma - \sigma \right) L'}{\alpha \left( \beta \left( 1+\gamma - \sigma \right) s + \gamma \sigma \left( 1-s \right) \right)} \). Imposing \( w = P_x = 1 \) and the expression for \( P_x \) in (8), the labour supply function in (3) is written as

\[
L' = N \left[ \frac{1-t}{\theta \left( M^{1/(1-\sigma)} \frac{\sigma(1-s)}{(\sigma-1)\phi} \right)^{\theta}} \right]^{1/\delta},
\]

which, upon replacing \( L' \) using the result derived above, yields

\[
M = N \left( \frac{\beta (1+\gamma - \sigma)}{\alpha \left( \beta \left( 1+\gamma - \sigma \right) s + \gamma \sigma \left( 1-s \right) \right)} \right) \left[ \frac{1-t}{\theta \left( M^{1/(1-\sigma)} \frac{\sigma(1-s)}{(\sigma-1)\phi} \right)^{\theta}} \right]^{1/\delta}.
\]

Substituting for \( \phi \) and \( t \) using (18), (20) and (21), we obtain the following solutions:

\[
M = \Omega \left( \beta \left( 1+\gamma - \sigma \right) \right)^{\delta(\sigma-1)} \left( \frac{\sigma(1-s)}{(\sigma-1)} \right)^{\frac{(\sigma-1)(\gamma \sigma (1-s) + \beta (1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma)s)}{\beta(\delta(\sigma-1))}} \left[ \frac{(\sigma-1)(\gamma \sigma (1-s) + \beta (1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma)s)}{\beta(\delta(\sigma-1))} \right]^{\left( 1+\delta(\sigma-1) \right) \left( \beta(\delta(\sigma-1)) \right)} \left( \frac{1-t}{\theta \left( M^{1/(1-\sigma)} \frac{\sigma(1-s)}{(\sigma-1)\phi} \right)^{\theta}} \right)\delta(\sigma-1) \left( \frac{\sigma(1-s)}{(\sigma-1)} \right) \left[ \frac{(\sigma-1)(\gamma \sigma (1-s) + \beta (1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma)s)}{\beta(\delta(\sigma-1))} \right]^{\left( 1+\delta(\sigma-1) \right) \left( \beta(\delta(\sigma-1)) \right)} ,
\]

\[
L' = \alpha \Omega \left( \beta \left( 1+\gamma - \sigma \right) \right)^{\delta(\sigma-1)} \left( 1-s \right)^{\frac{(\sigma-1)(\gamma \sigma (1-s) + \beta (1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma)s)}{\beta(\delta(\sigma-1))}} \left[ \frac{(\sigma-1)(\gamma \sigma (1-s) + \beta (1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma)s)}{\beta(\delta(\sigma-1))} \right]^{\left( 1+\delta(\sigma-1) \right) \left( \beta(\delta(\sigma-1)) \right)} ,
\]

where \( \Omega = \left( \frac{\alpha}{\Lambda N} \right)^{\frac{\delta(\sigma-1)}{\beta(\delta(\sigma-1))}} \left( \gamma \sigma \right)^{\frac{(\sigma-1)(\gamma \sigma (1-s) + \beta (1+\gamma \sigma - \sigma)s)}{\beta(\delta(\sigma-1))}} \) and \( \Lambda = \theta^{-1/\delta} \beta^{\delta/\sigma} \left( (\alpha f)(\sigma-1)/(1+\gamma - \sigma) \right)^{\delta/\sigma} \).

Inspection of these reveals that both \( M \) and \( L' \) are concave in \( s \), with \( L' \) reaching a maximum at a lower value of \( s \) than does \( M \). It is straightforward to show that the value of \( s \) in equation (22) maximises \( L' \) and hence welfare \( U \) which is a monotonically increasing function of \( L' \). Note
that equation (23) is obtained using (13), the expressions for $L'$ and $M$ and
$$l(\bar{\phi}) = \alpha \left( \frac{1 + \gamma \sigma - \sigma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \right)$$
optained above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A2. Two-country model setup</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>(A1)</td>
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<td>(A32)</td>
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<td>(A33)</td>
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A2. Derivation of the equations of the two-country model used in the numerical analysis

Using equations (A16) and (A18), (A17) in Table A2 can be written as $\pi_d = \frac{r_d}{\sigma} - (1 - s_d) w \alpha_d$. Then the zero profit condition of marginal non-exporting and exporting firms in home and foreign country imply

$$\varphi_d = \pi_d(\varphi_d) = 0 \Rightarrow r_d(\varphi_d) = \sigma (1 - s_d) w \alpha_d$$  \hspace{1cm} (E1)

$$\varphi = \pi_d^*(\varphi_d) = 0 \Rightarrow r_d^*(\varphi_d^*) = \sigma (1 - s_d^*) w^* \alpha_d^*.$$

$$\varphi = \pi_x(\varphi_x) = 0 \Rightarrow r_x(\varphi_x) = \sigma (1 - s_x) w \alpha_x,$$  \hspace{1cm} (E2)

$$\varphi = \pi_x^*(\varphi_x^*) = 0 \Rightarrow r_x^*(\varphi_x^*) = \sigma (1 - s_x^*) w^* \alpha_x^*.$$

The zero expected profit of entry for the home and foreign country require

$$M \pi_x(\tilde{\varphi}_d) + M_x \pi_x(\tilde{\varphi}_x) - FP_A f = 0,$$  \hspace{1cm} (E3)

$$M^* \pi_x^*(\tilde{\varphi}_d^*) + M_x^* \pi_x^*(\tilde{\varphi}_x^*) - F^* P_A f^* = 0.$$

The balanced government budget constraints (equating the subsidy bill with tax revenue) for the home and foreign country are

$$s_d w M l_d + s_x w M_x x = N t w h,$$  \hspace{1cm} (E4)

$$s_d^* w^* M^* l_d^* + s_x^* w^* M_x^* l_x^* = N t^* w^* h^*.$$  \hspace{1cm} (E4*)

The CES price indices in (A13) and the aggregations in (A22) and (A23) imply

$$P_i = \left( M \left( p_d(\tilde{\varphi}_d) \right)^{1-\sigma} + M_x \left( p_x(\tilde{\varphi}_x) \right)^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (E5)

$$P_i^* = \left( M^* \left( p_d^*(\tilde{\varphi}_d^*) \right)^{1-\sigma} + M_x^* \left( p_x(\tilde{\varphi}_x^*) \right)^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (E5*)

Per-capita labour supplies, given by (A2), are

$$h = \left( \frac{(1-t)w}{\theta P_i^{\beta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (E6)

$$h^* = \left( \frac{(1-t^*)w^*}{\theta P_i^{\beta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\delta}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (E6*)

The other equilibrium conditions which should hold are the labour market equilibrium conditions,

$$L_d + M l_d + M_x l_x = Nh.$$  \hspace{1cm} (E7)
\[ L_d + M^* l_l^* + M^* l_l^* = Nh^*, \quad (E7*) \]

the global market equilibrium condition for the homogenous good
\[ P_A \left( A + F f \right) + P_A' \left( A' + F' f' \right) = P_A A' + P_A' A'^*, \quad (E8) \]

and the global trade balance,
\[ P_A \left( A' - A - F f \right) + M_x r_x \left( \phi_x \right) = M_x^* r_x^* \left( \phi_x^* \right). \quad (E9) \]

It can be shown that (E8) and (E9) are satisfied – by the implication of Walras law – if (E1) to (E7*) hold.

Finally, since the homogeneous good is competitively produced under constant return to scales condition, is freely traded and is used as numeraire, we have \( P_A = P_A' = 1, \ w = P_A = 1 \) and \( w^* = P_A^* = 1 \). Taking account of the latter normalisations and making some substitutions to eliminate as many variables as possible, equations in (E1)-E(6*) can be shown to be expressed in the form of (E1)'-E(6')' below which satisfy labour resource conditions in (E7)-(E7*) and can be solved to determine the 12 unknowns \((\varphi, \varphi_x, \varphi_x^*, P, P_y', F, F^*, h, h^*, t, t^*)\) on the assumption that the subsidy rates are treated as exogenous policy instruments.

\[
\left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} N \beta (1-t) h \left( P_y \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( 1-s_d \right)^{-\sigma} = \sigma \alpha_d \quad (E1)'
\]

\[
\left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} N \beta (1-t^*) h^* \left( P_y^* \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi^* \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( 1-s_d^* \right)^{-\sigma} = \sigma \alpha_d^* \quad (E1^*)'
\]

\[
\left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} N \beta (1-t^*) h^* \left( P_y^* \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi_x \right)^{\sigma-1} \tau^{1-\sigma} \left( 1-s_x \right)^{-\sigma} = \sigma \alpha_x \quad (E2)'
\]

\[
\left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} N \beta (1-t) h \left( P_y \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi_x^* \right)^{\sigma-1} \tau^{1-\sigma} \left( 1-s_x^* \right)^{-\sigma} = \sigma \alpha_x^* \quad (E2^*)'
\]

\[
(1-s_d) \varphi_d^\gamma \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma-\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{N \beta (1-t) h}{\sigma} \left( P_y \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( 1-s_d \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_d +
\]

\[
(1-s_x) \varphi_x^\gamma \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma-\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{N \beta (1-t^*) h^*}{\sigma} \left( P_y^* \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi_x \right)^{\sigma-1} \tau^{1-\sigma} \left( 1-s_x \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_x = f \quad (E3)'
\]

\[
(1-s_d^*) \varphi_d^* \gamma \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma-\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{N \beta (1-t^*) h^*}{\sigma} \left( P_y^* \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( 1-s_d^* \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_d^* +
\]

\[
(1-s_x^*) \varphi_x^* \gamma \left( \frac{\gamma}{1+\gamma-\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} \frac{N \beta (1-t) h}{\sigma} \left( P_y \right)^{\sigma-1} \left( \varphi_x^* \right)^{\sigma-1} \tau^{1-\sigma} \left( 1-s_x^* \right)^{-\sigma} \alpha_x^* = f^* \quad (E3^*)' \]
\[ s_d \varphi_d^{-\gamma} F \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \right)^{-\sigma} N \beta (1-t) h (P_y)^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi_d)^{\sigma - 1} (1-s_d)^{-\sigma} + \alpha_d \] +
\[ s_x \varphi_x^{-\gamma} F \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \right)^{-\sigma} N \beta (1-t') h' (P_y)^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi_x)^{\sigma - 1} \tau^{1-\sigma} \left( 1-s_x^* \right)^{-\sigma} + \alpha_x^* = N \theta h \] (E4')

\[ s_d \varphi_d^{* -\gamma} F^* \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \right)^{-\sigma} N \beta (1-t') h' (P_y)^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi_d^*)^{\sigma - 1} \tau^{1-\sigma} \left( 1-s_d^* \right)^{-\sigma} + \alpha_d^* \] +
\[ s_x \varphi_x^{* -\gamma} F^* \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \right)^{-\sigma} N \beta (1-t) h (P_y)^{\sigma - 1} (\varphi_x^*)^{\sigma - 1} \left( 1-s_x^* \right)^{-\sigma} + \alpha_x^* = N \theta h^* \] (E4*')

\[ P_y = \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \right) F (\varphi_d)^{-(1+\gamma-\sigma)} \left( 1-s_d \right)^{1-\sigma} + \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \right) F^* (\varphi_x)^{-(1+\gamma-\sigma)} \left( 1-s_d^* \right)^{1-\sigma} \] (E5')

\[ P_y^* = \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right) \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \right) F^* (\varphi_d^*)^{-(1+\gamma-\sigma)} \left( 1-s_d^* \right)^{1-\sigma} + \left( \frac{\gamma}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \right) F (\varphi_x)^{-(1+\gamma-\sigma)} \left( 1-s_x \right)^{1-\sigma} \] (E5*')

\[ h = \left( \frac{1-t}{\theta P_y^\beta} \right)^{1/\delta} \] (E6')

\[ h^* = \left( \frac{1-t^*}{\theta P_y^* \beta} \right)^{1/\delta} \] (E6*')

The above 12 equations are used as in our numerical analysis. To see the recursive nature of the model and to derive equations (33) and (34), note that (E1)' and (E1*)' can be used to eliminate
\[ \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} N \beta (1-t) h (P_y)^{\sigma - 1} \] and \[ \left( \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \right)^{1-\sigma} N \beta (1-t') h' (P_y)^{\sigma - 1} \] from (E2)'-(E3)' to obtain
\[ (\varphi_x / \varphi_d)^{\sigma - 1} \left( 1-s_x \right)^{\sigma / \alpha_d} \] and \[ (\varphi_x^* / \varphi_d^*)^{\sigma - 1} \left( 1-s_x^* \right)^{\sigma / \alpha_d^*} \] which yield (33), and
\[ (\alpha_d (1-s_d) \varphi_d + \alpha_x (1-s_x) \varphi_x) \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \right) = f \] and \[ (\alpha_d (1-s_d) \varphi_d^* + \alpha_x (1-s_x) \varphi_x^*) \left( \frac{\sigma - 1}{1 + \gamma - \sigma} \right) = f^* \] which are in (34).