

Introduction:

The Demilitarisation of Protest Policing as a Historical Problem

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From military to civilian policing

Until the mid-19th century, military involvement in the policing of disorderly public gatherings was the norm in most parts of Europe. By the end of the First World War, civilian police forces had taken over the responsibility for maintaining public order in the majority of European countries. This book takes its starting point from the observation that during the 1890s, the French Third Republic and the German Empire developed opposite practices in terms of relying on the army for the policing of protest.

Up to the late 1880s, the use of troops in France and Germany followed a similar pattern. Throughout the first half of the 19th century the authorities in both countries mobilised military troops as a general practice whenever popular unrest or riots exceeded the capacity of the local *gendarmerie*, night watch or citizen militia. After the repression of the 1848 Revolutions, and subsequent incidents of popular unrest during the years 1848 to 1851, the role of the army in maintaining public order was in decline in both countries, with the bloody repression of the Paris *Commune* in 1871 standing as a notorious exception.

It was during the 1890s that the use of troops took diverging trajectories in the two countries. This happened at a time when authorities in both countries were increasingly challenged by organised mass protests. Yet after major military involvement in the great miners' strike of 1889, the authorities of the German Empire increasingly refrained from using troops against civilians; by the turn of the 20th century, the role of the Prussian-German army in the policing of strikes and demonstrations had become a rather unusual event.

During the same year, the French army became increasingly busy in policing social conflicts and political protest. The frequency of military interventions in France rose sharply after the turn of the 20th century, and it was not until 1921 with the establishment of the *gendarmerie mobile* that the French army was finally discharged from most of its policing duties.

The dissimilar approaches to the use of soldiers for the policing of popular protest appear paradoxical: after the unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony, civilian society, politics and popular cultures became heavily influenced by military values, and the authorities' approach to social disorder and political opposition maintained many features of authoritarianism throughout the Imperial era. In comparison, the French Republic styled itself as liberal and democratic; the extremely frequent and extended use of troops by successive French governments is remarkable: even if the Republican regime was occasionally challenged by social unrest and political extremism, the vast majority of instances where troops became involved in protest policing could not by any stretch of the imagination be described as threatening the stability of the existing social and political order. The divergent developments in France and Germany therefore call for a closer look at the factors that shaped the decisions by French and German authorities to involve or not involve the army in the policing of popular protest.

Historians have pointed to four main factors to explain the overall decline in the policing functions of national armies in the majority of European countries from the early half of the 19th century to the end of the First World War. Demilitarisation of policing in France and Germany – as in many other European countries – partly coincided with the emergence of modern professional police forces. As police forces took charge of most tasks of crime fighting, law enforcement and order maintenance, increasingly clear limits were drawn around the involvement of the regular army in the management of civilian society.¹

Yet, the establishment of civilian police forces was only a precondition for gradual military disengagement from the maintenance of public order. The dynamics behind the demilitarisation process arose from the particular problems created by the use of soldiers for policing tasks. One major incentive for governments around Europe to look for alternatives to military involvement was the prospect of alienating important social groups, together with fears of swelling opposition and provoking popular revolt.² The French Revolution, the 1848 Revolutions and the Paris *Commune* had given serious warnings about the potential for political and social unrest erupting amongst disaffected workers and the urban poor. In addition, political stability and sustained industrial growth increasingly came to depend on workers not rejecting the existing social, political and economic order. There were little grounds for complacency amongst European ruling elites and only few imagined that popular discontent could be contained with military force in the long term.

These problems became all the more serious for regimes whose national army was based on universal conscription, as was the case for both Imperial Germany and the French Third Republic. This raised concerns about the reliability of soldiers and fostered fears that conscripts might change sides and join a popular rebellion.

In addition to these problems, historians generally link the demilitarisation of protest policing to an emerging democratic culture in many parts of Europe; law enforcement agencies were increasingly expected to act with moderation in their use of force; pressure grew for military actions against civilians to be subjected to strict legal regulations; and governments and their bureaucrats felt increasingly compelled to justify their use of military assistance in terms of necessity and proportionality.³ In political debates, critics readily linked extended use of troops to low levels of government accountability, while moderation in the application of physical force by law enforcement agencies towards the civilian population became widely perceived as a central aspect of good governance. The issue of military involvement in the policing of civilian society was therefore often linked to demands for constitutionalism and for submission of the use of troops to parliamentary accountability and control. According to the same line of thinking, historians have sometimes pointed to military involvement in the policing of protest as an indicator of authoritarian and repressive governance.⁴

Within the context of individual countries a connection may indeed be established between long-term decline in the military involvement in protest policing, on the one hand, and, on the other, democratisation – including increasing concerns for public opinion – and fears of alienating important sections of the population. However, when comparing countries, we are confronted with a much more ambiguous picture showing many twists and turns in the transition towards demilitarisation of protest policing. In many respects, the process away from military involvement in policing remained incomplete: militarily organised *gendarmérie* corps continued to play a central role in civilian policing in many European countries including France,⁵ whilst involvement of the regular army in the handling of situations of high alert – such as terrorist threat or natural catastrophe – remains a persistent and even increasing feature of policing in many European countries to the present day.

Of course, the nature of the regime, the extent to which popular revolt was an imminent concern of the political elites, and the degree to which governments needed to reach an understanding with industrial workers were all important factors in shaping policing policies. Yet, the policing

strategies developed to handle social and political unrest did not necessarily lead to consistent reductions in the military involvement.

Nor was effective governmental accountability to an elected parliament, or legal restrictions around the actions of soldiers against the civilian population incompatible with continued frequent military interventions. In Britain, where parliamentary control and legal restrictions around military intervention had been in place since the early 18th century,⁶ there were numerous incidents of military intervention throughout the 18th and 19th centuries.⁷ In France of the Third Republic as well as in Italy of the *Risorgimento* and the Netherlands, public authorities very frequently involved the army in protest policing right until the end of the First World War.⁸ By contrast, the extent of military intervention was in sharp decline in the German Empire,⁹ and even in the Austro-Hungarian Empire a gradual decline in military involvement took place in many parts of the Empire, despite major internal problems of national conflicts and riots in the 1890s.¹⁰ Only Imperial Russia presents a straightforward example where autocratic rule was combined with extensive use of the army against civilians.¹¹

It is also worth noting that there was increasing unhappiness amongst army officers – at the senior as well as the junior ranks – with the army's traditional role in the policing of social and political protest. The military's opposition to its involvement in policing was largely unrelated to political considerations but focused on the pernicious effects that policing duties had on the morale of troops and the prestige of the army in the wider population. Voices of concern appeared from the German and French military establishments as well as in Italy¹² and Imperial Russia.¹³

The study of the use of troops in Republican France and Imperial Germany from the 1890s to the outbreak of the First World War shows the demilitarisation of protest policing as a multi-dimensional process with strong forces pulling in opposite directions. In both countries, governments were keen on maintaining economic growth and preventing industrial production and trade from being disturbed by social and political unrest. On the other hand, in both countries there were increased concerns for public opinion, with French and German government authorities feeling compelled politically to justify their policing policies when confronted with public criticism of heavy-handed interventions. In both countries, the national army was based on universal conscription, which led to serious concerns about the political wisdom of deploying troops against civilians. All these concerns, for and against the use of troops in the maintenance of public order, appeared in the French as well as in the Prussian debate.

Yet, although French governments were far more vulnerable to public criticism than the Prussian ministers, the Prussian Interior Ministry proved far more willing than its French counterpart to develop policing strategies that depended less on military involvement. If, as historians on German policing argue, concerns for politically legitimising military involvement in protest policing and fears of escalating social unrest convinced the Prussian Interior Ministry about the necessity of radically changing its approach to protest policing,¹⁴ why were these problems not sufficiently compelling for the French authorities to do likewise? Perhaps we need to look for additional forces and interests that pushed the German authorities towards demilitarisation. Similarly we need to identify the dynamics behind the policies and bureaucratic practices surrounding large-scale policing operations in France.

Military involvement in protest policing goes right to the heart of our understanding of the nature of the French Third Republic and the German Empire. The demilitarisation in Germany highlights some of the ambiguity of the German-Prussian 'Police-State tradition' and presents an unusual aspect of the otherwise heavily militarised state and society of the German Empire. A comparison with the frequent use of troops in France opens new perspectives on the intentions behind military involvement. This has implications for our understanding of the nature of policing in both countries and ultimately reflects on the interpretation of each of the two regimes.

The historical literature and its lacunae

That the authorities of Republican France called upon military assistance to civilian police far more frequently than did their German counterparts was already pointed out by contemporary observers, most notably by Karl Liebknecht in his influential pamphlet on *Militarism and Anti-militarism*.¹⁵ To Liebknecht as to many left-wingers it was particularly reprehensible that a Republican regime used the army against its civilian population. At the same time, he pointed out that the less frequent involvement of the Prussian army in the policing of protest did not in any way indicate that German public authorities and police were less heavy-handed than their French counterparts in their handling of popular opposition.¹⁶

Somewhat surprisingly, the dissimilar military involvement in French and German policing during the late 19th and early 20th centuries has not attracted much attention amongst historians.¹⁷ This may partly be due to the fact that very little comparative research has been undertaken into the

policing of 19th century France and Germany. Amongst the exceptions to this rule is an article by Heinz-Gerhard Haupt on the impact of policing on the constitution of the German and French working classes.¹⁸ In addition, two broad comparative works look at France and Germany amongst several other countries, namely Hsi-Huey Liang's study on the rise of political police in European states¹⁹ and Clive Emsley's book on *gendarmarie* forces in Europe.²⁰ Recently Wolfgang Knöbl has made an important contribution by comparing the development of Prussian policing during the 18th and 19th centuries to the rise of modern police in England and the United States.²¹

The scant attention paid by historians to the dissimilar degree of military involvement in policing in the German Empire and the French Third Republic may partly be explained by the fact that 'policing' is still a relatively new field of study. Whilst studies of the topic emerged amongst British and American scholars in the 1970s and 1980s,²² French and German scholars initially seemed reluctant to make 'policing' an object of study in its own right. Accordingly, whilst much research was conducted into the forms of popular protest and the organisation, ideology and strategies of the French and German left-wing opposition,²³ the police forces and military troops involved in the policing of popular protest were regarded as merely the instrument of government policies and industrial pressure groups.

This changed in the 1980s and 1990s when ground-breaking studies appeared on policing in 19th century France²⁴ and Germany.²⁵ Many of these studies sought to move beyond the political and institutional history of policing by focusing on everyday interactions between the police and the public in its social and cultural context; yet policies of public order maintenance were always amongst the key concerns in studies on 19th and 20th century policing.

Scholars working on 19th and 20th century France have focused on how politicians and bureaucrats of the Third Republic sought to adapt policing policies and tactics to a changing social and political reality, with increasing demands for political accountability and proportionality in the application of force. Some of the studies on French policing are particularly directed at forms of large-scale policing operations to handle popular protest, whether labour conflicts, political demonstrations, social protest or riots.²⁶

Historians working on policing within the German area have been more concerned with the everyday control of the public space as an aspect of the wider system of power relations between the elites and ordinary Germans.²⁷ Apart from legal-institutional changes in policing such as the transition away from military involvement or specific incidents where the

army became involved, the strategies behind the policing of mass protest in Germany is generally described simply as everyday policing on a larger scale, involving a variety of public, semi-public and private agencies.

Interpreting the role of the French army in 19th century policing

French scholars' particular interest in the changing strategies of maintenance of public order may be explained by their difficulty in squaring heavy-handed and sometimes brutal interventions by public forces with the proclaimed liberalism of the Third Republic.²⁸ Within French historiography, the increasing frequency of domestic military intervention – particularly during the first decade of the 20th century – is well-known. It is mentioned both in the general literature on the French Third Republic,²⁹ in books on the French army,³⁰ in studies of policing and the maintenance of public order,³¹ as well as in works on French labour movements.³²

Nevertheless, the role of the army in order maintenance has been treated as a marginal aspect of policing by the majority of scholars. The works on French policing are primarily concerned with municipal forces, including the Paris police, and with the militarily organised *gendarmerie* forces.³³ The pioneering study by Georges Carrot includes troops as well as police and *gendarmerie*, but focuses mainly on legal-institutional aspects and covers the entire period from 1789 to 1968.³⁴ Jean-Marc Berlière's broad and ground-breaking research on French policing of the early Third Republic in its political, social and cultural context is concerned primarily with municipal police forces.³⁵ His detailed description of the changes in policing strategies in Paris was invaluable for this study in identifying the changing features in the strategic approach to the policing of strikes and demonstrations, and the way in which this differed from German approaches to policing. The studies of Patrick Bruneteaux take up many of the points from Carrot and Berlière, but his aim is to explain the development of French approaches to protest policing and riot control from the early Third Republic to the present day.³⁶

The most important exceptions to the marginal interest in the role of the army in protest policing are a rather dated article by Dianne Cooper-Richet³⁷ and more recent studies by Odille Roynette-Gland. Like the present study, Roynette-Gland's research looks specifically at the military involvement in the policing of protest in Nord-Pas-de-Calais between 1871 and 1914, but focuses primarily on the experience and conditions of soldiers and officers.³⁸

In addition, Jean-Jacques Jauffret's article of 1983 is still the most important work on the French debate over the establishment of a police or

gendarmérie unit specialised in protest policing. Jauffret describes the political and parliamentary context of the on-going debate about approaches to the policing of protest and provides an important contribution to our understanding of the policing politics of the early Third Republic.³⁹

Finally, a few studies on the French army devote some attention to its role in protest policing;⁴⁰ however the majority of interpretations of the French army are remarkably silent when it comes to the involvement of military troops in protest policing. Most significantly, the five-volume work on French military history edited by Guy Pedroncini devotes merely seven pages out of 474 to the role of the French army in policing activities between 1871 and 1914.⁴¹

The very scant attention of historians to the role of the French army in policing and the gaps in the existing research has led to important misconceptions about its extent and implications. Whilst the number of military interventions is generally thought to be ‘high’, there has been no attempt to provide any quantitative indication of frequency, except Perrot’s estimations of military interventions in labour conflicts during the years 1870–1890.⁴² Instead historians often cite the list of incidents where protesters were killed in confrontations with troops. This, unfortunately, gives the impression that these were the main incidents of military involvement, whilst in reality military participation was far more frequent. This has occasionally led to the misconception that violent clashes and casualties were the norm whenever troops were involved.⁴³

The Republican dilemma: Republican ideals and the failings of the French Third Republic

Whilst important basic facts about the role of the French army in protest policing have not been properly established through detailed research, interpretations of the phenomenon have often been highly normative and politicised. The frequent military involvement in protest policing fits awkwardly into the image of the French Third Republic as a liberal regime. At the same time, much of the historical debates and analyses of the early Third Republic revolve around ideological definitions of the true nature of French Republicanism. Comparison with the experience of other European countries is rarely considered in these debates; instead historians tend to compare the political and social reality of the Third Republic against some ‘ideal’ Republic to show how the regime failed to live up to its self-proclaimed ideals.⁴⁴

The frequent mobilisation of military troops against civilian protesters during the early Third Republic constitutes a fault-line in this debate. For some historians, the frequent use of troops results from a series of missed opportunities, where politicians failed to ‘do the right thing’ and instead continued with a traditional approach for the sake of short-term political gain.⁴⁵ From a more radical perspective, some historians formulate a fundamental critique in which the frequent military involvement in protest policing is presented as a clear example of the essentially repressive nature of the ‘Bourgeois Republic’.⁴⁶ Other interpretations see the use of troops from the perspective of the army. Military historians tend to criticise the frequent use of troops because this practice caused major problems for any effective preparation for warfare and training of recruits.⁴⁷

Conversely, interpretations based on a fundamentally positive attitude towards the Third Republic tend to support the decisions of political leaders, and sometimes justify the use of troops as the regrettable – yet necessary – defence of the Republican institutions against challenges from far-right, as well as far-left, extremism.⁴⁸ This is also where most non-French scholars appear, who without being apologetic about the intentions of politicians and not-so-idealistic interests at stake, seek to understand the action of French politicians in terms of *Realpolitik*.⁴⁹

Scholars working specifically on French policing tend to describe the frequent military involvement as the result of a structural problem: during the late 1880s, social and political unrest increased in scale and intensity to an extent that largely exceeded the capacity of poorly trained and understaffed municipal police forces. This structural problem could not be effectively addressed, due to the lack of political will in seeking alternatives, especially the failure to gain political backing for any of the numerous projects to organise a special riot unit within the *gendarmerie*.⁵⁰

By identifying a structural problem of insufficient police and *gendarmerie* forces as the key explanation, historians on French policing avoid getting into a wider critique of the Third Republic. Despite continued military involvement, there is general agreement amongst police historians that the character of French protest policing changed fundamentally between 1890 and 1914, when attempts to introduce modern strategies for protest policing existed side by side with traditional military approaches. Serman and Roynette-Gland go as far as arguing that protest policing – even when the army became involved – was a matter of managing volatile and potentially violent protests through policing tactics, rather than simple ‘repression’ of popular discontent.⁵¹

The insights provided by studies on French policing have allowed interpretations of military involvement to move beyond debates about the failures of the Republic to be truly 'republican' and liberal. Of course, there is no denying that protesters were victims of violent confrontations with police, *gendarmeries* and troops acting on behalf of successive Republican governments.⁵² However the normative and politicised approach does not constitute a useful framework for understanding the complexities behind government policies of the Third Republic; moreover, this approach is particularly unhelpful in explaining the paradoxes appearing when comparing policing policies in France with the use of troops in Imperial Germany.

Transformations in late 19th century German policing: interpreting the demilitarisation process

The role of the Prussian army in the policing of protest during the Imperial era has been even less studied than the role of the French army. The scant attention given to the role of the army is of course linked to the fact that military involvement became relatively unusual during the Imperial era. Yet, the lack of interest is surprising in the light of the keen attention generally displayed by German historians to any military aspect of the policing of the civilian population.⁵³

The only study devoted exclusively to the role of the army in 19th century German policing is an article by Harald Klückmann, published more than a quarter of a century ago.⁵⁴ The groundbreaking study by Alf Lüdte on policing in Prussian garrison towns pays extensive attention to the role of the army, but looks only at the first half of the 19th century. Elaine Glovka Spencer, although devoting some attention specifically to the role of the army,⁵⁵ is mainly interested in civilian policing. Similarly the studies of German policing of the second half of the 19th century by Albrecht Funk and Ralph Jessen, and more recently by Wolfgang Knöbl, all focus primarily on civilian policing, while the continued role of the army is of marginal concern. The main themes in these works revolve around policing as part of a wider system of power, the emergence of the *Rechtsstaat* (i.e. the process of establishing legal and bureaucratic restrictions around Prussian policing), and the attempts by the Prussian state to gain control over municipal police forces.⁵⁶

The demilitarisation of German policing during the 19th century is generally explained with reference to overall processes modernisation, such as increased concerns for public opinion and fears of alienating the growing number of industrial workers. Thus, historians tend to faithfully render the

arguments put forward by Prussian bureaucrats and successive Interior Ministers in order to justify their opposition to military involvement, namely the serious disadvantages linked to the use of conscript soldiers for maintenance of public order: that infantry and cavalry units could only operate in inflexible military formations; that the mere presence of military troops at a scene of conflict contributed to the escalation of violent confrontations; and that young conscript soldiers were unfit for the policing of sensitive conflicts because they lacked personal authority, were inexperienced and prone to shoot in panic.⁵⁷

The references to the Prussian Interior Ministry's 'rational' justifications for demilitarising protest policing make the interpretations of the process appear rather unproblematic. The fact that the Prussian civilian administration had a problematic relationship with the civilian authorities is mentioned, but rarely mentioned as a key factor in the process.⁵⁸

Yet, even if the demilitarisation was in accordance with overall processes towards modernisation of policing, the ease with which this transition happened begs for more substantial factors to be identified than simply fears that military presence might escalate confrontations with protesters. As in France, the political wisdom of avoiding military involvement clashed with consistent demands from a wealthy bourgeoisie and industrial pressure groups who demanded effective protection of their private property and industrial interests.

Moreover, Lüdtke's study of Prussian policing and administration of civilian society during the first half of the 19th century amply testifies to the significance of direct military interference in numerous aspects of civilian life.⁵⁹ Throughout the Wilhelmine era the military establishment consistently threatened to interfere directly both against existing democratic institutions, notably the *Reichstag*, and against the Social Democratic opposition. The fact that, in reality, the Prussian army retired without further ado from its traditional involvement in the policing of civilian society might raise a question or two about the interests of the military organisation in the late 19th century and the dynamics behind the gradual retreat from involvement in policing. Similarly while Funk's study on the rise of the German *Rechtsstaat* shows how the actions of police forces were gradually limited through legislation, he also highlights the absence of effective legal boundaries around the actions of military troops involved in policing.⁶⁰

The limited research on the role of the Prussian army in protest policing in the Wilhelmine era has resulted in some rather conflicting accounts of military involvement in labour conflicts. Interpretations have been based on analyses of isolated conflict where the army became involved, or on

analyses of government policies with little attention paid to the extent to which these policies were implemented. This has led to a series of strictly misleading estimates of the importance of military involvement in labour conflicts, particularly as part of general interpretations that strongly emphasise the authoritarian and militaristic aspects of the Imperial German system. Martin Kitchen vastly overestimates the frequency and importance of military involvement in internal conflicts, claiming that calls for military troops to put down strikes happened 'quite often',⁶¹ whilst Manfred Messerschmidt describes the requisitioning of military assistance as a measure that was almost automatically implemented in the case of labour conflicts.⁶²

Similarly, in his influential work on the German Empire, Hans-Ulrich Wehler described the Prussian army as 'an instrument for the use in the struggles of internal politics' (*Kampfinstrument nach Innen*);⁶³ Volker Berghahn too insists on describing the Prussian army as the instrument of violence against the working class.⁶⁴

The idea that the Prussian army fulfilled the role as the iron fist against the Social Democratic Party and industrial workers fits nicely into an overall argument about the repressive nature of the regime and the continued rule of the 'traditional elites' in the Prussian government, the civil service, and the army. However, twenty-two years after the first publication of Wehler's influential synthesis on the German Empire, he concedes that military commanders of the Wilhelmine era generally maintained a pragmatic wait-and-see attitude towards popular protest, which often resulted in non-intervention.⁶⁵

The use of troops and the interpretation of the German Empire as a regime

Wehler's original claim that the Prussian army played an important role in the policing of protest during the Imperial era seemed to be established by inference from the observation that the military establishment exercised significant influence on many other aspects of society and politics of the Empire.

All interpretations of the Prussian army stress the particular powers of the military establishment: the Prussian army was not subjected to the Imperial Constitution and was free from parliamentary accountability; in foreign policy the military establishment upheld a parallel diplomatic system of military attachés in numerous foreign capitals; and in domestic politics, the Prussian officers corps constituted a permanent threat to existing democratic institutions.⁶⁶

The position of the army in state and society is a defining feature in almost any interpretation of the nature of the German Empire; it has earned the regime labels such as ‘authoritarian’, ‘semi-constitutional’, ‘militaristic’ or even a ‘military state’.⁶⁷ While the German-Prussian system was similarly characterised by its strong bureaucratic tradition and ubiquitous police,⁶⁸ it was the military element that distinguished Germany from the French system which also had a tradition for highly interventionist bureaucratic rule and well-developed police organisations. Compared to other European societies, the German Empire was also to a greater extent characterised by a culture of widespread enthusiasm and unqualified reverence for anything military.

Since the reunification of Germany, the interpretations of the long-term developments in German history from the 18th to the 21st century are still trying to find a balance between stressing German ‘exceptionalism’ and attempts to place the German experience within its wider European context. In this respect, the debate over the German ‘special path’ (*Sonderweg*) is still alive and well.⁶⁹ However, the role of the Prussian army in the policing of protest does not follow the fault-lines over which debates about the nature of the German Empire are generally conducted. Debates over German ‘exceptionalism’ revolve around the extent to which the development of political institutions and social structures lagged behind or were dissimilar from those of more ‘advanced’ European democracies, notably France and Britain.⁷⁰ However, with respect to the role of the Prussian army in the policing of protest, the German Empire did not seem to take a ‘special path’. Quite the contrary: the decline in the military involvement in German policing follows the general trend towards modern policing, whilst the development in Republican France was at odds with this, throughout the period 1889–1914.

The comparison with France opens up a series of aspects for discussion. In the light of widening approaches to Wilhelmine Germany in all its fractured and conflict-ridden complexity, and along with a new interest amongst historians for pockets of liberalism,⁷¹ one might wonder whether the low degree of military involvement in German protest policing indicates a more liberal and permissive approach to protesters compared to France. Or do we need to interpret the use of troops along different lines?

The comparison also raises the issue of the efficient functioning of the German-Prussian system. Military officers, as well as the civil servants in the ministries and the provincial administration, liked to see themselves as the pillars of the German-Prussian State, serving the throne with unparalleled efficiency and dedication to pursue the best interests of the Prussian Kingdom and the German Empire. Yet historians have long been

aware of the dysfunctions within the German-Prussian system, with different sections of the state organisation pulling in opposite directions in pursuit of the narrow interests of their particular branch of the state apparatus.⁷² Similarly, historians working on policing have questioned the extent to which Prussian authorities were actually able to control and discipline an increasingly volatile German population, which was experiencing rapid changes in its social and economic conditions.⁷³ The comparison with France adds a new dimension to the debate about elite cooperation in the German Empire by allowing the levels of practical cooperation between senior military commanders and civil servants in the provincial administration to be compared with that of their French counterparts.⁷⁴

Finally, the demilitarisation of protest policing also seems to be at odds with the militarisation of numerous other aspects of German society and political life. Research into German militarism has added new perspectives to our understanding of the political and social role of the Prussian army by focusing more broadly on the military spirit in the wider population and on the self-perception of young men called up for military service.⁷⁵ At the same time, studies by David Schoebaum and Nicholas Stargardt have revealed a counter-culture of German popular opposition to the prevailing militarism.⁷⁶

Of course, widespread enthusiasm for anything military, coupled with a popular culture of aggressive nationalism, was by no means limited to the German Empire in the late 19th century. Studies on French attitudes towards the military show both the extent of enthusiasm for the army, whilst also displaying important levels of anti-militarism amongst socialists and anarchists as well as within the French liberal tradition.

In recent years, two studies have been published on the nature and extent of militarism and anti-militarism in the French Third Republic.⁷⁷ The comparative analyses by Markus Ingenlath and by Jakob Vogel on German and French militarism clearly show that militarism in France was weaker than in Germany and qualified by various forms of anti-militarism.⁷⁸ This adds yet another element to the paradox that it was the French authorities who continued to rely on the assistance of thousands of conscript soldiers for the policing of popular protest.⁷⁹ Conversely, in Germany despite widespread militarism and deep involvement of the Prussian military establishment in the shaping of many aspects of German politics, this did not lead to significant military involvement in the handling of social and political protest.

‘Historical institutionalism’: the importance of bureaucratic practice

In order to understand the dissimilar paths taken by the French Third Republic and the German Empire, we need to search for the factors that shaped the decisions to request military assistance or to rely on the police and *gendarmerie*. The French and German systems display two major differences. One is linked to the emergence in France of new strategic approaches to protest policing. This study therefore focuses on the political processes behind the dissimilar recommendations from the Interior Ministries in Paris and Berlin. This involves an analysis of the options and constraints linked to the two approaches adopted by French and Prussian authorities.

The second important difference lies in the dissimilar ability of French and Prussian civilian and military authorities to engage in practical cooperation. The dynamics in the relationship between civilian and military authorities are particularly important in order to understand why the recommendations from Paris and Berlin were so consistently implemented by senior administrators and military commanders at *départemental* and provincial levels. Much has been written over the years about how powerful and independent French and Prussian civil servants in the provincial administration shaped the social and political development of both countries. Yet, studies tend to focus on the relationship between the provincial administration and local influential groups and individuals as well as on their relationship with the central powers in Berlin or Paris.⁸⁰ In contrast, the connections between the provincial administration and the military units based in the regions have not attracted much attention.

This study on the use of troops in the industrial areas of Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia indicates that the civil-military cooperation in France was characterised by high levels of formalisation, extensive exchange of information, coordination and joint decision-making across institutional boundaries. While some French military historians have stressed the importance of civil-military negotiations and detailed planning for the rebuilding the French army after 1871,⁸¹ these features are not generally recognised as highly significant in shaping the policies of large-scale protest policing. The Prussian example, on the other hand, provides important clues to the problems arising from low levels of inter-institutional exchange of information and coordination between civilian and military authorities.

Observing these differences in the inter-institutional cooperation in the two countries led to integrating an institutionalist perspective in the analysis. Political scientists have shown how institutions tend to build up

organisational structures and procedures over long periods of time. These subsequently tend to shape government policies and bureaucratic responses to complex problems. The historical institutionalist perspective offers a framework of interpretation that is particularly useful for understanding the dynamics within the French and Prussian-German systems. Yet the relationship between civilian and military authorities was crucial in shaping the preference for one particular type of approach to the policing of popular protest. The institutionalist perspective focuses on the connections between organisational imperatives of large-scale policing and how these facilitated or impeded military participation.⁸²

Historical institutional theorists have identified three features which are of particular relevance to this study.⁸³ The first is the so-called 'path dependency', i.e. the dynamics of self-reinforcing processes within a political system: through the repeated implementation of one type of solution to a specific problem, key bureaucratic procedures are gradually adapted to fit the logistical and organisational needs of this particular approach. As this solution becomes entrenched in the bureaucratic procedures, it becomes increasingly complicated to adopt a different response because this would require a complete rethink of existing strategies and preparations.

Another crucial element in the smooth functioning of large-scale policing operations is the gradual establishment of the 'rules of the game' or 'standard operation procedures', which are known and accepted by all parties involved. Such 'rules of the game' are particularly important when policing requires civilian administrators and military commanders to cooperate across institutional boundaries.

Finally, institutional learning and accumulation of knowledge is crucial for the smooth functioning of inter-institutional cooperation. In large-scale policing in French and Prussian industrial areas, the accumulation of knowledge and experience made any deviation from previous strategies unattractive because bureaucrats and other involved parties would be forced to operate outside established rules, with limited knowledge and experience. Accordingly bureaucratic logic presented strong reasons for repeatedly implementing strategies and procedures that had been tried before.

This is not to argue that French and Prussian civilian authorities were not in a position to take a different approach. French and Prussian government authorities and bureaucrats still had room for acting contrary to established practices, and in some cases they did. However, the general preference within each system was clear and consistent. It is worth noting that in the early 1890s, both Republican France and Imperial Germany

might just as well have developed completely different patterns of military involvement in protest policing. However, once the bureaucratic practices were set up for one particular approach to large-scale policing operations it became increasingly complicated to change the course.

Westphalia and Nord-Pas-de-Calais: comparing two industrial areas

A study on the use of troops for the whole of France and Germany would be a daunting task, particularly in the case of France. This study therefore concentrates on the development of government policies in Paris and Berlin and their implementation in two particularly turbulent areas: the Prussian province of Westphalia and the French region of Nord-Pas-de-Calais.

The French 1st Military Region covering the two *départements* ‘Nord’ and ‘Pas-de-Calais’ was one of the most turbulent industrial areas outside Paris. It is also one of the best documented areas from the side of the military because, unlike other French military regions, a very substantial collection of documents from the army corps commander’s office in Lille have been retained in the French Military Archive.

The Prussian province of Westphalia also comprised a major industrial area. The general commander in Münster was responsible not only for the three Westphalian districts but also the district of Düsseldorf, although the civilian administration of this district was part of the neighbouring Rhine Province. The 7th Military Region thus covered the entire Ruhr District, which was the centre for the German coal mining and steel industries. Within the federal structure of the German Empire, Westphalia was a province within the Kingdom of Prussia. Accordingly, the Westphalian provincial administration was part of the centralised Prussian state organisation and the military units present in Westphalia belonged to the Royal Prussian Army. References will therefore be made to Prussia rather than to the German Empire as a whole.

Comparing France with Prussia, rather than with the entire German Empire, has a number of advantages in terms of establishing comparable entities. In the first place, France and Prussia were similar in size (38–39 million inhabitants in the France, 40 million in Prussia by the beginning of the 20th century). This facilitates the comparison of global figures for the number of industrial workers within different sectors; the number of trade union members; the number of strikes; and the size of the police and *gendarmérie* forces. In addition, the institutions most involved in the decision-making and implementation of large-scale policing operations (the provincial or *départemental* administration as well as the French and the

Prussian armies) were organised along similar lines: highly centralised structures with provinces and *départements* being administered by government appointed officials and military commanders in charge of the territorial army corps.

The investigation begins in 1889; in both countries, this year opened an era of large-scale labour conflicts and mass demonstrations. The 1890s is also the decade when the Prussian Interior Ministry began to embark on its policy of demilitarising the policing of protest, while French authorities began to make increasing use of military troops to handle popular protest. The study ends by the outbreak of the First World War when the institutional relationship between civilian and military authorities was fundamentally changed as a result of the war.

Contributions, advantages and limits of the comparative approach

Many of the factors that shaped the policies in each country will be familiar to readers already acquainted with the history of the early French Third Republic or with Wilhelmine Germany. It is the comparison of the two that is surprising. This study draws particular attention to certain factors which have not previously been identified as crucial for the development of the policies and practices of large-scale policing. These factors may appear unproblematic or marginal when observed within the national context, yet when presented in a comparative context, they undermine established explanatory models. It is the discovery of how much more frequently the French army was called out than the Prussian and how much closer the French civilian and military authorities worked together than their Prussian counterparts that is surprising. It is the observation that the Prussian police and *gendarmérie* were no better equipped than their French counterparts to take over the full responsibility for maintenance of order that demands further analysis, as does the fact that French soldiers were mobilised in far greater numbers even for smaller incidents of potential conflict.

The comparison also provides a contextualisation that allows analysis of military involvement in protest policing to be analysed beyond a normative framework of interpretation. It is difficult to assess what constitutes 'frequent' military involvement: is it six times over twenty-five years, or is it once every second year? Similarly, which military interventions could be described as 'appropriate' or even 'necessary' and which instances should be described as 'excessive'? Both France and German politicians and regional administrators claimed that the decision to call upon military assistance was an *ultima ratio* solution, but *ultima ratio* clearly did not mean the same thing in the two countries.

Comparison also allows explanations of policies and practices to move beyond the focus on differences in the institutional arrangements, the political profile of governments, or the social structures of the ruling elites. In fact, the policies of military participation in protest policing in the German Empire and the French Third Republic appear counter-intuitive to the social and political structures within each of the two countries. Comparison thereby relegates these factors to a secondary level of importance.

The French and Prussian case studies reveal many common features both in terms of the interests at stake over the maintenance of public order, the problems raised by military involvement, and some of the solutions proposed. Comparison of the two countries makes it possible to distinguish between the features that were particular to each of the two cases and problems which were intrinsically linked to the management of large crowds.

This study concentrates on the aspects that are relevant for explaining the comparative problem. Accordingly, other interesting aspects of military involvement in protest policing may not be given full attention. These include the experiences of protesters, conscript soldiers or officers; the strategies adopted by the French opposition to undermine the legitimacy of the Republican regime by criticising the use of troops; or the question of whether protest actions involving the French far right were treated more leniently in terms of policing than strikes and demonstrations organised by the socialist opposition.

In focusing on the dissimilarities between the two units, generalisations had to be made which may not always have done justice to the complexities within each country. What this study highlights are general trends in policies and practices. It is hoped that subsequent studies will be able to pick up the divergences from the main trends that are not given sufficient attention here.

Factors to be compared and aims of the study

The use of troops in France and Prussia calls for comparison in four key areas: we will look at the political factors which are generally accepted as determining for the demilitarisation process of protest policing in Prussia. This includes analyses of the policies developed in Berlin and Paris: how and why did successive Prussian and French Interior Ministers come to adopt such dissimilar approaches to protest policing during the 1890s?

The comparative perspective also allows for contextualising the argument that frequent military involvement in France was due to structural

problems of insufficient numbers of policemen and *gendarmes*. A comparison will be made between the strength of local police and *gendarmerie* forces in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia, including the number of policemen and *gendarmes* who could be mobilised from other areas in case of major unrest. It also involves an evaluation of the challenges to internal stability posed by the incidents of protest that occurred in these two industrial areas.

In addition, an assessment will be made of the comparative significance of the pressures coming from local elites and industrial interest groups for the decision to call upon military assistance: were the local 'notables' in Nord-Pas-de-Calais so much more successful than their Westphalian counterparts in influencing civilian and military authorities that it can account for the much more frequent involvement of military troops? Finally, we will analyse the nature of coordination, exchange of information and practical cooperation between the regional administration and the military authorities in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia.

The arguments put forward in this book may inadvertently sound apologetic about the use of troops against civilians, or appear overly enthusiastic about the effectiveness of civil-military cooperation in Nord-Pas-de-Calais. This is an unintended consequence of my attempt to revise the interpretation of military involvement in policing on a number of counts.

Firstly the comparison highlights the need to distinguish between the long-term factors behind the gradual disengagement of regular military troops from protest policing on the one hand, and, on the other, the short-term factors behind the upsurge in the involvement of the French army during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In order to fully understand the preference for military involvement shown by successive French Interior Ministers and prefects, we need to recognise that prevention and containment of violence were at the heart of the French policing strategies, even when the army became involved.

In addition to the factors that are generally understood to have driven the process towards demilitarisation of protest policing in Prussia, we need to recognise the importance of the dynamics between the provincial administration and the military authorities. This study seeks to deepen our understanding of the constraints and options around the policing of protest and the way in which these options became increasingly narrow after the turn of the 20th century.

All this leads to a reconsideration of the implications of military involvement in the French Third Republic and the German Empire. The

presence of military troops at strikes and demonstrations did not have the same connotations and political implications in the two countries. Reconsideration of these aspects opens up new interpretations of how military involvement in protest policing reflects on the general nature of policing in each country and ultimately reflects on the two political regimes, their provincial administration and military organisations.

The book seeks to present the main aspects of the comparative paradox. The analysis of military involvement in the policing of protest in France and Germany between 1890 and 1914 is therefore organised around key themes. The reader will find that sometimes the German case is presented first, sometimes the French; the order of presentation entirely depends on which of the two cases best illustrates the other.

The first part of the book looks at the role of the Prussian and French armies in state and society. It indicates that Prussia had good reasons for demilitarising, but that the French Republican authorities had even more urgent reasons for refraining from involving the army in protest policing. Looking at policies and ministerial initiatives debates in Berlin and Paris, the study analyses why and how the Prussian and French Interior Ministry came to recommend distinctly dissimilar approaches to the policing of protest.

Part II looks at the nature of violence and protest in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia and compares the strength of police and *gendarmerie* forces in the provinces, as well as the police force that could be called to these regions. This is set against a detailed analysis of the patterns of military involvement in protest policing in the two regions.

Part III analyses the connections between the actors potentially involved in or influencing decisions to mobilise troops; it also analyses the implementation of large-scale policing operations in Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Westphalia, with particular focus on the relationship between the civil and military elites in Berlin and Paris and at the regional levels. Thus, the dissimilar approaches to the policing of protest not only reflect the nature of policing within the two countries but lay open important aspects of the internal functioning of the French Third Republic and the German Empire.

Notes

¹ Alf Lüdtke, “*Gemeinwohl*”, *Polizei und “Festungspraxis”*. *Staatliche Gewaltsamkeit und innere Verwaltung in Preußen, 1815–1850*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982, p. 251; Clive Emsley, *Policing in its context, 1750-1870*, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 143–145; Ralph Jessen, *Polizei im*

Industrieviertel, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991, pp. 24–25; Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le Préfet Lépine: Vers la naissance de la police moderne*, Paris: Denoël, 1993 (1), p. 170. Ronald van der Wal, *Of geweld zal worden gebruikt! Militaire bijstand bij de handhaving en het herstel van de openbare orde 1840–1920*, Hilversum: Verloren, 2003, pp. 12–20.

² Abrecht Funk, *Polizei und Rechtsstaat: Die Entstehung des Staatsrechtlichen Gewaltmonopols in Preußen, 1848–1918*, Frankfurt an Main: Campus, 1986, pp. 155–156; Hansjoachim Henning, ‘Staatsmacht und Arbeitskampf: Die Haltung der preußischen Innenverwaltung zum Militäreinsatz während der Bergausstände 1889–1912’, in Hansjoachim Henning (ed.), *Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichtliche Forschung und Probleme – Festschrift für Karl Erich Born*, Frankfurt: Campus, 1987, pp. 167–168; Jessen (1991) pp. 127–137; Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le monde des polices en France*, Paris: Éditions Complexe, 1996, p. 118; Patrick Bruneteaux, *Maintenir l’ordre*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1996, p. 21; Wal (2003) pp. 17–18.

³ For Great Britain see Anthony Babington, *Military intervention in Britain: from the Gordon riots to the Gibraltar incident*, London: Routledge, 1990; For France see Berlière (1996) p. 115; Bruneteaux (1996) pp. 34–44. For Germany see Funk (1986) pp. 37–40, 157–176; Jessen (1991) pp. 25, 108.

⁴ A typical example of this appears in Eric Hobsbawm’s *Age of Empire*, London: Abacus, 1997, p. 305.

⁵ Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

⁶ The King’s use of troops was made accountable to Parliament already by the Bill of Rights of 1688 and the Riot Act of 1715 placed some legal restrictions around military actions in the policing of civilian society.

⁷ Roger Geary, *Policing Industrial Disputes: 1893 to 1985*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 15–17; Babington (1990) pp. 117–121; Emsley (1983) p. 143; *ibid.*, *The English Police: a political and social history*, Harlow: Longman, 1996, pp. 54–55. Troops were mobilised in the UK at ten separate occasions between the ‘Bloody Sunday’ incidents at Trafalgar Square in 1887 and the outbreak of the First World War.

⁸ In Nord-Pas-de-Calais alone there were at least sixty-eight separate incidents of military intervention between 1889 and 1914 (for details, see Chapter 6). For Italy see Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975, pp. 148–164; John A. Davis, *Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth Century Italy*, London: Macmillan, 1988; John Gooch, *Army, State and Society in Italy, 1870–1915*, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 17; Similarly, Ronald van der Wal identifies no less than 189 incidents of military intervention in the Netherlands between 1890 and the outbreak of the First World War, while another thirty-eight incidents took place between 1914 and 1918. (Wal, 2003, pp. 343–348).

⁹ Less than thirty incidents for the entire German Empire between 1889 and 1914. (For details see Chapter 6.)

¹⁰ István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: a Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848–1918*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 46 & 66–68; Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*, West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1998, pp. 121–122, 128–130.

¹¹ N. J. Westwood, *Endurance and Endeavour*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 180–188; David Christian, *Imperial and Soviet Russia: Power, Privilege and the Challenge of Modernity*, London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 133.

¹² On the domestic role of the army of unified Italy see John Whittam, *The Politics of the Italian Army, 1861–1918*, London: Macmillan, 1977; Davis (1988) pp. 347–351.

¹³ On the Russian army see John Bushnell, *Mutiny amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905–1906*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, pp. 24–27; Christian (1997) p. 143.

¹⁴ Funk (1986) pp. 155–156; Henning (1987) p. 167, Jessen (1991) pp. 25, 77–79; (ibid.), ‘Unternehmerherrschaft und staatliches Gewaltmonopol: Hüttenpolizisten und Zechenwehren im Ruhrgebiet 1870–1914’, in Alf Lüdtke (ed.), *Sicherheit und Wohlfahrt: Polizei, Gesellschaft und Herrschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992, pp. 176–177.

¹⁵ Karl Liebknecht, *Militarism and Antimilitarism*, Cambridge: River Press, 1973, (first published in 1907), pp. 59–61.

¹⁶ Liebknecht (1973) pp. 65–66.

¹⁷ Lüdtke draws parallels with France and England, but only for the first half of the 19th century. Lüdtke (1982) pp. 345–346.

¹⁸ Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, ‘Staatliche Bürokratie und Arbeiterbewegung: Zum Einfluss der Polizei auf die Konstituierung von Arbeiterbewegung und Arbeiterklasse in Deutschland und Frankreich zwischen 1848 und 1880’, in Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (ed.), *Arbeiter und Bürger im 19. Jahrhundert. Varianten ihres Verhältnisses im europäischen Vergleich*, Munich: Beck, 1986.

¹⁹ Hsi-Huey Liang, *The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

²⁰ Emsley (1999). Similarly an edited volume by Jean-Noël Luc, *Gendarmerie, État et société au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002.

²¹ Wolfgang Knöbl, *Polizei und Herrschaft im Modernisierungsprozeß: Staatsbildung und innere Sicherheit in Preußen, England und Amerika 1700–1914*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1998.

²² Tom A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales, 1900–1966*, London: Constable, 1967; Wilbur R. Miller, *Cops and Bobbies: Police Authority in New York and London, 1830–1870*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973; Robert D. Storch, ‘The Plague of the Blue Locust. Police Reform and Popular Resistance in Northern England, 1840–1857’, *International Review of Social History*, vol. 20, 1975; ibid., ‘The Policeman as Domestic Missionary: Urban Discipline and Popular Culture in Northern England, 1850–1880’, *Journal of Social History*, vol. 9, 1975–1976; Eric Monkkonen, *Police in Urban America*,

1860–1920, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Emsley (1983); *ibid.* (1996).

²³ Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly (1975); Charles Tilly, *The Contentious French*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986; Charles Tilly and Edward Shorter, *Strikes in France 1830–1968*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974; Gerhard A. Ritter and Klaus Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im deutschen Kaiserreich, 1871/1875–1914*, Bonn: Verlag Dietz, 1992; Klaus Tenfelde, Heinrich Volkmann and Gerd Hohorst (eds.), *Streik. Zur Geschichte des Arbeitskampfes in Deutschland während der Industrialisierung*, Munich: Beck, 1981; Jacques Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur des grèves: l'affaire de Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-George*, Paris: Julliard, 1965; Michelle Perrot, *Les ouvriers en grève. France 1870–1890*, Paris: Mouton, 1974 (In the following references will be made to the French edition because the English translation of this book is a highly abbreviated version of the French original); Rolande Trempé, *La France ouvrière*, Part II: 1871–1914, Paris: Les Éditions de l'Atelier, 1995; Friedhelm Böll, *Arbeitskämpfe und Gewerkschaften in Deutschland, England und Frankreich*, Bonn: Dietz, 1992; Dieter Groh, 'Intensification of Work and Industrial Conflict in Germany, 1896–1914', *Politics and Society*, vol. 8, 1978, pp. 349–397; Klaus Saul, 'Zwischen Repression und Integration', in Tenfelde, Volkmann and Hohorst (eds.), *Streik: Zur Geschichte des Arbeitskampfes in Deutschland während der Industrialisierung*, Munich: Beck, 1981; Dick Geary, *European labour protest, 1848–1939*, London: Croom Helm, 1980; Stephen Hickney, *Workers in Imperial Germany: Miners of the Ruhr*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1985.

²⁴ George Carrot, *Maintien de l'ordre, depuis la fin de l'Ancien Régime jusqu'à 1968*, (unpublished thèse d'État), University of Nice, 1984; *ibid.*, *Le maintien de l'ordre en France au XXe siècle*, Paris: Veyrier, 1990; Jean-Marc Berlière, *Institution policière en France sous la Troisième République, 1875–1914*, (unpublished thèse d'État), University of Bourgogne, Dijon, 1991; *ibid.* (1993, 1); *ibid.*, 'Du maintien de l'ordre républicain au maintien républicain de l'ordre?', *Genèses*, vol. 12, 1993 (2), pp. 6–29; *ibid.*, 'Aux origines d'une conception "moderne" du maintien de l'ordre', in Madeleine Rebérioux (ed.), *Fourmies et les Premier Mai*, Paris: Éditions de l'Atelier, 1994; *ibid.* (1996); Patrick Bruneteaux, 'Le désordre de la répression en France, 1871–1921: des conscrits aux gendarmes mobiles', *Genèses*, vol. 12, 1993, pp. 30–46; *ibid.* (1996); Odile Roynette-Gland, 'L'armée dans la bataille sociale: maintien de l'ordre et grèves ouvrières dans le Nord de la France (1871–1906)', *Le Mouvement Social*, vol. 179, 1997, pp. 33–58.

²⁵ Lüdtke (1982); *ibid.* (ed.), *Herrschaft als soziale Praxis: historische und sozial-anthropologische Studien*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991; Herbert Reinke (ed.), "Nur für die Sicherheit da?..." *Zur Geschichte der Polizei im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993; Funk (1986); Jessen (1991); *ibid.* (1992); Elaine Glovka Spencer, *Management and Labor in Imperial Germany: Ruhr Industrialists as Employers, 1896–1914*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1984; *ibid.*, 'Police–Military Relations in Prussia, 1848–1914', *Journal of Social History*, vol. 19, 1985, pp. 305–317; *ibid.*, *Police and the Social Order in German Cities: the Düsseldorf District, 1848–1914*, DeKalb:

Northern Illinois University Press, 1992; Thomas Lindenberger, 'Politique de rue et action de classe à Berlin avant la première guerre mondiale', *Génèses*, vol. 12, 1993, pp. 47–68; *ibid.*, *Straßenpolitik. Zur Sozialgeschichte der öffentlichen Ordnung in Berlin*, Bonn: Dietz, 1995.

²⁶ Diane Cooper-Richet, 'Le Plan general de protection à l'épreuve de la grève des mineurs du Nord-Pas-de-Calais (September–November 1902)', in Philippe Vigier (ed.), *Maintien de l'ordre et polices en France et en Europe au XIXe siècle*, Paris: Créaphis, 1987; Berlière (1994) pp. 185–197; Bruneteaux (1993); *ibid.* (1996); Royenette-Gland (1997) pp. 34–37.

²⁷ Lüdtke (1982); Wolfram Sieman, *Deutschlands Ruhr Sicherheit und Ordnung: Anfänge der politischen Polizei, 1806–1866*, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1985; Funk (1986); Jessen (1991); Reinke (1993); Lindenberger (1993); *ibid.* (1995); Knöbl (1998).

²⁸ Jean-Pierre Machelon, *La République contre les libertés*, Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976, pp. 7–8.

²⁹ Madeleine Rebérioux and Jean-Marie Mayeur, *The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 190–191; Maurice Agulhon, *The French Republic 1879–1992*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 55; Michel Winock, *La France Politique, XIXe–XXe siècle*, Paris: Seuil, 1999, p. 248.

³⁰ Raoul Girardet, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine 1815–1939*, Paris: Plon, 1953, p. 262; David B. Ralston, *The Army of the Republic*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 281, William Serman, *Les officiers français dans la nation, 1848–1914*, Paris: Aubier, 1982, pp. 59–60.

³¹ Carrot (1984) p. 647; Bruneteaux (1996) pp. 46–47; Belière (1996) p. 118.

³² Rebérioux (1989) pp. 190–191, 264; Perrot (1974) pp. 83, 192; Trempé (1995) pp. 322–335.

³³ Emsley (1999), Eric Alary, *L'histoire de la gendarmerie de la renaissance au troisième millenaire*, Paris: Calman-Lévy, 2000; Similarly the recent book on the French *gendarmerie* edited by Jean-Noël Luc (2002).

³⁴ Carrot (1984).

³⁵ Berlière (1991); *ibid.* (1996).

³⁶ Bruneteaux, (1993); *ibid.* (1996).

³⁷ Dianne Cooper-Richet (1987).

³⁸ Royenette-Gland (1997).

³⁹ Jean-Charles Jauffret, 'Armée et Pouvoir Politique: la question des troupes spécialisées chargées du maintien de l'ordre en France de 1871 à 1914' *Revue Historique*, vol. 270, 1983, pp. 97–144.

⁴⁰ J. Monteilhet, *Les institutions militaires de la France (1814–1924)*, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1926; Girardet (1953) pp. 233–234, 262–263; Paul-Marie de la Gorce, *The French Army: a Military-Political History*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1963, p. 61; Serman (1982) pp. 45–63.

⁴¹ Guy Pedroncini (ed.), *Histoire Militaire de la France de 1871 à 1940*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992.

⁴² Perrot's quantitative estimations only comprise military involvement in the policing of labour conflict for the period 1870–1890. At the same time her figures involves both the instances where regular troops were mobilised and instances where only the *gendarmerie* intervened. Perrot (1974) p. 195.

⁴³ Madeleine Rebérioux goes as far as claiming that it was rare that military presence at strikes and demonstrations did not end in bloody confrontations with protesters being killed. Rebérioux (1989) p. 264. Similarly Berlière describes military presence being as “always extremely bloody.”, Berlière (1993, 2) p. 9.

⁴⁴ Agulhon very accurately expresses these conflicting interpretations of the Third Republic as the ‘good’ or the ‘bad’ republic. Maurice Agulhon, *Coup d’État et République*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997, pp. 81–82.

⁴⁵ Jean-Pierre Azéma and Michel Winock, *La Troisième République: 1870–1914*, Paris: Hachette, 1970, pp. 125–157; Rebérioux (1989) pp. 204–206; Agulhon (1993) pp. 48, 52–55; *ibid.* (1997) pp. 81–82; Winock (1999) pp. 88–89.

⁴⁶ Jean-Jacques Becker, *Le Carnet B: les pouvoirs publics et l’antimilitarisme avant la guerre de 1914*, Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1973; Rebérioux (1994) pp. 11–17; Trempé (1995) pp. 320–335.

⁴⁷ Girardet (1953) pp. 262–264; Serman (1982) pp. 45–63; Jauffret (1983) pp. 138–143.

⁴⁸ Pierre Miquel, *Clemenceau: la guerre et la paix*, Paris: Tallandier, 1996, pp. 42–45; René Rémond, *La République souveraine: La vie politique en France, 1879–1939*, Paris: Fayard, 2002, pp. 228–232. Similarly Machelon focuses on the necessity of maintaining order within the fragile Republican system. Machelon (1976) pp. 20–21.

⁴⁹ Robert Gildea, *The Past in French History*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 36–42; Robert Tombs, *France 1814–1914*, London: Longman, 1996; Roger Magraw, *Workers and the Bourgeois Republic*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, p. 50; *ibid.*, *France 1800–1914: A Social History*. London: Longman, 2002, p. 113.

⁵⁰ Carrot (1984) p. 665; Berlière (1991) pp. 498–510; *ibid.* (1996) p. 118; Bruneteaux (1993) p. 31. Similarly Agulhon describes the use of troops as due to the ‘institutional backwardness’ of the system of order maintenance. Agulhon (1993) p. 55.

⁵¹ Serman (1982) pp. 47–48; Roynette-Gland (1997) p. 34.

⁵² Rebérioux (1989) pp. 264; Trempé (1995) pp. 325–335; Magraw (2002) p. 103.

⁵³ Lüdtke (1982) pp. 53–54, pp. 326–338; Funk (1986) pp. 287–311; Jessen (1991) p. 159–162, 179–185.

⁵⁴ Harald Klückmann, ‘Requisition und Einsatz bewaffneter Macht in der deutschen Verfassungs- und Militärgeschichte’, *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, vol. 1, 1978, pp. 7–43.

⁵⁵ Spencer, 1984, pp. 305–317.

⁵⁶ Funk (1986); Jessen (1991); Knöbl (1998).

⁵⁷ Funk (1986) pp. 155–156; Jessen (1991) pp. 17, 40–43, Spencer (1992) pp. 86–87.

⁵⁸ Henning raises the issue, but does not go into details on the aspect. Henning (1987) p. 140.

⁵⁹ Lüdkte (1982) pp. 238–282, 291–300.

⁶⁰ Funk (1986) pp. 307–311.

⁶¹ Kitchen (1968) p. 163.

⁶² Messerschmidt (1980) p. 68.

⁶³ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871–1918*, Oxford: Berg, 1985, p. 157.

⁶⁴ Berghahn (1994) pp. 257–258.

⁶⁵ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 1849–1914*, Munich: Beck, 1995, p. 1123.

⁶⁶ Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Sceptre: The problem of Militarism in Germany*, London: Penguin, 1972 (first published in 1954), vol. 2, pp. 125–136; Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 255–266; Karl Demeter, *The German Officer Corps in Society and State 1650–1945*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965 (first published in 1930); Manfred Messerschmidt (with E. von Matuschka and Wolfgang Petters), *Militärsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert, 1814–1890*, Munich: Beck, 1979; Volker R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993, pp. 19–37.

⁶⁷ Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Symbol des halb-absolutistischen Herrschaftssystems’ in Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.), *Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871–1918*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970; *ibid.* (1985) p. 21. In his great synthesis of German Social History of the 19th century, Wehler prefers the term ‘Iron State’ to describe the militarised character of the Constitution and institutional arrangements of the German Empire (Wehler (1995) p. 874); Thomas Nipperdey describes the German Empire as a ‘military state’ (Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918: Machtstaat vor der Demokratie*, Munich: Beck, 1992, p. 201).

⁶⁸ Ullmann talks about the long Police State tradition in Germany (Hans-Peter Ullmann, *Das deutsche Kaiserreich*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995, p. 173); while Ritter and Tenfelde (1992) p. 683 think that despite the system of police supervision developed to watch over the Social Democrats, the German Empire could not adequately be described as a police state.

⁶⁹ Wehler (1995) pp. 1284–1295; Wilfried Loth, *Das Kaiserreich: Obrigkeitstaat und politische Mobilisierung*, Munich: dtv, 1996; Ullmann (1995); Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen*, Munich: Beck, 2000. Hartwin Spenkuch, ‘Vergleichsweise besonders? Politische System und Strukturen Preußens als Kern des “deutschen Sonderwegs”’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, vol. 29 /2, 2003, pp. 262–293.

⁷⁰ The literature on the German *Sonderweg* debate is vast. For a brief introduction in English see David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The peculiarities of German history: Bourgeois society and politics in 19th century Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984; R. G. Moeller, ‘The Kaiserreich Recast?’, *Journal of Social History*, vol. 17, 1984; Richard J. Evans, *Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich*, London: HarperCollins, 1987; *ibid.*, *Rereading German History, 1800–1996: From Unification to Reunification*, London: Routledge, 1997.

⁷¹ Alastar P. Thompson, *Left Liberals, the State and Popular Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, Oxford University Press, 2000; Kevin Repp, *Reformers, Critics, and the Path of German Modernity: Anti-Politics and the Search for Alternatives, 1890–1914*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000.

⁷² Wehler (1985) pp. 62–65; Wehler (1995) pp. 1000–1168; Wolfgang Mommsen, *Imperial Germany 1867–1918: Politics, Culture and Society in an Authoritarian State*, London: Arnold, 1995, pp. 278–299; Berghahn (1994) pp. 195–196.

⁷³ Spencer (1985) pp. 305–317; Spencer (1992) pp. 163–164; Evans (1987) pp. 171–174; *ibid.* (1997) p. 73.

⁷⁴ Christophe Charle, *Les Hauts Fonctionnaires en France au 19e siècle*, Paris: Gallimard, 1980; *ibid.*, *Les elites de la République (1880-1900)*, Paris: Gallimard, 1987; Walter S. Barge, *The Generals of the Republic: the corporate personality of high military rank in France 1889–1914* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) University of North Carolina, 1982; Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, *Histoire des élites en France au XIXe et XXe siècles*, Paris: Hachette, 1991; René Bargeton, *Dictionnaire Biographique des Préfets, 1870–1982*, Paris: Archives Nationales, 1994. For the German bureaucratic elites see the studies of Nikolaus von Preradovich, *Die Führungsschichten in Österreich und Preußen (1808–1918)*, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1955; Friedrich Wilhelm Euler, 'Die deutsche Generalität und Admiralität bis 1918', in Hanns Hubert Hofmann (ed.), *Das deutsche Offizierkorps 1860–1960*, Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1980; Bernhard vom Brocke, 'Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten 1815 bis 1945', in Klaus Schwabe (ed.), *Die preußischen Oberpräsidenten, 1815–1945*, Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1981; Daniel Hughes, *The King's Finest: a Social and Bureaucratic Profile of Prussia's General Officers 1871–1914*, New York: Atheneum, 1987.

⁷⁵ Stig Förster, *Die doppelte Militarismus: der deutsche Heeresrüstungspolitik zwischen Status-quo-Sicherung und Aggression, 1890–1913*, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985; Thomas Rohkrämer, *Der Militarismus der "kleinen Leute": Die Kriegervereine in deutschen Kaiserreich, 1871–1914*, Munich: Oldenburg, 1990; Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: militarism, myth and mobilisation in Germany*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

⁷⁶ David Schoenbaum, *Zabern 1913: Consensus politics in Imperial Germany*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1982; Nicholas Stargardt, *The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics, 1866–1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁷⁷ Hendrick L. Wesseling, *Soldiers and Warriors: French attitudes towards the army at the era of the First World War*, Westpoint, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000; Paul Miller, *From Revolutionaries to Citizens: Antimilitarism in France 1870–1914*, Durham, NJ: Duke University Press, 2002.

⁷⁸ Markus Ingenlath, *Mentale Aufrüstung: Militarisierungstendenzen in Frankreich und Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1994; Jakob Vogel, *Nationen im Gleichschritt: der Kult der "Nation im Waffen" in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1871–1914*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,

1997; *ibid.*, “Folklorenmilitarismus” in Deutschland und Frankreich’, in Wolfram Wette (ed.), *Militarismus in Deutschland 1871 bis 1945*, Hamburg: LIT, 1999.

⁷⁹ See Chapter 1.

⁸⁰ Karl-Erich Born, *Staat und Sozialpolitik seit Bismarcks Sturz*, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1957; *ibid.*, *Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Kaiserreich, 1867/71–1914*, Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1985; Hansjoachim Henning, *Die deutsche Beamenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert*, Stuttgart: Steiner, 1984; *ibid.* (1987). On French prefects and mayors, see Brian Chapman, *The Prefects and Provincial France*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1955; Jeanne Siwek-Pouydesseau, *Le corps préfectoral sous la Troisième et la Quatrième République*, Paris: Armand Colin, 1969; Vincent Wright and Bernard Le Clère, *Les préfets du Second Empire*, Paris: Armand Colin; Vincent Wright, ‘The History of French Mayors: Lessons and Problems’, in *Jahrbuch Europäischer Verwaltung*, vol. 2, 1990, pp. 268–280; *ibid.*, ‘La reserve du corps préfectoral’, in Pierre Birnbaum (ed.), *La France de l’Affaire Dreyfus*, Paris: Gallimard, 1994.

⁸¹ Monteilhet (1926); de la Gorce (1963); Ralston (1967).

⁸² The historical perspective as central to the understanding of the dynamics in the functioning of institutions was first described theoretically by James March and Johan Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational Basis of Politics*, New York: The Free Press, 1989, pp. 7–8, 21–26. For a recent assessment of this approach see Theda Skocpol and Paul Pierson, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science’, in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.), *Political Science: the State of the Discipline*, New York: Norton, 2002, pp. 693–721.

⁸³ March and Olsen (1989) pp. 58–63; Skocpol and Pierson (2002) pp. 694–695.