Dark Clouds or Silver Linings?  
Knightian Uncertainty and Climate Change

Yu-Fu Chen, Michael Funke & Nicole Glanemann
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of Knightian uncertainty upon optimal climate policy through the prism of a continuous-time real option modelling framework. We analytically determine optimal intertemporal climate policies under ambiguous assessments of climate damages. Additionally, numerical simulations are provided to illustrate the properties of the model. The results indicate that increasing Knightian uncertainty accelerates climate policy, i.e. policy makers become more reluctant to postpone the timing of climate policies into the future.

Keywords: Climate change, Knightian uncertainty, κ-ambiguity, real options
JEL-Classification: C61, D81, Q54.
1 Introduction

The future dynamics of greenhouse gas emissions, and their implications for global climate conditions in the future, will be shaped by the way in which policy makers respond to climate projections, react to model uncertainty, and derive resultant mitigation and adaptation decisions. When governments make climate policy decisions, they do not have complete confidence in the probability measure they utilise as a description of future climate uncertainty. Given the enormous complexity of the nonlinear physical system, they may think other probability measures divergent from their own measure are also possible. Such uncertainty, characterised not by a single probability measure but a set of probability measures, is called Knightian uncertainty. In contrast, uncertainty that is reducible to a single probability measure with known parameters is usually referred to as risk. Given the deep and irreducible uncertainties in the processes and implications of climate change, along with many economic complexities that climate adaptation and mitigation decisions entail, standard tools of policy analysis are often not up to the task. The evolution of the IPCC guidelines on risk and uncertainties from the 3rd to the 4th reports can be read as a move away from a purely probabilistic view of risk, to include more complex aspects of uncertainty.\footnote{See IPCC (2007) for details. A number of methods have been employed to provide information about future climate dynamics. Golub et al. (2011) have recently provided a non-technical summary of alternative approaches modelling uncertainty in the economics of climate change.}

Continuing along the same line, we formally develop mathematical tools for situations in which probabilities are not well defined, but not totally unknown either. In other words, we contribute to the climate change literature by developing continuous-time models with irreversibilities, Knightian uncertainty, and imprecise probabilities which appear on the informational radar screen of policy makers. We will then illustrate how the conceptualization of Knightian uncertainty alters optimal behaviour.\footnote{Research in climate projections has intensified remarkably in the last couple of years. The tools developed in this paper provide a better understanding of how a change in Knightian uncertainty due to increasing prognostic skills will affect decision-making. For example, increased information about the unfolding of climate dynamics may change the course of investment in adaptation and mitigation technologies as well as the willingness to join in various versions of bi-, multi- or global climate agreements.}

Recent theoretical analyses of decisions under uncertainty have highlighted the effects of irreversibility in generating “real options”. In these models, the interaction of time-varying uncertainty and irreversibility leads to a range of inaction where policy makers refer to “wait and see” rather than undertaking a costly action with uncertain consequences. We employ this recent literature and interpret climate policies as consisting of a portfolio of options. The general idea underpinning the view that climate policies are option-rights is that climate policy can be seen as analogous in its nature to the purchase of a financial call option, where the investor pays a premium price in order to get the right to buy an asset for some time at a predetermined price (exercise price), and eventually different from the spot market price of the asset. In this analogy, the policy maker, through her climate policy decision, pays a price which gives her the right to use a mitigation strategy, now or in the future, in return for lower
damages. Taking into account this options-based approach, the calculus of suitability cannot be done simply applying the net present value rule, but rather has to consider the following three salient characteristics of the environmental policy decision: (i) there is uncertainty about future payoffs from climate policies; (ii) waiting allows policy makers to gather new information on the uncertain future; and (iii) climate policies are at least partially irreversible. These characteristics are encapsulated in the concept of real option models. This strand of literature now constitutes a significant branch of the climate economics literature.

A limited, but growing, strand of literature – particularly in mathematical economics - has extended the real options approach to analyse the interplay of irreversibility and uncertainty under Knightian uncertainty. A first axiomatic foundation of Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity was given by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989). The impact of Knightian uncertainty on optimal timing decisions was further investigated by Nishimura & Ozaki (2007) and Trojanowska & Kort (2010) in continuous-time models. Recently, Asano (2010) and Vardas & Xepapadeas (2010) have transferred these theoretical advances into environmental economic issues. In this paper, we expand the paper by Pindyck (2009b) on uncertain outcomes and climate change policy by introducing Knightian uncertainty in a continuous-time setting. More precisely, we shall investigate the impact of Knightian uncertainty with regard to climate damages on the optimal climate threshold policies and their values. In particular, assessments of future climate damages as well as the costs to reduce them are essential to the decision when to implement a climate policy. However, a review of the existing estimates reveals enormous uncertainties, see Stern (2007). Apart from different appraisals of vulnerabilities, impacts of extreme weather events and catastrophes are often neglected and underlying assumptions about the future economies’ capability to adapt are highly controversial. Highlighting the ambiguity of these assessments, the three main benchmark studies by Mendelsohn et al. (2000), Nordhaus & Boyer (2000) and Tol (2002) vary between 0 and 3 percent of GDP losses for a 3°C warming. The concept of Knightian uncertainty thus offers a coherent description of the damage costs implied by climate change.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the comprehensive modelling set-up is presented. The framework incorporates cross-discipline interactions in order to derive dynamically optimal policy responses to Knightian uncertainty. Subsequently, in Section 3 we illustrate the working of the model through numerical exercises and examine the sensitivity of the main results with respect to key parameters. The paper concludes in Section 4 with a brief summary and suggestions for further research. Omitted details of several derivations are provided in appendices.

---

3 Concise surveys of the real options literature are provided by Bertola (2010), Dixit & Pindyck (1994) and Stokey (2009).
4 Asano (2010) examines the impacts of Knightian uncertainty referring to future economic developments that affect the social costs of a pollutant, e.g. the innovation of a technology could lower the costs of a climate policy adoption. Vardas & Xepapadeas (2010) apply the Knightian uncertainty concept to the evolution of species biomass to assess ecosystem management strategies.
2 The Model

Over the last decades, climate models have been developed to an impressive level of complexity. Over a similar period, there has been growing interest in the uncertainty of future climate scenarios. Future climate projections are uncertain because both the initial conditions and the computational representation of the known equations of motion of the natural system are uncertain. To aid future climate policy decisions, accurate quantitative descriptions of the uncertainty in climate outcomes under various possible policies and scenarios are needed. Of course, the multidisciplinary nature of the field presents a challenge. This requires integrating different natural and social sciences modelling paradigms traditions in a unified decision tool. Here, we have decided to extend the modelling framework of Pindyck (2009a,b) that embodies, in a simplified way, all essential ingredients by allowing for real options under Knightian uncertainty. The stochastic dynamic programming framework quantifies scientific uncertainties to the extent possible, and explains the potential implications of Knightian uncertainty for the outcomes of concern to the policy makers. It should be noted that the most obvious challenge along the way is to minimise complexity so that the model setup under complex uncertainty is still tractable.\(^5\)

The model assumes that a forward looking social planner strives to find the optimal timing of a climate policy by maximizing the flow of consumption over time.\(^6\) She faces the intergenerational trade-off problem that investments into a mitigation strategy, which substantially reduces emissions, force the present economy to abstain from consumption, but avoid climate damages that would decrease the future consumption potential. Moreover, a bad timing will certainly lead to one of the following two irreversibility effects. On the one hand, investing too early in mitigation technologies could trigger enormous sunk costs that are not recouped before long. On the other hand, waiting too long may cause irreversible damages to ecological systems that are valuable to human health or the economy. However, ubiquitous uncertainties in almost every component in the projections and especially in the assessment of future climate damages render a well-informed decision about the timing almost impossible. Put differently, all plans depend decisively on the unknown sensitivity of losses to climate change. Hence, particularly the uncertainties of the future climate damages and their effects are focussed on in the following, whereas any other lack of knowledge is assumed to be resolved for the sake of analytical tractability. Expressed mathematically, the policy maker solves the following isoelastic objective function, which consists of the expected net present value of

\[^5\]The plethora of potentially significant contributions to overall atmospheric heat balance that are not treated in the simple model used here includes changes in other well-mixed greenhouse gases, ozone, snow albedo, cloud cover, solar irradiance, and aerosols. From this list, it should be clear that the objectives of the present paper are limited ones. A more complete assessment of outcome probabilities would include detailed models of the past and future of each of these effects.

\[^6\]In our model framework we treat the world as a single entity in the interest of brevity. The world climate policy equilibrium can be constructed as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mitigation strategies. The equilibrium can be determined by simply looking at the single country policy which is defined ignoring the other countries’ abatement policy decisions [Leahy (1993)].
future consumption levels:

\[ W = E \left[ \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \frac{(L(X_t, \Delta T_t)C_t)^{1-\delta}}{1-\delta} e^{-rt} \, dt \right], \]

where \( E[\cdot] \) is the expectation operator and \( C_t \) is the aggregate consumption over time with the initial value normalised to 1. In the simplest form, the level of consumption is assumed to be equivalent to the level of GDP. The parameter \( \delta \geq 0 \) is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and \( r \) is the pure rate of social time preference. The climate damages are measured by \( L(X_t, \Delta T_t) \). This loss function is attached to the level of consumption, where \( \Delta T_t \) describes scientifically estimated changes in temperature and \( X_t \) is a (positive) stochastic damage function parameter determining the sensitivity of losses to global warming.

Instead of trying to model climate impacts in any detail, we keep the problem analytically simple by assuming that damages depend only on the temperature change, which is chosen as a measure of climate change. To be precise, following Pindyck (2009a,b) we assume that the damage from warming and the associated physical impacts of climate change as a fraction of GDP is implied by the exponential loss function

\[ L(X_t, \Delta T_t) = e^{-X_t(\Delta T_t)^2}, \]

where \( 0 < L(X_t, \Delta T_t) \leq 1 \), \( \partial L/\partial (\Delta T_t) \leq 0 \) and \( \partial L/\partial X_t \leq 0 \). This yields GDP at time \( t \) net of damage from warming in the order of \( L(X_t, \Delta T_t)GDP_t \), i.e. climate-induced damages result in less GDP, and hence less consumption.

Before we turn to the modelling of the uncertainty that is attached to \( X_t \) in equation (2), we briefly introduce the other component in the loss function: the temperature increase \( \Delta T_t \). For this we adopt the commonly used climate sensitivity function in Weitzman (2009a) and Pindyck (2009a,b). The single linear differential equation compresses all involved complex physical processes by capturing climate forcings and feedbacks in a simplified manner. Hence, a direct link between the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration \( G_t \) and the temperature increase \( \Delta T_t \) is obtained by

\[ d\Delta T_t = m_1 \left( \frac{\ln (G_t/G_0)}{\ln 2} - m_2 \Delta T_t \right) \, dt, \]

\[ \text{Due the scarcity of empirical information about the magnitude of the damages in question, the shape of the damage function is somewhat arbitrary. Pindyck (2009b) has assumed the exponential function } L(\Delta T) = \exp[-\beta(\Delta T^2)], \text{ where } \beta \text{ follows a gamma distribution. This implies that future damages are fully captured by the probabilistic outcomes of a given distribution. This concept can be understood as risk. However, the present uncertainty about } \beta \text{ also comprises the choice of the probability distribution, which will be tackled in this paper.} \]

\[ \text{Factors that influence the climate are distinguished between forcings and feedbacks. A forcing is understood as a primary effect that changes directly the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the earth-atmosphere system. Emissions of aerosols and greenhouse gases or changes in the solar radiation are examples. A secondary and indirect effect is described by a feedback that boosts (positive feedback) or dampens (negative feedback) a forcing. The blackbody radiation feedback exemplifies an important negative feedback, whereas, for example, the ice-albedo feedback accelerates warming by decreasing the earth’s reflectivity.} \]
where \( G_0 \) is the inherited pre-industrial baseline level of greenhouse gas, and \( m_1 \) and \( m_2 \) are positive parameters. The first term in the bracket stands for the radiative forcing induced by a doubling of the atmospheric greenhouse gases, i.e. \( G_t \) is set to equal \( 2G_0 \). The second term represents the net of all negative and positive feedbacks. A positive parameter for this term thus rules out a runaway greenhouse effect. The parameter \( m_1 \) describes the thermal inertia or the effective capacity to absorb heat by the earth system, which is exemplified by the oceanic heat uptake.

By defining \( H \) as the time horizon with \( \Delta T_t = \Delta T_H \) at \( t = H \) and \( \Delta T_t \to 2\Delta T_H \) as \( t \to \infty \), we obtain equations, which are convenient to use in the real options setting. The following differential equations allow to derive the corresponding partial differential equation related to the real options terms and thus to solve the optimal stopping problem in a straightforward way:

\[
(4) \quad d\Delta T_t = \frac{\ln(2)}{H} (2\Delta T_H - \Delta T_t) \, dt,
\]

and

\[
(5) \quad \Delta T_t = 2\Delta T_H \left(1 - e^{-\frac{\ln(2)}{H}t}\right),
\]

where \( \frac{\ln(2)}{H} \) denotes the adjustment speed of changes in temperature to the eventual changes in temperature \( 2\Delta T_H \).

Let us now focus on the other component in equation (2), which is the sensitivity of losses to global warming. The standard real options approach emphasises the importance of uncertainty in determining option value and timing of option exercise. However, the standard real options approach rules out the situation where policy makers are unsure about the likelihoods of future events. It typically adopts strong assumptions about policy makers’ beliefs and no distinction between risk and uncertainty is made. The usual prescription for decision making under risk then is to select an action that maximises expected utility. This is assumed although the knowledge of climate dynamics is still far from conclusive. New modelling techniques in natural science and greater computing power provide more details and finer distinctions, but do not necessarily lead to more accuracy in the projections. In the more

---

\(^{9}\)There is considerable a priori uncertainty in the probability and scale of climate change, but at least there are historical time series data available to calibrate probability distributions for parameters important in modelling climate sensitivity. On the other hand, based on current knowledge there is a large a priori uncertainty concerning when dramatic technological breakthroughs might occur and how much impact they will have, so allowing for such possibilities should increase the spread of outcomes for global carbon emissions and their consequences.

\(^{10}\)One has to admit that despite more observations, more sophisticated coupled climate models and substantial increases in computing power, climate projections have not narrowed appreciably over the last two decades. Indeed, it has been speculated that foreseeable improvements in the understanding of the underlying physical processes will probably not lead to large reductions in climate sensitivity uncertainty. See Roe & Baker (2007).
realistic Knightian uncertainty scenario, policies therefore become more complex, as now the policy makers carry a set of probability measures for future climate change and consequently every policy measure is associated with an interval of expected costs. This implies that it would be more appropriate to describe the process of \( X_t \) using a set of probability measures, not just one measure such as a geometric Brownian motion with a drift term as often used in real options.\(^{11}\) In other words, the Knightian version of the real options models differs from the plain vanilla real options model by having an entire set of subjective probability distributions. Modelling Knightian uncertainty is a non-trivial task in general. To incorporate a situation where policy makers are unable to assign a precise probability to future alternatives, we use the Knightian uncertainty modelling approach developed by Nishimura & Ozaki (2007). In their comprehensive representation of Knightian uncertainty, unresolved processes are represented by computationally efficient stochastic-dynamic schemes. We introduce their treatment of Knightian uncertainty below.

To formalise the concept, let \( (B_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \) be a standard Brownian motion on \( (\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, P) \) that is endowed with the standard filtration \( (\mathcal{F}_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \) for \( (B_t) \). Consider the real-valued stochastic process \( (X_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \) generated by the Brownian motion with drift \( \alpha \) and standard deviation \( \sigma \):

\[
(6) \quad dX_t = \alpha X_t dt + \sigma X_t dB_t.
\]

In equation (6) the particular probability measure \( P \) is regarded as capturing the true nature of the underlying process.\(^{12}\) This, however, is highly unlikely, as this would imply that policy makers are absolutely certain about the probability distribution that describes the future development of \( (X_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \). Unlike this standard case, Knightian uncertainty describes how policy makers form ambiguous beliefs. Thereby a set \( \mathcal{P} \) of probability measures is assumed to comprise likely candidates to map the future dynamics.

Technically spoken, these measures are generated from \( P \) by means of density generators, \( \theta \).\(^{13}\) Such a probability measure is denoted by \( Q^\theta \) in the following. By restricting the density generators to a certain range like a real-valued interval \( [-\kappa, \kappa] \), we are enabled to confine the range of deviations from the original measure \( P \). The broader this interval is, the larger

\(^{11}\) Alternatively, the imprecise probability concept in Reichert (1997) employs a set of probability measures describing the uncertain model parameters. For example, the ambiguity involved in the estimation of the global mean temperature change in the 21st century is analysed in Kriegler & Held (2005) by constructing a belief function that is the lower envelope of the corresponding distributions. The model results in large imprecisions of the estimates, highlighting the key role of uncertainties in climate projections. Apart from deriving upper and lower bounds of the sets, Borsuk & Tomassini (2005) examine other representations of the probability measures and demonstrate how to use them to describe climate change uncertainties.

\(^{12}\) The Brownian motion in equation (6) is a reasonable approximation and we share this assumption with most of the existing literature.

\(^{13}\) Assume a stochastic process \( (\theta)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \) that is real-valued, measurable and \( (\mathcal{F}_t) \)-adapted. Furthermore it is twice integrable, hence \( \theta := (\theta)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \in \mathcal{L}^2 \subset \mathcal{L} \). Define \((z^\theta_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}\) by \( z^\theta_t = e^{\left(-\frac{1}{2} \int_0^t \theta_s^2 ds - \frac{t}{2} \int_0^t \theta_s dB_s\right)} \forall t \geq 0 \). Note that the stochastic integral \( \int_0^t \theta_s dB_s \) is well-defined for each \( t \), as \( \theta \in \mathcal{L} \). A stochastic process \( \theta \in \mathcal{L} \) is a density generator, if \((z^\theta_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}\) is a \( (\mathcal{F}_t) \)-martingale. Using a density generator \( \theta \) another probability
the set of probability measures, $\mathcal{P} = \{ Q^\theta \mid \theta \in [-\kappa, \kappa] \}$, and thus the higher the degree of ambiguity. This specific notion of confining the density generators to an interval $[-\kappa, \kappa]$ is named $\kappa$-ignorance by Chen & Epstein (2002), who have applied this to a different field of research.

Endowed with this concept we can now define a stochastic processes $(B^\theta_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ by

$$\begin{align*}
B^\theta_t &= B_t + t\theta
\end{align*}$$

for each $\theta \in [-\kappa, \kappa]$. As Girsanov’s theorem shows, each process $(B^\theta_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ defined as above is a standard Brownian motion with respect to $Q^\theta$ on $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T, Q^\theta)$. Inserting the definition of $(B^\theta_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ into equation (6), we obtain for every $\theta \in [-\kappa, \kappa]$

$$\begin{align*}
dX_t &= (\alpha - \sigma \theta) X_t dt + \sigma X_t dB^\theta_t.
\end{align*}$$

Equation (8) displays all stochastic differential equations and thus all future developments of $(X_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ that the decision maker thinks possible. Note that the implementation of Knightian uncertainty implies different drift but the same volatility terms.

Knightian uncertainty allows to assume that the policy maker is uncertainty-averse, which makes her consider the worst case scenario. As $e^{-X_t(\Delta T_t)^2} GDP_t$ is calculated as GDP net of damages, the worst case scenario is described by the largest value of $X_t$. As an illustration and in order to gain an intuition we have numerically simulated equation (2) and (6) for a time period of 200 years for $\Delta T_H = 1.9^\circ C$ versus $\Delta T_H = 3.4^\circ C$ (equivalent to pre-industry levels of $2.5^\circ C$ versus $4^\circ C$) of warming and three alternative drift terms. The character of the impact function (2) for various drift terms is shown in Figure 1. The various graphs indicate the forces at play in our analysis. Two effects must be recognised. First, the highest value of the drift term generates the maximum of $1 - L(X_t, \Delta T_t)$ and therefore the minimum of $GDP_t$ net of damages. Second, as can be seen the function $L(X_t, \Delta T_t)$ spreads out considerably for higher temperature increases. After 100 years and for $\Delta T = 3.4^\circ C$ the damage is 0.09154 = 9.15 percent of GDP.\footnote{The calibrated damages from warming are in the range of previous estimates. Weitzman (2009b) has assumed damage costs of 1.7 percent of GDP for $2.5^\circ C$ of warming – a level that is considered to be a threshold for danger. For higher temperature increases he has assumed rapidly increasing damages of 9 (25) percent of GDP for $4^\circ C (5^\circ C)$ of warming. Millner et al. (2010) have assumed damages of 1.7 (6.5) percent of GDP for $2.5^\circ C (5^\circ C)$ of warming.}

After understanding the process of $X_t$, we can now discuss the optimal response to climate change under Knightian uncertainty. If the uncertainty-averse decision maker conducts no climate policy – referred to as the business as usual approach - and faces Knightian uncertainty measure $Q^\theta$ on $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}_T)$ can be generated from $P$ by

$$Q^\theta(A) = \int_A e^\frac{\theta}{\Delta T} dP \quad \forall A \in \mathcal{F}_T.$$ 

Note that any probability measure that is thus defined is called equivalent to $P$.\footnote{The calibrated damages from warming are in the range of previous estimates. Weitzman (2009b) has assumed damage costs of 1.7 percent of GDP for $2.5^\circ C$ of warming – a level that is considered to be a threshold for danger. For higher temperature increases he has assumed rapidly increasing damages of 9 (25) percent of GDP for $4^\circ C (5^\circ C)$ of warming. Millner et al. (2010) have assumed damages of 1.7 (6.5) percent of GDP for $2.5^\circ C (5^\circ C)$ of warming.}
Due to Global Warming in Percent of GDP.

The initial value for \( X \) is \( X_0 = 0.008 \) and \( H = 100 \). The simulated time series are computed ignoring the uncertainty part of equation (6), i.e. \( dX_t = \alpha X_t dt \).

in equation (1), then the resulting intertemporal welfare, \( W^N \), with consumption growing at a rate \( g_0 \) and initial consumption normalised as 1 is determined as

\[
W^N(X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) = \min_{Q^\theta \in \mathcal{P}} \mathbb{E}^{Q^\theta} \left[ \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( e^{-X_s(\Delta T_s)^2} C_s \right)^{1-\delta} e^{-r_s s} ds \right| \mathcal{F}_t \]
\]

(9) 

s.t. equations (4) and (8), where “N” refers to the no-actions-taken approach, \( r - (1-\delta)g_0 \) is assumed to be positive, and \( \mathbb{E}^{Q^\theta} [\cdot | \mathcal{F}_t] \) represents the expectation value with respect to \( Q^\theta \in \mathcal{P} \) conditional on \( \mathcal{F}_t \).\(^{15}\) The first equation holds as uncertainty aversion implies that the policy maker reckons with the lowest expected welfare value.\(^{16}\) Please note that the

\(^{15}\)For reasons of mathematical tractability we assume that the continuous Knightian uncertainty is independent of time and therefore the planning horizon is infinite. The reasoning for the perpetual assumption is that the underlying time scales in the natural climate system are much longer than those in the economic system. Technically, we consider \( T \to \infty \) for \( (B_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \) and \( (B^\theta_t)_{0 \leq t \leq T} \) in the above made introduction to the concept of Knightian uncertainty.

\(^{16}\)First, the uncertainty-averse policy maker takes only the probability measure into consideration that creates the worst outcomes for the welfare. Then she strives to find the policy strategy that maximises this ‘worst-case welfare function’. The maxmin nature of the problem links the analysis with contributions on robust control. See, for example, Funke & Paetz (2011).
The impact of Knightian uncertainty is not necessarily monotonous for the policy maker. As shown in the following, $W_N$ consists of two components: a particular integral that expresses the perpetual business as usual policy and the real options to adopt the policy. Both parts are affected by the Knightian uncertainty.\footnote{Though real options only dominate the particular integral with extreme Knightian uncertainty, while the effect of smaller Knightian uncertainty on the particular integral is prevailing.}

For the sake of analytical tractability, we apply a Taylor series expansion to $e^{-X_s(1-\delta)\Delta T^2_s}$ such that

$$e^{-X_s(1-\delta)\Delta T^2_s} \approx 1 - X_s (1 - \delta) \Delta T^2_s + \frac{1}{2} \left( X_s (1 - \delta) \Delta T^2_s \right)^2,$$

where $0 < L(\Delta T_t) \leq 1$ and $\partial L/\partial (\Delta T_t) \leq 0$ still hold. By inserting (10) into (9) we thus obtain

$$W_N (X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \min_{Q^0 \in \mathcal{P}} E^{Q^0} \left[ \int_0^\infty \left( 1 - X_s (1 - \delta) \Delta T^2_s + \frac{1}{2} \left( X_s (1 - \delta) \Delta T^2_s \right)^2 \right) e^{-(r - (1-\delta)g_0)\Delta T_s} ds \mid \mathcal{F}_t \right],$$

s.t. equation (4) and (8). Using Itô’s Lemma and following the standard dynamic programming argument, we formulate the problem in terms of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation\footnote{For the derivation please see Appendix A.}

$$(r - (1 - \delta)g_0)W_N = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} - X^* \Delta T^2 + \frac{1}{2} X^* (1 - \delta) \Delta T^4$$

$$+ \frac{\ln(2)}{H} \left( 2\Delta T_H - \Delta T \right) \frac{\partial W_N}{\partial \Delta T} + (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) X^* \frac{\partial W_N}{\partial X^*} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 X^2 \frac{\partial^2 W_N}{\partial X^*^2}.$$\label{eq:12}

The asterisk represents the density generator $-\kappa$, meaning that $Q^*$ is generated by $-\kappa$ and the stochastic process $X^*$ is defined by inserting $-\kappa$ into equation (8):

$$dX^*_t = (\alpha + \sigma \kappa) X^*_t dt + \sigma X^*_t dB^\kappa_t.$$\label{eq:13}

For policies to be optimal, equation (12) must hold.

The solution of equation (12) is the sum of a particular and general solution. The particular solution $W_{NP}$ is obtained by integrating the integral for $W_N$ of equation (11) without considering possible policy intervention. Therefore, the real options terms are not exercised. It is straightforward to explain $W_{NP}$ as the value of the business as usual policy. The policy maker does not intervene through exercising the real options to reduce the green house gas emissions, which leads to a cap of the future temperature changes $\Delta T_H$. The general/homogenous solutions or real options solutions $W_{NG}$ are obtained by focusing attention on the homogenous
part of equation (12) such that

\[(r - (1 - \delta) g_0) W^{NG} = \frac{\ln(2)}{H} (2\Delta T_H - \Delta T_s) \frac{\partial W^{NG}}{\partial \Delta T} + (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) X^* \frac{\partial W^{NG}}{\partial X^*} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 X^* \frac{\partial^2 W^{NG}}{\partial X^*^2}. \]

(14)

Now we turn our attention to the welfare value of implementing a climate policy. Let us assume that the policy maker is willing to pay annual abatements costs \( w(\tau) \) as a percentage of GDP to limit the temperature increase at \( t = H \) to less than or equal to \( \tau: \Delta T_H \leq \tau \).

Analogous to the derivation procedure in Appendix A, the intertemporal welfare function of taking action to reduce the green house gas emission, \( W^A \), is then given by

\[(r - (1 - \delta) g_0) W^A = (1 - \frac{\ln(2)}{H} (2\tau - \Delta T_s) \frac{\partial W^A}{\partial \Delta T} + (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) X^* \frac{\partial W^A}{\partial X^*} + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 X^* \frac{\partial^2 W^A}{\partial X^*^2}, \]

(15)

which is derived from the following integral

\[W^A(t = 0, X, \Delta T; \tau) = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \times \]

\[E^Q \left[ (1 - w(\tau))^{1-\delta} \left( 1 - X_s^*(1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2 + \frac{1}{2} (X_s^*(1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2)^2 \right)^2 \right] e^{-(r - (1 - \delta) g_0)s} ds \bigg| \mathcal{F}_t \]

(16)

s.t. equation (8), and equation (17) that is

\[d\Delta T_s = \frac{\ln(2)}{H} (2\tau - \Delta T_s) ds, \]

(17)

where equation (17) is a variant of equation (4) by replacing \( \Delta T_H \) with \( \tau \). If climate policy is time-consistent, then the solutions to \( W^A \) can be obtained by integrating equation (17) directly. In this case, the thresholds for \( X^* \) of taking actions to limit the future temperature increase to less than or equal to \( \tau \) at \( t = H \) are then computed from the identity

\[W^A(\bar{X}, \Delta T; \tau) = W^{NP}(\bar{X}, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) + W^{NG}(\bar{X}, \Delta T; \Delta T_H), \]

(18)

In practical terms, this means that the policy maker reduces \( G_i \) in equation (3) so that the increase in temperature is limited to less than \( \tau \) at \( t = H \).

Substituting, we have

\[W^A(\bar{X}, \Delta T; \tau) = W^{NP}(\bar{X}, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) + W^{NG}(\bar{X}, \Delta T; \Delta T_H), \]

(19)

where \( \bar{X} \) denotes the thresholds at which the policy-maker would take action by exercising
the real options today and committing paying annual abatement costs \( w(\tau) \) in percent of GDP to limit the future temperature increase to less than \( \tau \) at \( t = H \). On the contrary, exercising of the real options \( W^{NG}(\bar{X}, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) \) implies that the policy maker forgoes the option to wait and act later as more information about \( X_t \) becomes available. The next step is to solve the particular integrals of \( W^{NP} \) and \( W^A \), and real options \( W^{NG} \). As there are no uncertain terms for the processes of changes in temperatures \( \Delta T_t \), we can use equation (5) to obtain

\[
\Delta T_t = 2\tau \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{\ln 2}{r}t} \right).
\]

As shown in Appendix B the following particular integrals result from Itô’s Lemma:

\[
W^{NP}(X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) = \frac{1}{1-\delta} \left[ \frac{1}{r - (1-\delta) g_0} - 4\Delta T^2_H (1-\delta) \gamma_1 X^* + 8\Delta T_H (1-\delta)^2 \gamma_2 X^2 \right],
\]

where

\[
\gamma_1 = \frac{1}{\eta_1} - \frac{2}{\eta_1 + \frac{\ln 2}{H}} + \frac{1}{\eta_1 + \frac{2\ln 2}{H}},
\]

\[
\gamma_2 = \frac{1}{\eta_2} - \frac{4}{\eta_2 + \frac{\ln 2}{H}} + \frac{6}{\eta_2 + \frac{3\ln 2}{H}} - \frac{4}{\eta_2 + \frac{4\ln 2}{H}} + \frac{1}{\eta_2 + \frac{5\ln 2}{H}},
\]

\[
\eta_1 = r - (1-\delta) g_0 - (\alpha + \kappa \sigma),
\]

\[
\eta_2 = r - (1-\delta) g_0 - (2(\alpha + \kappa \sigma) + \sigma^2).
\]

Note that it is assumed that both \( \eta_1 \) and \( \eta_2 \) are positive. After obtaining the analytical particular solutions of equations (21) and (22), we now need to turn our attention to the real options term \( W^{NG} \) in equation (14). In Appendix C we show that the general solutions have the forms:

\[
W^{NG}(t = 0, X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) = A_1 X^{*\beta_1} \left( \Delta T^2 - 4 \Delta T_H \Delta T + 4 \Delta T^2_H \right),
\]

where \( \beta_1 \) is the positive root of the quadratic characteristic equation

\[
\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \beta (\beta + 1) + (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) \beta - \left( r - (1-\delta) g_0 + 2 \left( \frac{\ln(2)}{H} \right) \right) = 0,
\]

and \( A_1 \) is the unknown parameter to be determined by the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. The meaning of equation (23) is straightforward. For a small \( \Delta T_H \) the
value of the options to take actions is small – the option of taking action is reduced for less global warming. The effective discount rate for real options is a positive function of $2 \ln(2)/H$. As we know from equation (4), $\ln(2)/H$ also denotes the adjustment speed of changes in temperature. Higher adjustment speed to the higher temperature (for example, $H = 50$ years instead of $H = 100$ years) means that the damage is higher and thus the option value is smaller. After obtaining the solutions to equation (19) by applying the value-matching condition, the smooth-pasting condition is given by equalising the derivative of (22) with respect to $X^*$ with the sum of the derivatives of (21) and (23) with respect to $X^*$.

Substituting (21) – (23) back into the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions yields

$$4\gamma_1 \left( \Delta T_H^2 - \Delta \tau^2 (1 - w(\tau))^{1-\delta} \right) \bar{X} - 8 (1 - \delta) \gamma_2 \left( \Delta T_H^3 - (1 - w(\tau))^{1-\delta} \tau^4 \right) \bar{X}^2$$

(25)

$$= \frac{1 - (1 - w(\tau))^{1-\delta}}{(r - (1 - \delta) g_0) (1 - \delta)} + A_1 \bar{X}^{\beta_1} \left( \Delta T^2 - 4 \Delta T_H \Delta T + 4 \Delta T_H^2 \right),$$

and

$$4\gamma_1 \left( \Delta T_H^2 - \Delta \tau^2 (1 - w(\tau))^{1-\delta} \right) - 16 (1 - \delta) \gamma_2 \left( \Delta T_H^3 - (1 - w(\tau))^{1-\delta} \tau^4 \right) \bar{X}$$

(26)

$$= A_1 \beta_1 \bar{X}^{\beta_1-1} \left( \Delta T^2 - 4 \Delta T_H \Delta T + 4 \Delta T_H^2 \right).$$

So far, our discussion of Knightian uncertainty has been exclusively analytical. With the optimality conditions and the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, we can now proceed to the numerical simulations of the model.

### 3 Numerical Simulations and Results

While the preceding section has laid out the modelling framework, we now focus on a thorough numerical analysis of the model. Several problems occur when mapping the theoretical framework presented above into real-world climate data. Where possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical studies. The determination of some parameters, however, requires the use of judgement, i.e. they reflect a back-of-the-envelope calculation. Therefore, for each parameter a sensitivity analysis over a sufficiently wide grid is performed. The unit time length corresponds to one year. Our base parameters are $\sigma = 0.075$, $\kappa = 0.02$, $r = 0.04$, $\alpha = 0.0$, $g_0 = 0.01$, $\delta = 0.0$, and $H = 100$. $\Delta T_H$ is assumed to be $3.4^\circ C$ which is equivalent to 4 degrees of warming since the pre-industrial level. $\tau$ is assumed to be $1.4^\circ C$.

---

20 Despite the increasingly detailed understanding of climate processes from a large body of research, various parameters involved inevitably remain inestimable, except in retrospect.

21 The calibrated model is not based on detailed time series data in the way econometric models are and does not have the projective power of the latter. Note, however, that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise quantitative estimates of the impact of Knightian uncertainty, but rather to illustrate the scale of the Knightian uncertainty impact, and to see what we can learn from this framework. We address this point clearly and frankly knowing that economics ultimately is an empirical science. Without empirical evidence, many beautiful theories would be merely that beautiful.
by assumption which is equivalent to 2 degrees of warming compared with the pre-industrial level. Special attention has to be paid to the calibration of \( w(\tau) \). The term \( w(\tau) \) represents the achievability and costs of climate targets. What are the economic costs of reaching the target of climate stabilisation at no more than 2°C above pre-industrial level by the end of this century? To assess this question, Edenhofer et al. (2010) have compared the energy-environment-economy models MERGE, REMIND, POLES, TIMER and E3MG in a model comparison exercise. In order to improve model comparability, the macroeconomic drivers in the five modelling frameworks employed were harmonised to represent similar economic developments. On the other hand, different views of technology diffusion and different structural assumptions regarding the underlying economic system across the models remained. This helps to shed light on how different modelling assumptions translate into differences in mitigation costs. Low stabilisation crucially depends upon learning and technologies available. Despite different structures employed in the models, four of the five models show a similar pattern in mitigations costs for achieving the first-best 400ppm \( \text{CO}_2 \) concentration pathway. After allowing for endogenous technical change and carbon capture and storage with a storage capacity of at least 120 GtC, the mitigation costs are estimated to be approximately 2 percent of worldwide GDP. These costs turned out to be of a similar order of magnitude across the models. We therefore assume that \( w(\tau) = 0.02 \).

In the real option literature the problem we must solve is referred to as “optimal stopping”. The idea is that at any point in time the value of temperature reductions is compared with the expected value of waiting \( dt \), given the available information set and the knowledge of the stochastic processes. First, we consider the thresholds for adopting climate policies, i.e. we calculate the optimal timing of adopting climate policies. The optimal strategy is to stop and adopt the climate policy right now if \( X_t^* \geq \bar{X}^* \) and to continue waiting if \( X_t^* < \bar{X}^* \), where \( \bar{X}^* \) is the threshold value.\(^{22}\) To start with, in Figures 2 and 3 we focus our attention on the sensitivity of the optimal thresholds of an uncertainty-averse policy maker with respect to the degree of Knightian uncertainty \( \kappa \) and changes in the degree of risk, i.e. the volatility of the geometric Brownian motion process \( \sigma \). The solutions for \( \kappa = 0 \) characterise the situation of a single probability measure and therefore the situation without Knightian uncertainty as in a traditional real option framework.

Figure 2 provides a sensitivity analysis of the threshold with respect to \( \kappa \). The numerical results indicate an acceleration of climate policy for higher degrees of Knightian uncertainty, i.e. increasing ambiguity has an unequivocally positive impact upon the timing of optimal climate policy and shrinks the continuation region where exercising climate policy is sub-optimal. In contrast, Figure 3 indicates that the threshold value at which climate policy is implemented is increasing in the noisiness level \( \sigma \). The intuition is that the policy maker can counteract the impact from additional risk by a wait and see attitude for the time being.

\(^{22}\)It is worth conjecturing that the existence of the no action area sheds light on why policy makers often deem it desirable to stay put, contrary to intuition which stems from thinking in terms of a simple cause and effect framework.
The case $\kappa = 0$ again represents the case of no Knightian uncertainty. As expected, increased Knightian uncertainty tends to accelerate optimal timing, while increased risk leads to the opposite response.

Additional observations emerge from a bird’s eye examination of the 3-dimensional Figure 4, which helps to visualise the parameter space. The perspective is such that the viewer is looking from the origin from a point high in the positive orthant, i.e. from a low value for all three axis variables. Figure 4 tells essentially the same story. The qualitative result is that as $\kappa$ increases or/and $\sigma$ decreases, the threshold plunges downward. Furthermore it is evident from Figure 4 that an increase in $\kappa$ has a comparatively smaller impact on the climate policy threshold.

The fundamental explanation to this finding lies in the fact that higher Knightian uncertainty decreases the confidence of the policy maker on the credibility of the probability distribution describing the stochastic behaviour of the underlying state variable $X_t$. Consequently, a rational policy maker becomes more reluctant to postpone the timing of climate policy further into the future on the basis of this vaguer probability distribution. We now put the spotlight on the discount rate.

To explore the sensitivity to alternative discounting assumptions, we employ a range of $0.035 < r < 0.055$. As expected, the results in Figure 5 affirm the view that higher discount rates will bolster the reasons for taking a “wait and see attitude” towards climate policy. This
is due to the fact that for a small value of $r$ the particular integral is a good deal bigger and therefore the intertemporal damage is substantially larger. Conversely, a higher discounting factor will trigger a later adoption and a lower intensity of climate policy. This highlights the importance of attaining a consensus on the discount rate before an appraisal on the optimal timing of policy implementation can be achieved. Once again, we also find that if policy makers face a higher level of Knightian uncertainty, then the option value is lower, thus the benefit of climate policy is bigger and the policy maker exercises the option earlier.

Figure 6 provides a sensitivity analysis of the thresholds with respect to $w(\tau)$, i.e. we illustrate the impact of alternative climate stabilisation costs upon the threshold. The major result of the simulations is that higher climate stabilisation costs lead to an increase of the no action area, i.e. an increasing $w(\tau)$ increases the climate policy threshold. Intuitively, this makes perfect sense. Higher costs make climate policies less attractive for policy makers, so policy makers hesitate to perform them in the first place. However, the option value of the climate policy opportunity is again lower under Knightian uncertainty than in the standard model. Therefore, an uncertainty-averse policy maker acts earlier.
Finally we analyse how different expected degrees of warming, i.e. changes in $\Delta T_H$, affect the threshold. Figure 7 clearly indicates that the tactic to keep options open and await new information rather than undertake climate policy today becomes less attractive. In other words, higher $\Delta T_H$ values accelerate climate policies by shrinking the no action area.

4 Conclusions

The modelling of Knightian uncertainty is a relatively unchartered area of climate research. In spite of its clear climate policy relevance, few authors have explored the topic yet. While the paper will be of interest to specialists in real option theory, given the policy importance of the issue in hand we also believe that our assessment of the central question motivating our analysis will be of interest to a wider audience of climate scientists and policy makers. A unifying message from our paper could be stated as follows: We have demonstrated that Knightian uncertainty affects irreversible climate policies in a way which radically differs from the impact of risk, and that Knightian uncertainty accelerates climate policy. This insight holds non-trivial value for decision making. We believe that our application of Knightian uncertainty comes with an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that it allows one
to recognise the difference between risk and uncertainty.\textsuperscript{23} Thus it provides a more realistic grounding for assessing current climate policy and to derive optimal and rational policy trajectories when fundamental uncertainties and ambiguities are involved.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand one has to admit that the comparative static results also have their limitations. First, the numerical results do not account for the fundamental dynamic nature of abatement and mitigation policies. Second, we have focussed on Knightian uncertainty in the damage function. However, there are further layers of uncertainty in complex climate models about which we have ambiguous beliefs. Our analysis may therefore be considered as a first step and it may be refined in several ways. One future research question is the possibility of tipping points. In addition to a high level of complexity, the major challenge of this extension is the need to incorporate thresholds, discontinuities and sudden switches which remain poorly understood on a theoretical level.\textsuperscript{25} Another interesting direction goes towards a more detailed analysis of short- and medium-run climate projections.\textsuperscript{26} We hope to take up some of these tasks in our future work and we consider it probable that this research agenda and the conceptual follow-up issues will continue to warrant substantial research effort in the future.

Acknowledgement
The research was supported through the Cluster of Excellence "Integrated Climate System Analysis and Prediction" (CliSAP), University of Hamburg, funded through the German Science Foundation (DFG) and the International Max Planck Research School on Earth System Modelling (IMPRS-ESM). We are grateful to Hermann Held for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Appendixes

A Derivation of equation (12)
First, we to show that the $Q^\theta \in \mathcal{P}$ that minimises the expectation value in equation (11) is generated by $\theta = -\kappa$.

\textsuperscript{23}To quote from Mastrandrea & Schneider (2004, p. 571) “we do not recommend that our quantitative results be taken literally, but we suggest that our probabilistic framework and methods be taken seriously”. See also Schneider & Mastrandrea (2005).

\textsuperscript{24}Some readers may find the ambiguity and the additional layer of uncertainty psychologically disturbing. But if the previously agreed modeling framework was wrong and the certainty about appropriate climate policy unjustified, it seems an improvement.

\textsuperscript{25}The climate literature on tipping points is, indeed, a fast growing industry. Unfortunately, there are not any models yet incorporating such nonlinearities into micro-founded decision-making frameworks with Knightian uncertainty. It must be emphasised that the model described here is sufficiently general to study various tipping points. It is only necessary to fine-tune the framework for specific nonlinearities and to embed further stochastic processes.

\textsuperscript{26}In Figure 2 – 6 the impact of Knightian uncertainty is “statically” addressed. Hence, we may next aim to study the temporal implications of Knightian uncertainty, and the impact of less medium-run ambiguity resulting from more reliable decadal projections upon optimal climate policies.
We know that \(X_s(1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2\) has a small value so that \(\frac{1}{2} (X_s(1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2)^2\) only adds insignificantly to the term in equation (11). We therefore neglect the quadratic term when minimising the expectation value in the following.

Additionally Fubini’s theorem for conditional expectations transforms \(W^N(X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H)\) to

\[
(A.1) \quad \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \min\{Q^\theta \in \mathcal{P} : \int_0^\infty e^{-(r-(1-\delta)g_0)t} E^Q^\theta [1 - X_s(1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2 | \mathcal{F}_t] \, ds \}
\]

By applying Itô’s Lemma to the logarithm of \(X_s\) we obtain \(\forall s \geq 0:\)

\[
(A.2) \quad X_s = X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 - \sigma \theta)s + \sigma B_s^\theta} = X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 - \sigma \theta)s + \sigma B^\theta_s}.
\]

Obviously it holds that

\[
(A.3) \quad X_s = X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 - \sigma \theta)s} e^{\sigma B_s^\theta} \leq X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + \sigma \kappa)s} e^{\sigma B^\theta_s} \quad \forall s \geq 0, \quad \forall \theta \in [-\kappa, \kappa].
\]

Due to the monotonicity of the conditional expectation value, we obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
E^Q^\theta \left[1 - X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 - \sigma \theta)s} e^{\sigma B^\theta_s} (1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2 | \mathcal{F}_t\right] \\
\geq E^Q^\theta \left[1 - X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + \sigma \kappa)s} e^{\sigma B_s^\theta} (1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2 | \mathcal{F}_t\right] \\
= \left(1 - X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + \sigma \kappa)s}\right) (1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2 E^Q^\theta \left[e^{\sigma B_s^\theta} | \mathcal{F}_t\right] \\
= \left(1 - X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + \sigma \kappa)s}\right) (1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2 e^{\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 s} \\
(A.4) \quad = \left(1 - X_0 e^{(\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 + \sigma \kappa)s}\right) (1 - \delta) \Delta T_s^2 E^{Q^{-\kappa}} \left[e^{\sigma B^{-\kappa}_s} | \mathcal{F}_t\right] \\
\forall s \geq 0, \forall \theta \in [-\kappa, \kappa].
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, the measure \(Q^{-\kappa} \in \mathcal{P}\) minimises the expectation value in (11), which we therefore denote as \(Q^*\). Consequently the process \(X\) that results from implementing \(\theta = -\kappa\) into equation (8) shall be called \(X^*\).

For the following considerations let \(W^N(X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H)\) be conveniently abbreviated by \(W^N\). The corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to equation (11) is as follows (see for example chapter 3.1. in Stokey (2009) as an introduction to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation):

\[
(r - (1 - \delta) g_0) W^N = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \left(1 - X^*(1 - \delta) \Delta T^2 + \frac{1}{2} (X^*(1 - \delta) \Delta T^2)^2\right) + \frac{1}{dt} E^{Q^*} [dW^N | \mathcal{F}_t]
\]

\[
(A.5) \quad = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} - X^* \Delta T^2 + \frac{1}{2} X^*(1 - \delta) \Delta T^4 + \frac{1}{dt} E^{Q^*} [dW^N | \mathcal{F}_t].
\]

\(W^N\) is obviously differentiable at least once in \(\Delta T\) and twice in \(X^*,\) which allows to apply
Itô’s Lemma:

\[
dW^N = \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial \Delta T} d\Delta T + \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial X^*} dX^* + \frac{\partial^2 W^N}{\partial X^{*2}} (dX^*)^2
\]

\[
= \ln \left( \frac{2}{\Delta T} \right) \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial \Delta T} dt + \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial X^*} \left[ (\alpha + \sigma \kappa) X^*_t dt + \sigma X^*_t dB_t^j \right] + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 X^{*2} \frac{\partial^2 W^N}{\partial X^{*2}} dt
\]

(A.6)

by using equation (4) in the text. Taking expectation of (A6) and dividing by \(dt\) we obtain

\[
\frac{E[dW^N]}{dt} = \ln \left( \frac{2}{\Delta T} \right) \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial \Delta T} + \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial X^*} \left[ (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) X^*_t \right] + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 X^{*2} \frac{\partial^2 W^N}{\partial X^{*2}}.
\]

(A.7)

Substituting (A7) back to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (A5) gives

\[
(r - (1 - \delta) g_0) W^N = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} - X^* \Delta T^2 + \frac{1}{2} X^{*2} (1 - \delta) \Delta T^4
\]

\[
+ \ln \left( \frac{2}{\Delta T} \right) \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial \Delta T} + \frac{\partial W^N}{\partial X^*} \left[ (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) X^*_t \right] + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 X^{*2} \frac{\partial^2 W^N}{\partial X^{*2}},
\]

(A.8)

which is equation (12) in the text.

B Particular solutions to \(W^{NP}\) for \(W^A\)

Using equations (11) and (5) yields the following particular integral,

\[
W^{NP}(X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \times
\]

\[
\int_{t=0}^{\infty} \left[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{(-1)^{i+1}}{i!} X^{*i} e^{\left[ (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) + \frac{1}{2} (i-1) \sigma^2 \right] s} (1 - \delta)^i \left( 2\Delta T_H \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{ln 2}{\Delta T_H}} \right) \right)^{2i} \right] e^{-(r - (1 - \delta) g_0) s} ds.
\]

(B.1)

In the same manner we employ equation (16) and (20) to derive

\[
W^A(X, \Delta T; \tau) = \frac{(1 - w(\tau))^{1 - \delta}}{1 - \delta} \times
\]

\[
\int_{t=0}^{\infty} \left[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{(-1)^{i+1}}{i!} X^{*i} e^{\left[ (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) + \frac{1}{2} (i-1) \sigma^2 \right] s} (1 - \delta)^i \left( 2\Delta T_H \left( 1 - e^{-\frac{ln 2}{\Delta T_H}} \right) \right)^{2i} \right] e^{-(r - (1 - \delta) g_0) s} ds.
\]

(B.2)

Equations (B1) and (B2) result from Itô’s Lemma which means that equation (A2) with \(\theta = -\kappa\) is applied to equation (11) and (16), respectively. Furthermore please note that
\( E^{Q^{-n}} \left[ e^{\sigma B^{-n}} | \mathcal{F}_t \right] = e^{\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 t} \). By expanding the terms

\[
(B.3) \quad \left(1 - e^{-\frac{\ln^2 t}{\pi^2}} \right)^2 = 1 - 2e^{-\frac{\ln^2 t}{\pi^2}} + e^{-\frac{2 \ln^2 t}{\pi^2}}
\]

and

\[
(B.4) \quad \left(1 - e^{-\frac{\ln^2 t}{\pi^2}} \right)^4 = 1 - 4e^{-\frac{\ln^2 t}{\pi^2}} + 6e^{-\frac{2 \ln^2 t}{\pi^2}} - 4e^{-\frac{3 \ln^2 t}{\pi^2}} + e^{-\frac{4 \ln^2 t}{\pi^2}},
\]

we obtain

\[
(B.5) \quad \left[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{2} \frac{(-1)^{i+1}}{i!} X^i e^{\left[ i(\alpha + \kappa \sigma) + \frac{1}{2} \iota (i-1) \sigma^2 \right] s} (1 - \delta)^i \left(2\Delta T_H \left(1 - e^{-\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} \right) \right)^{2i} \right] e^{-(r-(1-\delta)g_0)s} \]

\[
= e^{-(r-(1-\delta)g_0)s} - 4\Delta T_H^2 (1 - \delta) X^*(1 - \delta)^s \left(2e^{-\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + e^{-\frac{2 \ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} \right) e^{-(r-(1-\delta)g_0)s} \]

\[
+ 8\Delta T_H (1 - \delta)^2 X^s e^{2(\alpha + \kappa \sigma + \sigma^2) s} \times \]

\[
\left(1 - 4e^{-\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + 6e^{-\frac{2 \ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} - 4e^{-\frac{3 \ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + e^{-\frac{4 \ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} \right)^4 e^{-(r-(1-\delta)g_0)s}.
\]

Substituting (B5) back into (B1) and integrating yields

\[
W^{NP} (X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) = \frac{1}{1 - \delta} \left[ \frac{1}{r - (1 - \delta) g_0} - 4\Delta T_H^2 (1 - \delta) X^* \left( \frac{1}{\eta_1} - \frac{2}{\eta_1 + \frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + \frac{1}{\eta_1 + 2\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} \right) \right]
\]

\[
(B.6) \quad + 8\Delta T_H (1 - \delta)^2 X^2 \left( \frac{1}{\eta_2} - \frac{4}{\eta_2 + \frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + \frac{6}{\eta_2 + 2\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} - \frac{4}{\eta_2 + 3\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + \frac{1}{\eta_2 + 4\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} \right),
\]

where

\[
\eta_1 = r - (1 - \delta) g_0 - (\alpha + \kappa \sigma), \quad \eta_2 = r - (1 - \delta) g_0 - (2(\alpha + \kappa \sigma) + \sigma^2).
\]

Similarly, we have

\[
W^A (X, \Delta T; \tau) = \frac{(1 - w(\tau))^{1-\delta}}{1 - \delta} \left[ \frac{1}{r - (1 - \delta) g_0} - 4\Delta T_H^2 (1 - \delta) X^* \left( \frac{1}{\eta_1} - \frac{2}{\eta_1 + \frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + \frac{1}{\eta_1 + 2\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} \right) \right]
\]

\[
(B.7) \quad + 8\Delta T_H (1 - \delta)^2 X^2 \left( \frac{1}{\eta_2} - \frac{4}{\eta_2 + \frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + \frac{6}{\eta_2 + 2\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} - \frac{4}{\eta_2 + 3\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} + \frac{1}{\eta_2 + 4\frac{\ln^2 s}{\pi^2}} \right),
\]

which are equations (21) and (22) in the text, respectively.
C General Solution $W^\text{NG}$ for $W^N$

We guess the solution to equation (14) has the following functional form:

\[(C.1)\quad W^\text{NG} (t = 0, X, \Delta T; \Delta T_H) = AX^{*\beta} \left( \Delta T^2 + C \Delta T + D \right).\]

where $A, C, D$ are some parameters. Calculating derivatives, we obtain

\[(C.2)\quad \frac{\partial W^\text{NG}}{\partial \Delta T} = AX^{*\beta} \left( 2 \Delta T + C \right),\]
\[(C.3)\quad X^* \frac{\partial W^\text{NG}}{\partial X^*} = \beta AX^{*\beta} \left( \Delta T^2 + C \Delta T + D \right) \quad \text{and}\]
\[(C.4)\quad X^{*2} \frac{\partial^2 W^\text{NG}}{\partial X^*^2} = \beta (\beta - 1) AX^{*\beta} \left( \Delta T^2 + C \Delta T + D \right).\]

Substituting equations (C1) - (C4) back to equation (14) and rearranging yields

\[(C.5)\quad 2 \left( \ln \left( \frac{2}{H} \right) \right) AX^{*\beta} \left( \Delta T^2 - \left( 2 \Delta T_H - \frac{C}{2} \right) \Delta T - C \Delta T_H \right) = \left[ - (r - (1 - \delta) g_0) + (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) \beta + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \beta (\beta - 1) \right] AX^{*\beta} \left( \Delta T^2 + C \Delta T + D \right).\]

Solving (C5) requires $\Delta T^2 - \left( 2 \Delta T_H - \frac{C}{2} \right) \Delta T - C \Delta T_H = \left( \Delta T^2 + C \Delta T + D \right)$. Thus, we have

\[(C.6)\quad C = -4 \Delta T_H\]

and

\[(C.7)\quad D = -C \Delta T_H = 4 \Delta T_H^2.\]

Plugging (C6) and (C7) into (C5), we obtain

\[(C.8)\quad \left[ - \left( r - (1 - \delta) g_0 + 2 \left( \ln \left( \frac{2}{H} \right) \right) \right) + (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) \beta + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \beta (\beta - 1) \right] W^\text{NG} = 0,

where $W^\text{NG} = AX^{*\beta} \left( \Delta T^2 - 4 \Delta T_H \Delta T + 4 \Delta T_H^2 \right)$. The solution of (C8) requires

\[(C.9)\quad (\alpha + \kappa \sigma) \beta + \frac{1}{2} \sigma^2 \beta (\beta - 1) - \left( r - (1 - \delta) g_0 + 2 \left( \ln \left( \frac{2}{H} \right) \right) \right) = 0.\]

Let $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ be the positive and negative roots of the above characteristic function, respectively. By some manipulations, this leads to

\[(C.10)\quad W^\text{NG} = A_1 X^{*\beta_1} \left( \Delta T^2 - 4 \Delta T_H \Delta T + 4 \Delta T_H^2 \right) - A_2 X^{*\beta_2} \left( \Delta T^2 - 4 \Delta T_H \Delta T + 4 \Delta T_H^2 \right).\]
As we only consider the option to take action, we need to set the boundary condition such that \( \lim_{X \to 0} W^{NG}(X) = 0 \), which is tantamount to a zero option value of a climate policy, if climate change causes no damages that reduce the GDP. Therefore, the general solution with the negative root can be ignored. Consequently, we obtain

\[
W^{NG} = A_1 X^{1 + \beta_1} \left( \Delta T^2 - 4 \Delta T H \Delta T + 4 \Delta T^2 H \right) .
\]  

(C.11)

References


23
