Following the devastating droughts of the 1990s in Southern Africa, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia mooted the idea of transferring water from the Congo River, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in order to meet the water needs of Namibia and Botswana, the most water scarce countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). To this end, Namibia spent an estimated US$70,000 on a planned feasibility study last year. Most water specialists in Namibia and the region have constantly dismissed the idea as an unworkable proposal citing cost and security considerations. Unsurprisingly the local media have come to term the idea of pumping water from Congo as simply a "Congo pipe dream" which will never see the light of day. However, of recent the pipeline has been defying sceptics and has been receiving interest from various potential sponsors. The Southern African Development Community during its latest meeting threw its political weight behind conducting an extensive feasibility study into Congo water. The call of President Nujoma was at the same time also echoed by an international partnership of a Congolese company, Western Trade Corporation (WESTRAC), and a US company, Sapphire Aqua Corporation (SAC) to built two pipelines (known as the Okapi Pipelines water abduction project) – one to Southern Africa and another to the Middle East. The partnership aims to utilize the expertise of Gulf Interstate Engineering (GIE) and Boyle Engineering Corporation (BOYLE).

Constructing and operating the pipelines, however, clearly suggest a significant range of activities that need consideration, least of which are measures to put in place the legal, social and political implications involved in controlling and redirecting the distribution of water from surplus countries or regions to the deficit areas (countries and regions). With the political will, adequate funds and technical know-how pumping water from one country or region to another might be said a foregone conclusion. However, experience in the oil and gas pipelines shows that for a pipeline of this magnitude, issues of transit, ownership, acceptability (amongst others) play a crucial role in ensuring successful implementation. What are the legal and institutional implications of the Congo cross-border water pipelines in international law? This paper aims at examining the legal and institutional implications of cross-border water pipelines drawing from the lessons of oil and gas cross-border pipelines in international law. The paper uses these lessons to make legal and institutional recommendations in the construction of the Congo Cross-Border Water Pipelines Project.

2.   The Economics of Pipelines

Transferring water from one place to another is very expensive because water is heavy and bulky, thus its movement consumes a lot more energy. To this end, as with most African projects, the CWPP will only be able to succeed if there are enough funds committed to the project. Ideally most of these resources could be amassed and raised within Africa, however in reality the technological know-how is deficient in most African countries thus the involvement of export credit agencies or commercial lenders will be crucial to the success of the project. In other words, while issues of security and political stability will play very important roles, it would ultimately be economics which would determine whether the CWPP succeeds or not. Though smaller compared to the CWPP, the only any other water project funded in equal manner is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) which had cost an estimated US$8 billion to construct. There are currently two ‘cross-border' water pipelines projects that have been cost which are discussed below to illustrate the cost of water pipelines in general and those that are involved. Another example which is not discussed, and which could be relevant, is the planned water pipeline to be constructed in the People's Republic of China (PRC) which would be more than 760 miles long and estimated to cost more than $11 billion. The pipeline is expected to divert billions of tones of water from the south of the country to the drought-hit north where more than 3.2 million people in Shandong province are facing water shortage and swarms of locusts threatening hundreds of thousands of farmers with economic ruin.

In the absence of an equivalent cross-border water pipelines project in the world in general and in Africa in particular, this section of the paper shall focus on the lessons that can be learned from economics of oil and gas pipelines.

The economic calculus for both oil and gas can be summarised to include:

• Cost of production at the wellhead
• Cost of transportation to viable markets
• Market demand from paying customers
• Tariffs or tolls imposed by transit countries over and above the costs of transport.

Compared with oil, the economics of exporting gas are generally less attractive, making gas transmission projects even more vulnerable. It is noted that "gas is triply burdened":

• the market price is typically below that of oil, often tied to a discount from fuel oil values,
• markets are less fungible, and
• transport costs are higher (the unit cost per kilometre is four to six times higher than for oil).

Given the complete dependency of gas on transport infrastructure, the security of supply is particularly important for both exporters and importers. If the flow of gas is interrupted, there are no other means, unlike in the case of oil, to bring it to consumers. Generally, gas is exported on the basis of long-term contracts, ensuring a bankable minimum income over the duration of the project. There are other differences between oil and gas pipeline projects, which may be of relevance to the industry and countries involved. Oil and gas pipelines typically require large upfront capital investments, leading to large fixed costs, and relatively low operating costs. As a rule of thumb, the cost of 1 km of a large diameter trunk pipeline is around US$ 1 million. These capital costs are sunk costs, which have to be recovered regardless of the scale of the pipeline's operation. The payback period is extremely long, exposing the pipeline owners to a multitude of risks, both economical and political. These common risks and issues require particular attention and have to be addressed through appropriate legal mechanisms, national and international.

2.1.   France-Spain Water Pipeline

Increasing water scarcity in the arid regions of eastern Spain, particularly around Barcelona, Spain's second largest city and the main seat of industry, has led to a plan to build a 200-mile pipeline. The pipeline, if approved, would pass through southern France and the Pyrenees to bring water from the Rhone River to Spain. This is the first project of its kind in Europe of a pipeline that crosses national boundaries, and experts believe it represents the future along the Mediterranean, where the climate is becoming drier and warmer. The cost is estimated at US$1bn, depending on whether the pipeline would be used to supply water to French towns along the way, such as Beziers, Carcassone and Narbonne, which also occasionally experience water problems. Planners of the project believe that negotiating the water rights for the aqueduct could serve as a model for future European water export projects. Among the expected challenges, in addition to legal issues, is what can best be described as political intricacies involving French farmers' mistrust of their counterparts in Spain.

2.2   Iran-Kuwait Water Pipeline

The Middle East is one of the regions hardest hit by water scarcity in the world. The plans to build the ambitious fresh water pipelines in the Middle East had been unveiled in London recently (February 2001). The 540-Km long pipeline is expected to carry water from a dam in Iran to the coast of Kuwait, across the Iranian territory and under the sea (330 km of the pipeline is expected to run across Iranian territory, the rest under the sea). The pipeline, estimated to cost US$2 billion, will be built and operated by a consortium of European, Arab and Japanese companies that have won a contract to build and operate it. The consortium will be led by Gulf Utilities Company (GUC), a British company which is close to securing an agreement with Kuwait to build the pipeline. Construction on the pipeline is expected to begin in 2002 with commissioning planned for 2004. The new pipeline will enable Kuwait to rely less heavily on desalination, which is believed to be causing environmental damage to the coastline.

3.   Oil and Gas Pipelines: an Analogy

In the oil and gas industry there is an international legal perspective out of which two types or models of cross-border pipeline arrangements can be identified. The first is a connected national pipelines model, with each "national" section of the cross-border infrastructure being under the territorial jurisdiction of a respective state and governed by its domestic law. In such a case, the entire transnational petroleum transport infrastructure is not considered as a unitary whole: it may have several owners and/or operators and be subject to a patchwork of national regulatory systems. Regulation of transnational issues is based on contracts concluded between owners or operators of national sections, or by agreements with the respective governments.

For obvious reasons, such a system may increase political risk and uncertainty for any company wishing to utilise pipelines. Moreover, the major difficulty in dealing with cross-border transport is extraterritoriality – the inability to rely just upon a single state's pricing, regulatory, or legal issues to resolve potential commercial or contractual disputes. Thus, although enhancing the legislative and contractual framework at the national level can help reduce risks in the pipeline sector, the most durable would be bilateral and multilateral treaties that provide the legal foundation on which commercial agreements relating to cross-border pipelines would be based.

3.2.   Integrated Pipelines Model

The second model is a genuinely "international" pipeline project devised, built and functioning as a single integrated system. This model reflects a growing tendency to deal with a cross-border pipeline as a legal and factual unit where a system of interrelated agreements – intergovernmental and commercial – creates a specific legal regime ensuring the uninterrupted flow of energy. This unit "must be protected by intergovernmental pipeline agreements proscribing unwarranted disruption of the flow and undue burdens imposed by excessive transit fees or taxes".

A proliferation of transnational pipeline projects, especially in the regions known for their political and economic instability, has resulted in the more active involvement of governments concerned in the construction and operation of cross-border petroleum infrastructures. Such transnational projects require the support of each host and transit country, not only for the segment constructed and operated within their respective territories, but for the entire system as well. In this respect, international pipeline-related arrangements have tended to have different forms. Such an arrangement may be a "framework" international (multilateral or bilateral) agreement establishing a set of general principles and obligations concerning cross-border pipelines and applicable to all cross-border pipelines between the state parties. Examples of this type of international agreement are numerous. On the other hand, there are a number of agreements dealing with specific pipeline projects.

In the field of trans-border trade, transport and transit, however, there exist a considerable body of international agreements of a general character, which may also be relevant to the construction and operation of cross-border petroleum infrastructures. Some of these instruments of jus communicationis contain general principles and rules applicable to various modes of transport and communications. These agreements may not necessarily directly deal with cross-border pipelines (and some even explicitly exclude pipelines from their scope) but their fundamental provisions, such as the principles of "freedom of transit", "non-interference", "non-discrimination", and "equal treatment", provide a legal background for the pipeline transport as well.

3.3.   Legal Issues for Transit: Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)

The 1994 Energy Charter Treaty is the only multilateral instrument that establishes a general legal framework for a secure and unimpeded transport of energy products and materials. The ECT was signed by 51 countries and was as of May 2001 ratified by 43 countries situated along the Central Asian, European and Trans-Caucasian energy transport routes. The ECT, which entered into force in April 1998, is predominantly a trade and investment agreement, whose main purpose was to establish the legal framework for cooperation in energy matters including exploration, production, transit and trade, the protection of investments and the transfer of profits. It is also the first multilateral treaty to provide binding international dispute settlement as a fundamental provision.

In particular, it ensures that energy and energy products can transit through third countries and compels transit countries to take the measures necessary to facilitate such transit. They must also not interrupt the flow of energy in the event of any dispute over terms and conditions of transit. Transit, in its traditional sense, implies the involvement of at least three states. Under the treaty regime, its provisions apply even if only two states – the "transit state" and either the state of origin or the state of destination – is a contracting party. It is clear, that in this case the ECT will govern energy transit involving only those states, which are parties. Thus, the transit regime, established under the ECT, becomes operational even if the energy originates outside the territory of contracting parties, or is destined for areas outside that area.

The ECT also covers the situation where only two states are involved. This is the case where the areas of origin and destination belong to one state, and the transit area to the other. There are a number of transit pipelines involving only two states. One such pipeline is a Russian oil line, which crosses Ukrainian territory before returning back to Russia. Under the ECT, in such a situation both states concerned must be contracting parties in order for the transit provisions to apply. However, under the ECT, the contracting parties concerned are able to make a reservation excluding them from the treaty transit regime. Currently, only Canada and the United States, none being a party to the ECT, have made such a joint reservation. These two states created their own legal framework for transit pipelines based on a bilateral agreement.

The ECT contains an impressive system of dispute settlement, designed to deal with a range of possible controversies. This system is among the most essential elements of the ECT regime, as it provides a mechanism that builds the confidence of private investors involved in the trade and investment activities in the contracting parties. It should be noted from the outset, that for historical reasons, trade and investment disputes have been treated differently. While trade remains a state-to-state issue, investors are given a standing vis-à-vis states over disputes involving investment issues.

The primary objective of the transit regime under the ECT is to achieve a proper balance between the interests of international trade, concerned about the certainty and stability of energy supply, and the sovereign interests of states, especially those whose territories are used for energy transit. However, although the ECT is a useful instrument, which provides a general legal framework for transit, to be effective it must be supported and supplemented by well-drafted contractual agreements for the sale, purchase or transit of energy materials and products. To this end, though the ECT does not and cannot address all problems related to transit, it nonetheless establishes the first binding international obligations specifically dealing with transit petroleum infrastructures. However, they provide a legal foundation for actions against discriminatory and unfair treatment of energy transit and, thus, should be considered as an important step in creating safe and reliable international energy markets.

The Congo River has had hydrologic studies conducted that span over the period 1902-1956 and these studies have been used, inter alia, for the feasibility studies and the design of the hydroelectric Inga dams. With more than 50% of Africa's water resources, the Congo River basin contains approximately 1,325 billion m³ of water and covers almost all of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, eastern Zambia, northern Angola, and parts of Cameroon and Tanzania. The Congo River is the fifth longest river in the world and meanders for 4,667 kilometres through west central Africa. It carries more water than any river except the Amazon and it drains an area of about 3,630,000 square kilometres. The river which can be divided into three main regions: the upper Congo, the middle Congo, and the lower Congo, which receives an average of 1,500 mm of rain per year, of which more than 25 percent it discharges into the Atlantic Ocean. The upper Congo has many tributaries, lakes, waterfalls, and rapids. The middle Congo has seven cataracts known collectively as Boyoma Falls, below which the river becomes navigable. The lower Congo begins where the river divides in two and forms the vast Malebo Pool. The river also has great hydroelectric potential, although this has not been widely exploited, estimations indicate that it has the hydroelectric potential of supplying the whole Africa. The river clearly has abundance of water and herein lies the rationale for diverting water to areas of where water is most needed.

4.2.   Congo Water Transfer

Following the devastating drought that hit the SADC region in the early 1990s, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia, mooted the idea of building pipeline to transfer water from the Congo river to other countries in Southern Africa. As was indicated earlier, the pipeline was given a lifeline when SADC countries, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, gave approval for Namibia to conduct a preliminary feasibility study in the more realistic ways of bringing the Congo water to Southern Africa. The possibilities being considered include diverting water from one of the river's southern tributaries (Site A, see Map above), instead of pumping water the 1,000km from the mouth of Congo (Site B). In this way, SADC intends to have the water pumped over the Angolan highlands - which form the watershed - to boost the flow of a tributary of the Kavango River.

Namibia is expected to implement and pay for the six-month SADC-approved study. However, as recent as 11 January 2001, Botswana indicated its interest in teaming up with Namibia to jointly pump water from the Congo. Although the two countries have different ideas on the use of such water once brought to Southern Africa, there is one feature that binds them together: water scarcity. Namibia sees the water from Congo as an ideal opportunity to have "irrigation schemes in the Namib Desert modeled on similar projects undertaken by Sahara desert countries." To do that, however, Namibia will pump the water from the Kavango River (250 kilometres) to deliver it to the capital, Windhoek. Botswana on the other hand, intends to pump the water from the Kavango Delta (300 kilometres) to the nearest agricultural area, or a further 700 kilometres to its capital, Gaborone. The CWPP (which SADC is yet to put a cost on) is expected to be the biggest water project in Sub-Saharan Africa.

4.2.2.   WESTRAC Position

According to the press release from WESTRAC circulated to global media, the company was given the "rights by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to build and operate the pipelines to deliver the much-needed water to arid regions." To this end, the WESTRAC intends to build two pipelines. The first pipeline is expected to be designed to deliver 25 cubic metres per second of water from Moanda in the DRC to Walvis Bay (in Namibia), 1000 kilometres (see Site B on the map) away to Namibia, increasing to 100 cubic metres per second in three phases over a three year period or via the Kavango Delta to Southern Africa. The second pipeline (2000 km see Site C on the map) is expected to initially supply Port Sudan in the Red Sea from a starting point of Lisala in the DRC with 25 cubic metres per second.

The Congo Government will reportedly provide water for free as a humanitarian gesture to help alleviate the dangerous political tensions in those regions caused by the critical scarcity of water and to promote world peace. In particular the Congo water is expected to offset Israel's water scarcity after the return to Syria of the Golan Heights. In this respect, the press release maintains that "Israel and Jordan are high on the list of water-scarce nations where the potential for continued conflict in the Jordan River valley is no longer a question."

The release further asserts that the project will cost an estimated US$6 billion dollars and will generate thousands of jobs for local economies in the DRC, Central Africa Republic, Sudan, Angola, Namibia and Botswana. It will also generate huge business opportunities such as electricity and communications supplies resulting from the fibre optics that will be positioned along the pipelines. Social and environmental development programs, such as the building of churches, mosques, hospitals, parks, housing, commercial centres and schools, are envisaged under the vast water project. However, following the recent death of President Laurent Kabila, at the time of writing, the authors have been unable to get confirmation from any other source about the status of the DRC government ‘humanitarian gesture' offer or association with WESTRAC. The remaining section of this paper will focus mainly on the pipelines to Southern Africa of which DRC is a member state.

4.2.3.   Socio-Economic and Political Factors

Generally, political stability is the first prerequisite for pipelines, which traverse international boundaries. This political aspect need also be accompanied by governmental support of the countries involved. On-land pipelines, by nature, pass through either privately owned land or land inhabited by indigenous communities whose livelihood might be negatively impacted by the pipelines. To this end, social (indigenous communities) acceptance of the project will therefore be a second prerequisite. Availability of funds would complete the jigsaw of the factors worth consideration when constructing pipelines. The aforementioned factors are equally relevant to the participating SADC countries (particularly the transit countries Angola and Zambia) in construction of the Congo Pipelines. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which will supply the water, is a country endowed with vast natural resources including water. It is located in south-western-central Africa and covers an area of 2,345,410 sq. km (roughly the size of the whole Western Europe, which has an estimated combined population of more than 340 million) and an estimated population of 51 million. It shares long borders with Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The economic wealth of the country has throughout the decades of colonialism and Cold War dictatorship not been used to the benefit of the ordinary people of Congo. In 1997, the Cold War dictator was toppled and a new coalition government came to power. Not long thereafter, the coalition crumbled and some renegades of the coalition launched a foreign-backed rebellion in the eastern part of the country in August 1998 to take over the government in Kinshasa. SADC forces intervened to stop the rebel's overthrow of the Kinshasa government and pushed the rebels back to the east of the country. Effectively therefore, the eastern part of the DRC has been still at war although peace making efforts are ongoing. Also, on 16 January 2001, the president of the Democratic Republic of Congo was assassinated allegedly by one of his own bodyguards. Subsequently, the president's son was sworn in, as the ‘caretaker' new head of state until the next elections would be held. The new president has reaffirmed his country's continued co-operation with SADC.

4.2.4.   Selected Risks

The political and therefore security risks as mentioned above require utmost consideration by in the CWPP. Analysis of the options (Site A and B indicated on the map) for the CWPP brings out the following risks that will affect the final choice:

5.   Proposed Legal and Institutional Framework for CWPP

The Congo Water Pipelines Project will set a unique precedent for cross-border water pipelines in the international law particularly in Africa. The CWPP will involve six sovereign countries (DRC, Angola, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe). The participation of more than five countries, by definition, implies a substantial degree of cooperation between the states concerned and consequently requires an adequate international legal framework necessary to formalise and support such cooperation. This is particularly so because on-land pipelines in general and water pipelines in particular have no special status under international law, their regime depends on specific arrangements agreed to between the states concerned.

It was observed in the oil and gas analogy above that any cross-border pipeline project involves a complex balancing of cross-border political risks, regulatory issues and legal and contractual structures, in order to create a framework that is workable politically, viable commercially and attractive to international lenders. Similarly, for the CWPP to be successful the following prerequisites will have to be developed:

• A sound political framework in the form of international – multilateral or bilateral – agreements facilitating cross-border cooperation and minimising the risk of cross-border disputes.
• An adequate domestic legal system in host countries providing for the protection of property rights, enforceability of contracts and non-discrimination, as well as a regulatory authority with appropriate powers and free from political interference.
• A clear contractual framework setting out commercial relationships between the host governments, producers, shippers, and buyers.
• A bankable framework, whereupon the combination of the three requirements mentioned above is acceptable to international lenders.

Furthermore, the four-tiered legal framework typically required for oil and gas cross-border pipeline project are also applicable to the CWPP and as such must address the following contractual relationships:

• the country-to-country relationship;
• the country/pipeline company relationship;
• the pipeline consortium relationship; and
• the pipeline company/commercial contractor's relationships.

Generally, therefore, cross-border pipeline projects raise special legal issues concerning their construction and/or operation, which may be different from those related to domestic pipelines. Given that parts of a cross-border pipeline are almost always located within the domestic jurisdiction of individual states whose territories are traversed by this pipeline, it is national law that governs in many cases. However, as was seen in the oil and gas pipelines, international agreements, intergovernmental as well as between the host state and the investors, may also deal in considerable detail with these issues, which include, inter alia, the securing of right-of-way, ownership, tariffs and transit fees, pipeline capacity allocation (including the question of third party access), non-diversion (in case of transit), notification and mitigation of the effects of major interruptions, technical standards (including environmental and safety standards), taxation, metering and measuring, and dispute settlement.

5.2.   Institutional/Commercial Contractual Arrangements

In the final analysis, governments involved in the CWPP will need to decide on the institutional arrangements supporting the project. However, the parties to the CWPP could consider the two types of legal models discussed under the oil and gas analogy, namely a connected national pipeline or an integrated international pipeline. The connected national pipeline model requires that each "national" section of the cross-border infrastructure be under the territorial jurisdiction of a respective state and governed by its domestic law. In other words the pipeline does not get considered a unitary whole and it may have several owners and/or operators and be subject to a patchwork of national regulatory systems. Regulation of transnational issues is based on contracts concluded between owners or operators of national sections, or by agreements with the respective governments. The drawback with this model is that it is prone to increased political risk and uncertainty for any company wishing to utilise pipelines.

If the above model is found limiting the parties to the CWPP could consider the second model, integrated international pipeline, which typically can be devised and built and can function as a single integrated system. This model reflects a growing tendency to deal with a cross-border pipeline as a legal and factual unit where a system of interrelated agreements – intergovernmental and commercial – creates a specific legal regime that may ensure the uninterrupted flow of water. This unit must be protected by intergovernmental pipeline agreements proscribing unwarranted disruption of the flow and undue burdens imposed by excessive transit fees or taxes. The integrated model may prove desirable particularly in the framework of the growing cooperation between countries in Southern Africa under the umbrella of SADC.

6.   Recommendations

The scarcity of water in some countries in Southern Africa is well accepted, but the extent to which the growing population and therefore increasing demand for water threatens the region's population is perhaps not appreciated enough. It took endemic droughts of the early 1990s for a political leader to moot the idea for diverting water from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Namibia and Botswana respectively. A host of factors are to be considered, including availability of adequate funds and technological know-how. In particular, a cross-border water pipeline project such as the CWPP has neither legal nor institutional precedent in SADC. Therefore, the existing general and pipeline-specific international arrangements, particularly in the oil and gas industry, can serve as a basis on which the SADC countries can embark on developing and harmonising domestic regulatory frameworks to ensure efficient and secure cross-border transport of the Congo water.

In general, the project, being an international undertaking, will require harmonisation and coordination of available resources, including domestic laws, of all the countries involved. To this end, among the factors to be considered are the plan, design and locating the pipeline routes, the need for rights-of way, the type of transportation modes, environmental and social factors, engineering and design considerations, safety and security concerns, topography, geology, land-use plans, economics, politics, regulations and standards.

It must however be pointed out that the present worldwide reality is that there is no uniformity in the legal and financial structuring of cross-border pipeline projects. There exist different models: from connected national pipelines to fully integrated pipelines, having one set of owners and consistent legal treatment along the entire route. An integrated model of a cross-border (transit) pipeline appears to be emerging as the preferable formula used for new projects. This approach provides a certain degree of legal and regulatory uniformity thereby mitigating the problems arising from jurisdictional differences. To this end, the SADC treaty which makes provision for the establishment of SADC Tribunal could be instituted and harmonised along the principles of not only dispute resolution but also compliance with agreed terms as well as strengthening the dispute avoidance regime.

As to the necessary legal framework, a four-tiered approach is considered as the optimal, especially with respect to cross-border and transit infrastructures involving countries that lack developed legal and regulatory frameworks or that present high investment risks. In such a system international (intergovernmental) agreements should constitute the "umbrella" supported by the host government agreements and necessary commercial contracts. The choice of the most appropriate legal regime to be employed in any particular route will have to depend upon several key factors: the nature of the project (i.e. dedicated / general use / open access pipeline), the states involved (developed / undeveloped national legal regime; level of political and economic stability), and, the international legal instruments already in place (i.e. ECT, UNCLOS, regional investment protection agreements).

Finally, it is to be pointed out that although the pipeline may face political and economic risks it also presents opportunity and potential to improve lives and unite people. To this end, however expensive, these projects are, such infrastructure can be perceived as the muscle and bone of development because they will connect not only different countries but also people of Southern Africa. Today it is the pipeline tomorrow it could be roads, railways, and communications connecting five countries in Southern Africa and then all fourteen SADC countries and eventually this could extend to other parts of Africa. On the social level therefore, the CWPP, should from start to the end involve communities along the proposed pipeline route and civil society of each participating country in order to ensure that the initiative receives acceptance by all concerned.